PROMOTING A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN AREAS AFFECTED BY ARMED CONFLICT

INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK (IPF)
2009 – 2012
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Executive summary

The eastern provinces of the DRC have suffered from intermittent but serious violence over the last six years, even as the remainder of the country has stabilized. Foreign armed groups are still active, violence against civilians remains at high levels, and an estimated two million people are displaced from their homes.

However, a window of opportunity has recently opened for political progress. One major armed group (the CNDP) and a number of smaller militias agreed in March 2009 to integrate their cadres into Government structures. Relations with Uganda and Rwanda have also improved, and reinvigorated military operations are now ongoing against the two largest armed groups: the FDLR (in North and South Kivu) and the LRA (in Uganda and Province Orientale).

Against this background, the Government finalized its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) in June 2009. To support STAREC, the United Nations system and key partners have revised the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) first developed in 2008 to better align it with Government priorities. This document – the Integrated Programme Framework – explains the resulting strategy and programmatic priorities.

The revised UNSSSS – now known as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) – comprises five key objectives:

1. **Improving security**: Create a protective environment for civilians by strengthening the security forces, and improving discipline and control; supporting the demobilization and reintegration of armed groups.

2. **Supporting political dialogue**: Help national and provincial governments to advance peace processes and implement key commitments under existing agreements.

3. **Strengthening the state**: Re-establish essential public services in areas formerly controlled by armed groups; transferring security to civilian police, and building up the rule of law.

4. **Facilitating return, reintegration & recovery**: Support the safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees, address priority social needs and key sources of conflict, and kick-start economic recovery.

5. **Combating sexual violence**: in each of the above areas, mainstream more effective prevention and response to sexual violence as contemplated in the Comprehensive Strategy on Sexual Violence.

Interventions focus on a limited number of high-priority areas critical to the overall stability of the East. These comprise areas formerly under the control of armed groups; vital economic / transport arteries; and areas which could produce a significant peace consolidation “ripple effect” for their regions.

The total funding requirements for the ISSSS are estimated at approximately 800 million USD of which 139 million USD has already been programmed as at December 2009. To help allocate resources in a flexible and effective manner, a common fund management mechanism – the Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility – has been established. The fund is managed by the UN, the GoDRC and interested donors.

This document provides an overview of the strategy and programmatic contributions through which the international community intends to support the priorities of the GoDRC “Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan”. It also describes modalities for the coordination of international stabilization efforts in eastern DRC, and the management of the common fund management facility and associated structures, which together will seek to maximize the coherence and collective impact of international support.

The ISSSS *Integrated Programme Framework* is also closely aligned with the United Nations national strategy for DRC, as articulated in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). Within this framework, the IPF provides the detailed programmatic and operational strategy for achieving strategic objectives of UN support in Eastern DRC specifically.
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I. The situation in the East

Challenges to peace

Six years after the 2003 peace accords, the Eastern provinces remain volatile.

The eastern provinces have suffered from intermittent cycles of violence following the peace accords that put an end to the political crisis in 2003, and the establishment of a democratic government in 2006.

Tensions have mainly been due to the presence of foreign and local armed groups hindering state control and preying on the civilian population. The upsurge of violence in North Kivu and Ituri in late 2008 as a result of the resumption of hostilities by the CNDP and FRPI militias created massive unrest,1 reversing the fragile progress made in peacebuilding during recent years.

Although important progress has since been made, the situation remains fragile. There is a significant risk of further violence and conflict, especially due to the continued presence of the FDLR and LRA and efforts by the GoDRC to disarm these groups.

The activities of foreign and indigenous armed groups have led to the collapse of state authority in vast areas.

Decades of misgovernance in the DRC have led to weak, unreliable security services, which are subject to parallel chains of command or private use by politicians and businessmen, prone to mutiny and coup attempts, and corrupt and predatory in nature.

As a result, government authority has been severely challenged by the wars and rebellions of the last two decades. Local militia and foreign-backed rebel movements were able to take over vast areas of Congolese territory and (in some cases) install parallel administrative structures.

Since 2003, the withdrawal of foreign armies and the integration of Congolese armed groups into the security forces have gradually led to formal unification, but there remains a substantial residual presence of foreign and indigenous rebel groups and criminal networks.

This situation challenges the ability of the central government to govern, levy taxes, restore the rule of law and protect its borders and citizens. It has also led to large-scale violence against civilians in areas where the state has attempted to suppress rebellions.

Complex layers of interests continue to undermine peace building efforts.

Economic dynamics: Decades of state absence, war and instability have transformed the socioeconomic environment. Markets, trading centres, routes, national parks, mining centres and key border crossings are subject to violent competition between residual rebel groups, marauding bandits, local identity based militia, poachers and elements of the official armed forces. This environment has driven youth and economically active elements of the population to seek protection or socio-economic emancipation in joining militias.

Ethnic violence: Tensions over resources and political power have often led to the manipulation of ethnic identities to fuel armed conflict. The return of IDPs and refugees and the renewed cultivation of land may lead to new incidents of violence or ethnic cleansing, unless robust arrangements to protect vulnerable groups and restore inter-community dialogue are in place.

Land conflicts are also rife, generated by decades of corruption, demographic changes, different cultural traditions of land tenure and misappropriation of land by powerful businessmen and warlords.

Sexual violence: Is perpetrated by armed groups, security forces and increasingly by civilians. It represents a human rights, public health and development problem that fuels local conflict dynamics.

Legitimacy of the state: In areas where the GoDRC has deployed its agents, they are often faced with local resistance. In many cases, they have started to coexist with local armed groups and criminal networks and are either unable to impose state authority or unwilling to give up their own private interests. Their indiscipline limits effectiveness, and does not build confidence in the central government.

Inaccessibility: Many areas are simply inaccessible, due to insecurity or lack of roads and basic infrastructure. This enables insurgent activity, and makes the establishment of economic activity, state security and law enforcement much more difficult.

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1 CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) and FRPI (Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri).
The current environment

Recent developments have opened a window of opportunity to consolidate peace.

By mid-2009 violence and threats to stability have been considerably reduced. This is due to:

- Improvements in diplomatic relations with Rwanda and Uganda, thereby limiting foreign support to armed groups.
- The January 2009 cease-fire with the CNDP, the arrest of Laurent Nkunda and the integration of various armed groups into the national armed forces.
- Joint operations against the major foreign armed groups: with Uganda (against the LRA) and Rwanda (against the FDLR).
- The March 2003 peace agreements between the GoDRC, the CNDP and most other armed groups in the Kivus which created a framework for reconciliation.

The GoDRC has now re-occupied most of the areas previously controlled by armed groups in North Kivu, and ex-combatants are being progressively integrated into the FARDC or demobilized and reintegrated into community life.

There are credible political frameworks to achieve this.

The Nairobi Communiqué in November 2007 demonstrated the willingness of the DRC and Rwanda to address the FDLR problem. This agreement led to joint DRC–Rwandan operations against the FDLR in early 2009.

The signing on 23 January 2008 of the Actes d'Engagement (also known as the Goma process) provided a framework for ending conflict in the Kivus. While the relevance of the Actes d'Engagement was undermined by the resumption of conflict in North Kivu in August 2008, it still serves as an overarching political framework for national and international efforts.

The 23 March Agreements signed between the government, the CNDP and eight Mayi-Mayi groups provide specific political solutions to the conflict within this broader framework.

Efforts to consolidate peace are at a critical juncture.

Political settlements remain fragile, and the current situation is characterized by:

- A delicate political and military balance due to continuing mutual suspicion on all sides, despite widespread agreements between armed groups to disengage.
- A resurgence of violence by the FDLR in North and South Kivu following the Joint Operations of January/February 2009, and continued attempts by the FARDC (with MONUC support) to counter these actions.
- Continued widespread violence in Haut-Uele District in the context of operations against the LRA.
- Continued harassment and violence against civilians by FARDC units, including by new deployments to areas previously controlled by armed groups.
- High levels of violence by rebel groups against the civilian population, including child recruitment and sexual violence.
- Each of the above factors impeding the return of over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

Furthermore, local and national elections are expected in the next several years. This represents an opportunity to improve the legitimacy and responsiveness of the state, but could also be destabilizing. Spoilers who have resorted to violence and intimidation in the past may threaten the process and/or return to violence if their interests are not met.

International support for stabilization efforts is critical to consolidate gains.

The challenges for the GoDRC are enormous and can only be tackled in a progressive manner and at critical locations. Among the key challenges:

- The FARDC, assisted by MONUC, needs to remove illegal armed groups from these areas and protect the population, allowing for civilian police and state agents to deploy unchallenged.
- A gradual demilitarisation of stable areas will then need to follow, with the garrisoning and removal of the military.
- The arrival of civilian law enforcement services to clamp down on criminals, regulate commerce and trade and administer justice.
- Restoring access to the hinterland, where residual militia are seeking sanctuary will depend on the consolidation of legitimate security in main arteries first.
- The illicit trade and private taxation of commodities needs to be brought to an end, not only by the imposition of legitimate law enforcement services and the harmonisation
of a credible taxation system but also through agreements with neighbouring countries.

- People who have been uprooted by war, both refugees and the internally displaced, and the fighters who engaged in it all need to voluntarily return and begin their lives again.
- The state needs to be made credible enough to support their protection, security and the delivery of basic social and economic services particularly health and education in order to improve the deplorable social indicators in DRC.

**Stabilization initiatives**

**STAREC – The government’s plan for the East**

The GoDRC elaborated its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) in June 2009. This plan identifies a number of priorities for the short to medium term, grouped under three components:

- **Security and restoration of state authority:** Strengthening of FARDC operational capacities; disengagement of armed groups and their integration into security forces or demobilization; protection of civilians, including action against sexual violence; bolstering police, justice and local administration services; and action against the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** Support to the voluntary return of Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons, socio-economic reintegration of these populations; and the protection of civilians including actions to combat sexual violence.

- **Economic recovery:** Support to road rehabilitation and revival of vital economic sectors, such as agriculture, husbandry, small industry; revival of economic relations with Burundi and Rwanda.

STAREC was developed on the basis of pre-existing stabilization interventions supported by the international community and the “Amani Programme” for disengagement and demobilization.

Building on on-going efforts in the Kivus and Ituri, the Plan also targets the districts of Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele in Orientale Province, Maniema Province, and the North Tanganika district of Katanga province.

**The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy**

Following the development of the Government’s plan, national and international partners agreed that the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), developed in 2008, should be adapted as the primary mechanism for international assistance within this framework.

The UNSSSS has accordingly been renamed as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS). Substantively, it has been revised to focus on four key areas and a cross-cutting component:

- Security
- Political processes
- Restoration of state authority
- Sustainable return and reintegration
- Sexual violence

In order to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of international efforts in support to the GoDRC, the ISSSS has also been expanded to comprise three main components:

- **A strategy:** The Integrated Programme Framework (IPF), which sets out objectives and underlying programs to support STAREC priorities.

- **A funding facility:** The Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility (SRFF) which provides a flexible mechanism for managing international funds for stabilization programs.

- **A secretariat:** The Stabilization Support Unit (SSU) which will support coordination, fund management, program design and monitoring / reporting.

**Relationship of the ISSSS to other frameworks**

ISSSS interventions are transitional activities which:

- **build on** emergency assistance under the Humanitarian Action Plan;

- **prioritize and accelerate** recovery and development activities that are key enablers for stabilization; and

- **fill gaps** critical to stabilization that are not already covered by other frameworks.

To ensure continuity of effort, ISSSS activities will be closely coordinated with those in other sectors, including the humanitarian clusters, the reform committees and the government’s thematic groups.

With respect to:
II. Overview of the ISSSS

Objectives

The overall objective of the ISSSS is to support national efforts to promote a secure and stable environment in key conflict-affected areas of Eastern DRC.

As such: The ISSSS aims to address specific root causes and consequences of conflict, support the implementation of peace initiatives at local level, and help stabilize areas where conflict has recently ceased. As a transitional strategy, the ISSSS will focus on urgent needs and priorities within a minimum time-frame of three years.

Five key areas of support have been identified, including a cross-cutting component.

(1) Improve security
Reduce threats to life, property and freedom of movement by:

- strengthening security forces (army and national police) in areas formerly controlled by armed groups;
- supporting the disengagement and disbanding of armed groups through either demobilization or integration into security forces; and
- improving operational and internal control systems for FARDC units to reduce rates of abuse of civilians, including sexual violence.

(2) Support political processes
Support national and provincial governments to advance peace processes by:

- helping to improve diplomatic relations between the DRC and key neighboring countries;
- identifying and sanctioning spoilers, serious human rights abusers and those involved in sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo; and
- supporting political leaders to follow through on commitments made under the Communiqués and other key agreements.

(3) Strengthen state authority
Restore and strengthen the state in areas where it has been weak or non-existent by:

- ensuring reliable road access;
- deploying police, courts and prisons to uphold the rule of law and ensure public order; and
- re-establishing decentralized administrative services.

(4) Facilitate return, reintegration, and recovery

Ensure the voluntary and safe return of refugees and IDPs, and sustainable socio-economic reintegration in their areas of origin, by:
- addressing priority social needs, restoring basic social services and infrastructure (including schools, health centers, and markets, among others);
- promoting employment generation and agricultural productivity; and
- facilitating local reconciliation and conflict resolution linked to housing, land and property issues.

(5) Combat sexual violence

Strengthen prevention, protection and responses to sexual violence by:
- combating impunity and improving access to justice;
- preventing, mitigating threats and reducing vulnerability to sexual violence;
- addressing sexual violence in security sector reform processes;
- improving access of survivors to multi-sectoral services; and
- improving data collection and mapping of cases of SV.

Guiding principles

Align with GoDRC priorities.

The development and implementation of the ISSSS will be fully aligned with the strategic and programmatic priorities articulated in STAREC and with longer-term interventions and planning frameworks, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Priority Action Plan and the Country Assistance Framework.

At the operational level, international efforts within the ISSSS will be closely coordinated with the GoDRC at central and provincial/district levels to ensure that targeting and sequencing of interventions are coordinated and in conformity with national and local priorities and needs.

At the implementation level, projects will be developed with appropriate linkages to on-going or planned long-term development and institutional capacity reform and development programs.

Close collaboration with national actors in the implementation of projects and programs will ensure (a) the proper targeting and sustainability of capacity strengthening efforts; and (b) promote transfer of knowledge and expertise between international and national actors.

Seize windows of opportunity.

Eastern DRC is characterized by simultaneous conflict and 'post-conflict' dynamics, which vary considerably between individual provinces and districts.

This context necessitates an unconventional approach to security, stabilization and recovery efforts, an approach which:
- produces immediate and visible results; positive ‘peace dividends’ for the Congolese population that help address local conflict dynamics;
- responds quickly to priority needs, supporting the rapid implementation of peace agreements;
- exploits openings to stabilize key areas and generate positive political momentum, and thereby alter the ‘calculus’ of conflict in a given area; and
- concentrates efforts and resources in areas which are currently stable in order to reduce their vulnerability to broader negative forces.

At the same time, a focus on quick and visible results should not come at the expense of longer-term sustainability. As noted above, ISSSS interventions will be in line with the principles and orientations of key reform plans for the army, the police and the justice system.

Concentrate resources in the right places.

ISSSS support to STAREC will focus on a limited number of high-priority areas. These include: areas severely affected by conflict; vital economic or transport arteries; areas formerly under the control of armed groups; and areas which if stabilized, would produce a significant “ripple effect” across a broader area.

Between July 2008 and June 2009, the efforts of the UN and its partners were focused in six ‘priority axes’ in Ituri District and the Kivus (mapped in Annex 3). Activities will continue to focus on these areas, but eventually expand, subject to available funding, to cover additional priority areas identified in the GoDRC Plan, including Haut and Bas-Uele, Maniema and North Katanga.
Efforts in the target areas are inter-dependent. Lack of adequate security, for instance, inhibits the ability of the state to provide vital services, and precludes economic recovery. Likewise, a lack of support for equitable economic reintegration or restoration of basic social services can lead to the resumption or new forms of localized conflict and violence.

This means that implementation must be tailored to realities at the provincial, district or territorial levels, which will determine the specific sequence of actions needed to achieve security, state-building and reintegration/recovery objectives, and ensure convergence across sectors for given geographical areas.

Remain flexible.

Implementation arrangements must take into account the volatility of the environment and the need to rapidly re-align and adapt interventions, resources and capacities towards opportunities as they arise. Concretely, this means:

- flexible planning and operational frameworks;
- the ability to rapidly acquire and re-orient human and logistical resources; and
- funding arrangements which allow for re-allocation and re-prioritization of resources.

Respect humanitarian space.

The implementation of the ISSSS requires interaction between military and humanitarian actors. While there are benefits to this joint approach, there is also the risk that key humanitarian principles such as impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence may be undermined. ISSSS actions are therefore guided by the ‘The Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions’² and the IASC Reference Paper: “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies”.³

Strategic orientations in target provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North &amp; South Kivu</th>
<th>Orientale</th>
<th>Maniema &amp; Katanga</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disband armed groups (Congolese and foreign) through political and military pressure; support disengagement of combatants and demobilization or integration into army and police.</td>
<td>Neutralize remnants of active militias (notably the FRPI), and extend security and access to conflict-affected areas. In other areas, consolidate current stabilization and post-conflict recovery efforts.</td>
<td>Mitigate remaining &amp; potential threats to security and stability, notably ex-combatants who have not yet been effectively reintegrated into civilian life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore and strengthen state authority and public services in areas vacated by armed groups; curtail illicit exploitation of natural resources.</td>
<td>For Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele:</td>
<td>Consolidate the authority and presence of state security and administrative services in fragile areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support return and reintegration of approximately 2 million IDPs and refugees.</td>
<td>Improve security and protection of civilians in areas affected by the conflict with the LRA.</td>
<td>Particular emphasis on supporting economic recovery in strategic areas, including areas of refugee returns, and promoting local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts to mitigate possible conflict triggers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link interventions with key political frameworks: Goma Accords, Nairobi Communiqué, Tripartite Agreements, 23 March Agreements.</td>
<td>Strengthen state security and administration capacities, in particular police, justice and local administration.</td>
<td>Reduce vulnerability of Maniema and North Katanga to conflict dynamics in adjacent provinces (especially North and South Kivu).</td>
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Major risks

Experience to date has highlighted a number of issues which condition the future success and overall impact of international efforts to stabilize Eastern DRC. These include:

- continued volatility in the political and security environment, which threatens the viability and sustainability of interventions and reverses the return of IDPs;
- a difficult operating environment, which stretches the logistical and operational capacities of partners;
- the uncertain political will of relevant actors within national and provincial governments.
- the practical difficulties faced by the GoDRC in integrating large numbers of new personnel into the army and civilian administration;
- limits to the capacity of international actors to produce results quickly, and to re-align efforts to adapt to changing conditions; and
- limited national capacities to implement necessary reforms in the army, police and justice system.

While these are serious challenges, they are not insurmountable. STAREC and the common funding mechanisms established to support it should help to strengthen partnerships, and address these challenges in a coordinated, coherent and innovative manner.

Benchmarks for success

The benchmarks against which the success of the ISSSS will be measured include:

- GoDRC security services have sufficient capacity to restore and maintain law and order in former conflict areas without resort to international peacekeeping assistance.
- The professionalism of the FARDC is strengthened through the completion of the initial phases of security sector reform; including an action plan to end recruitment of children.
- Armed groups are sufficiently weakened that they do not pose a significant threat to peace and stability.
- Essential state functions are re-established in former conflict areas, meaning improved access to justice, the restoration of law and order, and the provision of essential social services.
- Violations of human rights and impunity for violence against civilians, including sexual violence, are significantly reduced.
- Conditions are in place for the majority of IDPs and refugees to voluntarily return to their homes and begin the process of reconciliation and socio-economic reintegration.
- Basic social services, including schools, health centers and water and sanitation infrastructure are successfully restored in durable return areas targeted and there is an improvement in social indicators.
- Economic productivity improved in return areas, leading to employment creation and improved food security.
- Conflicts related to socioeconomic, ethnic and land, housing and property issues are significantly reduced.
III. Progress to date

From mid-2008 to mid-2009, partners working within the framework of the SSSS have achieved the following:

**Improving security**

**Strengthening the army:** Support to FARDC operations against the FDLR and to consolidation of integrated units. Construction of 7 temporary garrisons and works to transform 3 of these into durable buildings.

**Demobilizing combatants:** Support for integration of over 20,000 combatants into the FARDC, and demobilization and reintegration of a projected additional 3,500 combatants.

**Deploying police:** Ongoing support to training and deployment of 1,500 rapid intervention police in areas vacated by armed groups.

**Strengthening state authority**

**Re-opening key access roads:** On-going rehabilitation of six priority roads with a total combined length of over 600 kms. Creation of 3,000 jobs for local inhabitants, including ex-combatants.

**Deploying police:** 300 territorial police deployed in areas vacated by CNDP; an additional 280 to be deployed shortly in South Kivu and Ituri. Deployment of MONUC Joint Monitoring Teams to monitor performance and provide support.

**Rebuilding administration:** Construction of over 50 police posts, courts, prisons and local administration buildings is underway, to be followed by UN support for the deployment of relevant state officials.

**Supporting return and recovery**

**Return and reintegartion:** Two joint projects by UNICEF/UNDP/FAO reintegration and community recovery program started in South and North Kivu targeting over 300,000 people. UNICEF PEAR Plus programming targeting 160,000 in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga. UN-HABITAT has launched a program to support mediation of housing, land and property conflicts.

**Kick-starting economic recovery:** USAID-funded program for job creation and rehabilitation of social infrastructure in 45 localities underway in South Kivu.

IV. Component strategies

**Component 1. Improve security**

Domestic and foreign armed groups still control unacceptably large parts of eastern DRC. Over 20 groups and about 20,000 combatants operate in Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and northern Katanga.

National security forces have largely failed to disband these groups due to a variety of structural problems. At the same time, security forces are themselves the biggest single cause of violations against civilians.

**Current priority issues**

Following agreements in early 2009, a number of domestic armed groups have nominally been integrated into the army and are being utilized in military operations against foreign armed groups (notably the FDLR and the LRA).

This situation presents several serious challenges:

- **Over-militarization:** An estimated 60,000 FARDC elements in the Kivus, including combatants recently integrated into the army without any prior vetting.
- **Military confrontations and predatory activities** by combatants that are causing continuous protection incidents and large population displacements in areas that were previously stable.
- **Military and civilian criminal justice systems** that lack the capacity to investigate or prosecute crimes, resulting in an environment of generalized impunity.
- **Army integration remains fragile and depends on progressive improvement in relations between DRC and Rwanda. Issues of ranks and salaries remain a concern, with a high number of newly integrated troops still not officially enlisted.**
- **Domestic armed groups that yet need to be integrated into the army or demobilized. Some disgruntled groups that have turned away from the integration process, forging new alliances with the FDLR and/or other armed groups.**

**Component strategy**

The overall objective for the security component is to reduce threats to life, property and freedom of movement.
The key interventions to achieve this are as follows:

(i) **Strengthen FARDC capacities**

Urgently enhance the professionalism, discipline and operational effectiveness of deployed FARDC units. This support will be closely aligned with the medium and long-term actions foreseen in key reform plans.4

International support will be planned in close collaboration with the Ministry of Defense, the FARDC hierarchy and provincial authorities, and will be implemented within the phased approach foreseen in the STAREC. This comprises:

- A preparatory phase to evaluate FARDC deployments and operational needs.
- A second phase focused on the redeployment and temporary garrisoning of certain units; conditioning operational support on respect of human rights, child rights and IHL; vetting and right-sizing of the army; improving the living conditions of FARDC and their dependents; complementary training; improvement of internal control mechanisms and support to military justice.
- A third phase to further strengthen capacities of key battalions including full training, provision of non-lethal equipment for operations (conditional on respect of human rights and IHL), training on prevention of sexual violence and garrisoning.

(ii) **Support disengagement**

For armed groups which are yet to disengage, provide support to registration and processing of combatants at regroupement centers. Additionally, provide support to:

- integration of eligible combatants into the army or national police;
- community reintegration of ex-combatants eligible for demobilization but not the Programme Nationale DDR (PNDDR);
- early identification and extraction of children associated with armed groups; and
- focal points to assist and support reintegration of female ex-combatants and their dependants.

At the same time, the international community will support GoDRC efforts to avoid a security vacuum through deployment of Rapid Intervention Police.

(iii) **Protect civilians in conflict areas and disengagement zones.**

Support the GoDRC to protect civilians in conflict areas and zones from which armed groups are disengaging. The key dimensions of this work are captured in the UN’s Joint Protection Strategy, with the following key objectives:

- prevent, mitigate and anticipate protection risks by improving the UN’s monitoring and analysis capacity;
- institutionalize joint contingency planning and improve coordination; and
- enhance the UN’s reaction to protection priorities.

Military support will be provided through regular patrolling, as well as temporary deployments to increase the reach of MONUC in insecure areas. Civilian support will be provided through temporary deployments of multi-disciplinary Joint Protection Teams.

**Component 2. Support political processes**

The political context in which international partners have operated in the DRC is derived from the following international and national developments:

- the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
- the 2003 Sun City Agreements;
- the 2006 elections;
- the 2007 Nairobi Communiqué;
- the 2008 Goma Actes d’Engagement;
- the resumption of conflict in 2008 between FARDC and CNDP;
- the March 2009 agreements between the government, CNDP and other Armed Groups.

None of these agreements has been fully implemented. Instead, each has created new dynamics which have helped move the DRC forward, but left some parties believing themselves poorly served by the slow steps to replace violence with political processes. Nonetheless, in the context of the stabilization of the east, the recent rapprochement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda has changed for the better the prospects for the gradual dismantling of most armed groups.

**Current priority issues**

From the UN’s perspective, the international community needs to engage with the political context at several levels:

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4 The Revised Army Reform Plan and the Plan Intermediaire d’Urgence.
monitor and encourage national and regional processes set up to foster accountable and internationally acceptable governance;

ensure that the momentum from the March 23rd agreements is not lost and they are implemented by all parties;

expose links between political and military players and illicit traffic in weapons, minerals, charcoal and other resources; and

identify and try to help solve localized conflicts which may retard progress at the provincial level.

Component strategy

The overall objective of this component is to support national and provincial governments to advance peace processes and implement objectives identified in the Communiqués and other key agreements.

Key interventions are as follows:

(i) Improve regional relations

Improve diplomatic and bi-lateral relations with key neighboring countries through constructive dialogue.

(ii) Sanction political spoilers

Investigate, identify and sanction spoilers, i.e. people involved in hate-speeches, serious human rights violations, sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo.

(iii) Support pacification

Encourage and support political leaders to follow through on commitments that pave the way for the stabilization and pacification of eastern DRC.

Component 3. Restore and strengthen state authority

In many areas in the East, state control extends barely beyond the roads that surround large population centers. Some areas remain under the control of armed groups that have established parallel administrative structures.

Current priority issues

In 2009, administrators and militants from some armed groups have been nominally integrated into state structures. However, a real restoration of the state will require recycling of these elements: vetting, training and redeployment elsewhere.

Newly recruited and trained elements will be needed in many cases, and control and taxation systems must be established to collect revenues for the state. This will be particularly important in the context of proposed new decentralization laws to increase decision-making authority at the local level.

Component strategy

The overall objective for this component is to support the progressive restoration and strengthening of essential public services in areas where armed groups have formerly exerted control or where state presence has historically been weak.

Assistance provided within this component is expected to contribute to a resumption of normal civilian life, and to a reduction in impunity and acts of violence against civilians through the extension of law and order and access to justice. Although focused on the rapid restoration of state authority, international support will be aligned with longer-term institutional reform and capacity development processes and support frameworks.

Key interventions are as follows:

(i) Rehabilitate key access roads

Road rehabilitation will boost commercial activity, permit State access, and deny safe haven to armed groups. Priority will be given to road axes that have experienced recurrent waves of conflict as well as those linking eastern and western DRC in order to promote national unity. In addition, the use of labor-intensive methods is intended to create rapid income-generation opportunities for the local population and vulnerable subgroups.

(ii) Support the screening, training and deployment of officials

Support services including: territorial and border police; military and civilian courts; corrections; decentralized and customary local authorities; and state services responsible for regulating trade in natural resources.

(iii) Rehabilitate state infrastructure

Support local authorities to rehabilitate or rebuild essential infrastructure in priority areas, and provide necessary equipment and logistical support for the proper functioning of public services. Particular emphasis will be placed on provision of permanent hard-wall office space and housing.

(iv) Monitor, and provide capacity building and mentoring support
Accompany the deployment of state officials with capacity building measures. These will include:

- training sessions on technical areas of responsibility;
- strengthening planning, budgeting, management and decision making;
- reinforcing dialogue and cooperation between State authorities, civil society and other interest groups; and
- deployment of experts at field level to monitor, mentor and backstop deployed officials.

Component 4. Facilitate return, reintegration and recovery

OCHA estimates that there are still some 2 million persons displaced in eastern DRC. Displacement is not only a symptom, but also a cause of conflict as families lose their land, homes, and livelihoods, and communities are torn apart. The ‘durable’ return of IDPs in conditions of safety and dignity could, therefore, help reduce the risk of violent conflict and promote reconciliation.

At the same time:

- Over 60,000 Congolese refugees have voluntarily returned from Tanzania since 2005.
- An unconfirmed number of refugees from Uganda have started returning in 2009 to areas in North Kivu and Ituri District.
- A Tripartite Agreement between DRC, Rwanda and UNHCR is scheduled to be signed before the end of 2009, with UNHCR expecting to repatriate some 160,000 refugees from Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in the next two years if the security situation continues to improve.

Current priority issues

The need to undertake urgent early recovery-related activities in return areas is evident in view of the ongoing humanitarian needs in many areas. Given the long years of conflict, it is important that these activities are accompanied by peace and reconciliation initiatives to reduce local tensions among returning communities, and a focus on the swift reintegration of ex-combatants as well as community development projects to help promote recovery and make the shift from relief to development assistance.

Component strategy

The overall objective of this component is to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees and IDPs, and their sustainable socio-economic reintegration in areas of origin.

Activities will focus on those areas where security and accessibility have improved to allow for the durable return of IDPs. This will be linked with pre-defined benchmarks for safe\(^5\) and dignified\(^6\) return of civilian populations; and efforts to ensure that IDPs and refugees are free to choose their areas of return.\(^7\)

Within these target areas, the RRR component is divided into four sub-components:

(i) Prepare for voluntary and safe return

Preparatory activities to create a protective environment conducive to return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. Focus will be on: (a) assessing potential return areas; (b) sensitizing refugees and IDPs and facilitating well-informed decisions on return; and (c) ensuring the absorptive capacity and willingness of receiving communities.

(ii) Support basic needs and restore basic social services

It is clear that needs remain enormous in return areas even a long time after people return home,\(^8\) and that early recovery assistance is needed to help transition from relief to development. Efforts will focus on the following activities:

- Transitional shelter
- Health services
- HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
- Water, sanitation and hygiene
- Education
- Protection and child protection
- Prevention and response to sexual violence
- Food security

(iii) Boost livelihoods and economic productivity

\(^5\) In which displaced people can return under conditions of legal, physical and material security.

\(^6\) In which displaced people are not harassed either on departure, en route or upon arrival, are not separated from their family members, are allowed to return without preconditions, are accepted and welcomed by national and local authorities and local populations, and their rights and freedoms are fully restored so that they can start a meaningful life with self-esteem and self-confidence.

\(^7\) The majority of IDP return movements in the DRC are ‘spontaneous’ and therefore ‘assisted’ returns will only be considered in exceptional cases for vulnerable groups.

Support for creation of livelihoods (particularly in the agriculture sector) and jump-starting economic productivity is essential for reducing vulnerability and preventing new forms of conflict. Efforts will focus on enhancing communities’ assets and capabilities to re-energize local economies and improving food security; reduce individual and collective vulnerability through income-generating activities and measures to enhance economic productivity.

(iv) Local peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict resolution

Strengthen community capacities through participatory decision-making mechanisms, including a focus on dialogue and the peaceful resolution of differences. Priority interventions will include strengthening of conflict resolution mechanisms (especially property disputes), promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, and measures to reduce armed violence at community level (including community disarmament).

Organization of work

Although divided into four sub-components, the RRR component will be coordinated as one programmatic strategy at provincial and local levels to ensure a comprehensive, integrated, and ultimately sustainable approach.

RRR interventions will be delivered in two ways:

- individual/family assistance provided on the basis of assessed vulnerabilities; and
- community-based assistance: rehabilitation of basic services such as schools and clinics and roads, community empowerment projects, community-based sexual violence prevention, etc.

Special attention will be given to a number of vulnerable groups. These include female-headed households, victims of sexual violence, pregnant and lactating women, separated / abducted women, handicapped individuals (including amputees and war-wounded), orphans, the infirm and elderly as well as the orphans and widows of security forces, children associated with armed groups and unaccompanied minors.

Component 5: Combat sexual violence

Sexual violence has become a prominent feature of the protracted conflict in the East. Violence is perpetrated by militias, governmental security forces and increasingly by civilians.

To help establish a more coherent and consistent response to this problem, the UN developed in 2008 the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in cooperation with the GoDRC and in consultation with relevant national and international partners. The Strategy has been endorsed by the international community and by the government of DRC.

The Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence is fully mainstreamed in the various components of the STAREC and the ISSSS. For clarity of reference, it has also been programmatically integrated as the 5th thematic component of the ISSSS and will serve in this regard as the framework for the implementation of specific SV interventions in Eastern DRC. The strategy will be reported on and monitored in stand-alone fashion, but also as part of the broader framework of the STAREC/ISSSS.

The Strategy will also serve as the strategic/operational framework of the Strategie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Violences Basees sur le Genre developed by the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, in respect to those activities specifically related to Sexual Violence and for areas affected by conflict and transition focusing on Eastern DRC, the National Strategy being a larger conceptual framework addressing all types of gender based violence with a long term perspective.

Component strategy

The overall objective of the Comprehensive Strategy is to create a common framework for all those involved in combating sexual violence in DRC, with a view to improving prevention and response to sexual violence and improved coordination and coherence.

The Comprehensive Strategy comprises five areas of intervention:

(i) Combating impunity

Four objectives are identified: (1) strengthen the capacities of judicial institutions and develop a criminal justice policy focused on sexual violence, (adopting a victim-centered approach); (2) improve access to justice for victims; (3) guarantee the effective application of the 2006 DRC Laws on Sexual Violence; (4) ensure reparation for victims of sexual violence.

(ii) Prevention and protection

The following objectives are central to addressing sexual violence as part of the broader protection of civilians agenda in the DRC: (1) prevent and/or mitigate threats and reduce vulnerability and exposure to sexual violence; (2) strengthen the
resilience of survivors of sexual violence; and (3) create a protective environment.

(iii) Security sector reform
A vital facet of this component is to link with ongoing justice reform initiatives especially military justice, the demobilization and disengagement plans for armed groups and the reform of the FARDC.

To accomplish this, three objectives have been identified: (1) Accountability: security agents and forces need to both prevent and respond effectively to sexual violence and ensure that any perpetrators of SV crimes are held accountable; (2) Vetting: reform processes for security agents and forces need to incorporate mechanisms aimed at excluding individuals who lack integrity, in line with international human rights standards and best practices; and (3) DDR/Brassage: the disarmament and disengagement processes need to include special procedures to assist survivors of sexual violence.

(iv) Multi-sectoral response for survivors
The primary aims of this component are to improve access of survivors of sexual violence to multi-sectoral services and to establish minimum standards for the provision of assistance.

The two overall objectives are: (1) improve the referral pathway for a multi-sectoral response for survivors of sexual violence at the community and local level and to coordinate the scaled-up delivery of services; and (2) develop a National Protocol for Multi-sectoral Assistance amongst the relevant DRC Ministries. This will consist of four sub-protocols on the provision of assistance in the following sectors: medical, mental health, judicial and reintegration.

(v) Data collection and mapping
The aim of this component will be to coordinate the development and management of a system for an improved centralized database on sexual violence.

The expected result is to develop a database that allows for a clearer indication of the patterns of and response to sexual violence in the DRC, providing details on incidents, victims, perpetrators, and on judicial, medical, psychosocial responses, as well as reintegration, and protection. The system should also improve the centralization and analysis of data from several partners. This would also allow for a better platform to analyze trends and actual and potential hotspots.

V. Implementation

Programming
The key programming tool for the ISSSS is the Results Framework (Annex 1). This defines expected outcomes outputs under the five components, and the activities that are expected to support these outcomes.

The Results Framework will be the main tool for:
(a) managing the project design and approval process under the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility; and
(b) measuring progress under the Strategy and adjusting work as needed.

The IPF will be revised on a yearly basis. However, a mid-year review of the Results Framework will allow for strategic and operational revisions to be made.

Resource mobilization
The ISSSS budget (in annex 2) estimates resource requirements for the interventions set out in the Results Framework. The estimates are based on current interventions and are intended to be indicative only. Additional budgetary revisions will be made on the basis of further needs assessments in target provinces.

The IPF is intended to serve as the general framework on the basis of which implementing partners will develop and submit detailed proposals and budgets to request funding.

Contributions to the ISSSS made through the Stabilization and Recovery Fund and/or parallel contributions supporting activities within the programme framework will be recorded to track and monitor support to these interventions. The ISSSS budget and tracking of allocations will be up-dated and shared every three months.

Other donor interventions in the eastern provinces related to but not specifically reflected in the programme framework will be monitored through the Platforme de Gestion de L’aide managed by the Ministry of Planning.

The Stabilization and Recovery Fund
The Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility (SRFF) is intended to: (1) provide a coherent strategic international framework for supporting and complementing GoDRC efforts to stabilize Eastern DRC, and allocating and managing resources to this end; and (2) ensure that the international community is able to respond quickly
and effectively to changes on the ground and address new priorities as they emerge.

The SRFF will be linked to the STAREC Steering Committee, from which it will receive broad strategic orientations, and to which it will report on financial allocations and delivery. The key features of the Fund Management Facility include:

- A common mechanism for allocating and managing financial resources from the international community in support of GoDRC stabilization and reconstruction priorities, including dual fund management arrangements (pooled and parallel funding modalities) and including the possibility of specific earmarking per component.
- A programmatic focus on short and medium-term interventions (2-3 years) intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development plans, while ensuring consistency and continuity between the different phases of international assistance.
- A streamlined governance structure for setting allocation priorities and disbursing funds against approved projects, optimized for speed and flexibility.
- Close integration with national coordination structures on stabilization to ensure: (a) that international funding allocations correspond to national priorities; and (b) participation of national actors in the development and monitoring of projects funded by international donors.

Organizations eligible to receive funds to include UN agencies, international and national NGOs, Government agencies, the private sector and other multilateral organizations with proven implementation capacity.

The United Nations will accordingly organize its efforts around the following:

- **Coordination and oversight**: Support to overall coordination of international efforts within the STAREC / ISSSS framework. A key responsibility will be regular monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of international efforts.
- **Strategic and technical advice**: Support to development of strategies, policies and programs within the STAREC/ISSSS framework, with a particular focus on strengthening national capacities.
- **Project implementation**: The UN system will directly contribute to results within the STAREC framework in areas where it has a demonstrated in-house capacities and where national capacity is either weak or lacking. Direct implementation will not serve as a substitute for national engagement, and will be structured to ensure strengthening of national capacities and an eventual hand-over to appropriate GoDRC agencies.

**Systems and processes**

The coordination and management of ISSSS activities will be closely linked to the national coordination structures established under the Government’s STAREC plan.

**At the Kinshasa level:**

- STAREC Oversight Committee: Chaired by the Prime Minister and composed by relevant Ministries and international partners. Provides strategic oversight and determines policy and priorities.
- STAREC Technical Teams: Working groups led by GoDRC counterparts with UN and international partners. Provide sectoral oversight, review and approve concept notes.
- Stabilization Funding Board: Review and approval of projects for funding. Oversight of delivery.
- Stabilization Donor Group: International community policy and programme oversight.
- UN Stabilization Policy Working Group of the IMPT: Internal UN policy oversight. Principals level.

**At the regional level:**

- Inter-provincial STAREC coordination.
- Stabilization Programme Group (regional IMPT): Oversight and coordination of programme development, implementation / delivery, monitoring and evaluation; forum for decision-making and provision of guidance on programmatic issues.
At the provincial level

- Joint Technical Committees (CTC): Oversight and operational coordination of STAREC activities. Composed of provincial and international partners.
- Provincial IMPTs: Oversight and operational coordination of ISSSS activities. Composed of lead UN entities and all implementing partners (UN and non UN).

Component coordination.

The efforts of UN and international partners will also be coordinated at the sub-component level by designated MONUC sections and UN agencies selected on the basis of their established lead role functions and mandates in DRC.

Key functions of sub-component leads include:

- Ensuring the coherence and overall harmonization of international support within a given component and mobilizing other actors e.g. NGOs.
- Supporting the development of common criteria, standardized procedures for monitoring and evaluation, and joint program frameworks at the component level.
- Facilitating the development of territorial, district, provincial and regional strategies, identifying priorities, gaps and funding requirements.
- Serving as the focal point for the international community within the framework of the STAREC structures, and in particular the Technical Teams.
- Facilitating and supporting the development of project proposals within the STAREC framework, in close collaboration with the Technical Teams, the Stabilization Support Unit, Sexual Violence Unit and the Provincial Joint Technical Committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Sub-component</th>
<th>Lead agencies for support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improve security</td>
<td>1.1 Strengthening of FARDC capacities</td>
<td>MONUC SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Disengagement of armed groups</td>
<td>MONUC DDR/RR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.3 Reintegration of combatants</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.4. Protection of civilians</td>
<td>MONUC POC/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political processes</td>
<td>1.1 Strengthening of FARDC capacities</td>
<td>MONUC SSR</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. State authority</td>
<td>3.1 Rehabilitation of roads</td>
<td>WFP (logistic cluster)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Deployment of the police</td>
<td>UNPOL</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Deployment of</td>
<td>MONUC Rule</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Return, reintegration and recovery</th>
<th>4.1 Basic needs and basic services</th>
<th>UNHCR / UNICEF/WFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Livelihoods and economic productivity</td>
<td>UNDP / FAO / WFP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.3 Local peacebuilding</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>5. Combat sexual violence</th>
<th>5.1. Impunity</th>
<th>MONUC/ OHCHR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2. Protection and Prevention</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3. Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>MONUC SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4. Multi-sectoral assistance</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>5.5. Data and mapping</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
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</table>

Stabilization Support Unit

The Stabilization Support Unit, established within the Integrated Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC/RR in Goma, coordinates and supports the implementation of the ISSSS. The primary objective of the SSU is to ensure the programmatic and financial coherence and coordination of international support within the framework of the GoDRC Plan.

Specific functions include:

- providing strategic analysis and policy advice to provincial, national authorities, UN senior management and international partners on stabilization and recovery issues;
- coordinating operational oversight over implementation of stabilization and recovery interventions supported or implemented by the international community;
- serving as a resource on programmatic issues, including assisting the development and review of project proposals for funding and programmatic strategies;
- coordinating assessment of performance against stabilization and recovery objectives, and facilitating reporting to donors, the Security Council and other stakeholders; and
- promoting, in close collaboration with national authorities, enhanced awareness and understanding of stabilization.
Measuring performance

Monitoring and evaluation of the ISSSS strategy will have three major components:

Progress measures at the outcome (sub-component) level under the ISSSS, and for the overall objectives of each component. Data on each outcome will be collected by partners with expertise and resources in that area.

Periodic reporting on progress measures. The Stabilization Support Unit will act as a technical secretariat to compile this information and present it for decision-making at the provincial, regional and national levels.

Policy review through the Stabilization Fund Board and STAREC Comité de Suivi. Robust data on outcomes will be used to evaluate progress under each component and against the objectives of the Strategy as a whole, and feed into the biannual review of the Results Framework and IPF.
Annex 1. Results framework

**Objective 1: SECURITY**

*Threats to life, property and freedom of movement are significantly reduced.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Outcomes</th>
<th>Outcome Indicators</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
<th>Areas of Intervention</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Threats posed by armed groups reduced through the sustainable integration of vetted combatants into the FARDC.</td>
<td>• Targets for integration set pursuant to 23 March Agreements are met.</td>
<td>1.1 Identification, selection and training of combatants into the FARDC is successfully accomplished.</td>
<td>North Kivu, South Kivu</td>
<td>End 2009</td>
<td>TBD Partners:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• % of these units which have gone through a credible vetting process.</td>
<td>1.2 International support is conditional upon screening of FARDC elements for human rights violations.</td>
<td>North Kivu, South Kivu</td>
<td>Jan 2010</td>
<td>MONUC OHCHR, EUSEC, Partners: Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Security improved and threats posed by armed groups neutralized through more effective and organized FARDC operations.</td>
<td>• # FARDC Battalions screened, trained, equipped and redeployed.</td>
<td>2.1 Integrated FARDC units transferred to Brassage Centers for basic training, and supported through provision of food, medical and other services.</td>
<td>All areas Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Jan 2010 – 2011</td>
<td>MONUC Force, EUSEC Partners: EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• % FARDC elements paid on time.</td>
<td>2.2 Battalion-level training (MTP+) provided to FARDC units deployed in East.</td>
<td>Ituri, North Kivu</td>
<td>Jan 2010 – 2011</td>
<td>SMI Partners: MONUC DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Redeployment of 15 FARDC trained battalions and their dependents facilitated through provision of food, medical and logistical assistance.</td>
<td>Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema</td>
<td>Jun 2010 – 2011</td>
<td>MONUC Force, OHCHR Partners: Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Non-lethal operational support provided to FARDC units involved in Operations Kimia II and Rudia.</td>
<td>Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu</td>
<td>2010 – 2011</td>
<td>MONUC Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Security of local populations enhanced through improved FARDC conduct and discipline.</td>
<td>• % of allegations of HR violations reported through MONUC HR that implicate FARDC</td>
<td>3.1 FARDC dependents are relocated to permanent barracks outside population centers.</td>
<td>Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema</td>
<td>Jan 2010</td>
<td>MONUC Force, IOM Partners: UK, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• % FARDC units in purpose-built housing</td>
<td>3.2 Permanent FARDC deployments in the East are housed in permanent barracks.</td>
<td>Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
<td>UNDP, MONUC Force, IOM Partners: UK, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Component III, Obj B of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC.
| 3.3 | FARDC units have effective weapons control systems in place. | Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema | Dec 2010 | UNDP Partners: |
| 3.4 | FARDC units are paid their salary entitlements on full and in time. | All areas Eastern DRC | 2009 – 2011 | EUSEC Partners: |
| 3.5 | Widows and families of combatants are relocated or repatriated to locations of their choosing. | All areas Eastern DRC | Dec 2010 | Partners: |

| 4. | Impunity for human rights violations and crimes committed by FARDC soldiers significantly reduced. | | | |
| 4.1 | Military justice systems strengthened through technical and material support, including development of specialized expertise in SV. | All areas Eastern DRC | 2009 – 2011 | MONUC RoL, OHCHR Partners: |
| 4.2 | Military justice systems strengthened through creation of Parquets Secondaires of the Tribunaux de Grande Instance and Brigades judiciaires militaires. | | | |
| 4.3 | Relevant aspects of criminal law, humanitarian law and military law are mainstreamed into FARDC training. | | | |

| 5. | The professionalism and competency of the FARDC improved through the demobilization of excedent elements and their integration into social services. | | | |
| 5.1 | Elements of the FARDC are demobilized voluntarily or following a vetting process. | North Kivu, South Kivu | 2009 – 2011 | |
| 5.2 | Public service units created with demobilized / vetted combatants. | | | |

| 6. | Insecurity and acts of violence attributable to armed groups significantly decrease through their demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. | | | |
| 6.1 | Regroupement centres are constructed and supported by transport, feeding, and registration of combatants. | North Kivu, South Kivu | 2009 – 2010 | IOM, MONUC Partners: Germany, UK UNDP Partners: |
| 6.2 | Ex-combatants who are ineligible for national DDR processes are demobilised through short-term employment and integration into community recovery projects. | | | |
6.3 Rwandan FDLR ex-combatants are demobilised and repatriated.
6.4 Children associated with armed groups are identified and extracted at the start of the disengagement process.
6.5 DDR programs include special measures for women associated with armed groups and their dependants.

7. Violence against at-risk populations prevented or mitigated through direct protection measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Reliable road access to key population centres is restored and maintained.</th>
<th>7.1 MONUC forces are deployed to “must protect areas” to deter violence against civilians.</th>
<th>Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri</th>
<th>2009 – 2010</th>
<th>MONUC (CAS), UNHCR Partners: MONUC (CAS), UNHCR Partners: MONUC (CAS), UNHCR Partners: MONUC Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• # km of roads meeting minimum vehicle speed spec</td>
<td>• # reported incidents of violence against civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Net # civilians displaced, month-on-month</td>
<td>• Joint Protection Teams missions deployed to “must protect areas” to set-up local civil / military protection mechanisms.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• A mapping of local conflicts and stakeholders is made.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MONUC patrols dismantle illegal barriers in course of their regular activities.</td>
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</table>

**Objective 3: STATE AUTHORITY**

*Public security, access to justice and administrative services progressively restored and strengthened in key affected areas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Outcomes</th>
<th>Outcome Indicators</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
<th>Areas of Intervention</th>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Responsibilities (Output levels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reliable road access to key population centres is restored and maintained.</td>
<td>• # km of roads meeting minimum vehicle speed spec</td>
<td>1.1 Roads are cleared and rehabilitated through a combination of labour-intensive methods and mechanised rehabilitation.</td>
<td>Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga</td>
<td>2009 – 2011</td>
<td>UNOPS, MONUC Force, ACTED Partners: Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, USA, UK, EC, DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Essential road structures (culverts, retaining walls, bridges) are built using labour-intensive methods.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Local populations and local authorities have capacity to maintain durability and sustainability of roads.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Short-term employment opportunities created for local populations and ex-combatants through road rehabilitation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Public security restored in high-risk areas through temporary deployments of Rapid Intervention Police.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Refresher training provided to three PIR battalions. North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, OHCHR Partners: Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Support for three battalions: construction of temporary camps, communications, transport and logistics assistance. North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, OHCHR Partners: Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Monitoring and backstopping of deployed units through UN Joint Monitoring Teams. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, GTZ, OHCHR Partners: Netherlands, Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Refresher training provided to three PIR battalions. North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, OHCHR Partners: Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Support for three battalions: construction of temporary camps, communications, transport and logistics assistance. North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, OHCHR Partners: Germany</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Monitoring and backstopping of deployed units through UN Joint Monitoring Teams. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM, GTZ, OHCHR Partners: Netherlands, Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Public order and community security is established through a permanent policing presence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Durable infrastructure (including family accommodation), non-lethal equipment and transport provided for new deployments of Police National Congolaise. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, UNOPS, GTZ, OHCHR Partners: Netherlands, Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>800 Border Police are selected, screened trained and deployed, and supported through the construction of police stations and provision of equipment and logistics support. Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, IOM Partners: USA, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Operational support provided on a temporary basis by MONUC Formed Police Units. Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu 2009 – 2010 UNPOL</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Operational capacity of deployed police units improved through mentoring support by Joint Monitoring Teams. Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu 2009 – 2010 UNPOL, OHCHR Partners: Sweden, Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Access to justice and prosecution of crimes improves through the restoration of the penal chain.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Competent judiciary and corrections personnel are selected and deployed. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (RoL, OHCHR), UNDP, REJUSCO, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Courts and prisons rehabilitated or constructed, and provided with essential equipment. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (RoL, OHCHR), UNDP, REJUSCO, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, EC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Skills and competencies of deployed justice and corrections staff enhanced through training and capacity development support. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (RoL, OHCHR), UNDP, REJUSCO, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Core administrative and technical public services are restored at decentralised levels of administration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Disseminate relevant laws and texts on decentralization, public finance and planning, among others. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (CAS), UNDP, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Skills and competencies of local administrative personnel enhanced through training. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (CAS), UNDP, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, UK</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Assist local government to rationalize and strengthen finances. Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga 2009 – 2011 MONUC (CAS), UNDP, UNOPS Partners: Netherlands, UK</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Objective 4: RETURN, REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY

**Conflict-affected communities successfully reintegrate displaced populations, reconcile and begin socio-economic recovery.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Outcomes</th>
<th>Outcome Indicators</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
<th>Areas of Intervention</th>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Responsibilities (Output levels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Basic social needs of returning populations and receiving communities are met, including through restoration of key social | • Crude mortality rate  
• % coverage for key vaccinations | **1.1 Health:** Support for strengthening of local health services and provision of direct medical assistance including provision of treatment and psychosocial support for victims of sexual | Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga | 2009 – 2011 | UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO  
**Partners:** Dutch, |
1. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH): Improved quality of drinking water, expanded access to hygienic latrines and improved family hygiene practices. Partners: UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

2. Education: Expanded access to education materials, training of teachers, rehabilitation of schools, increased participation of parents in school management, access to school meals, and enhanced opportunities for youth for vocational training and participation in community life. Partners: UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

3. Transitional shelter: Support for local construction material production, organization of shelter committees, and provision of low-cost housing for urban refugees through a micro-credit scheme. Partners: UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

4. HIV/AIDS: Rate of HIV/AIDS infection and transmission reduced through inclusion of ARVs in repatriation kits and support to 10 health zones in main return areas. Partners: UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

5. Protection: (a) prevention of statelessness through improved access to personal documentation and legal assistance; (b) Security measures to increase protection of survivors; (c) activities to reduce stigma of survivors; (d) support for the protection of vulnerable children (including CAAGs), (e) family reunification; (f) Pre and post-return protection monitoring to ensure that return and reintegration takes place in safety and dignity; (g) promotion of durable solutions to the plight of refugees in Congolese soil. Partners: UNICEF, UNHCR

6. Social and economic empowerment promoted through increased access to skills and vocational training, with a particular focus on women, youth and other vulnerable groups. Partners: UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP

**2. Conditions for economic recovery in return areas improved.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component IV, Obj A of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC.</th>
<th>SIDA, USAID, MDG Fund</th>
<th>Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga</th>
<th>UNICEF, UNHCR Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• % access to improved sanitation and gender-based violence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH): Improved quality of drinking water, expanded access to hygienic latrines and improved family hygiene practices.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Education: Expanded access to education materials, training of teachers, rehabilitation of schools, increased participation of parents in school management, access to school meals, and enhanced opportunities for youth for vocational training and participation in community life.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4 Transitional shelter: Support for local construction material production, organization of shelter committees, and provision of low-cost housing for urban refugees through a micro-credit scheme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5 HIV/AIDS: Rate of HIV/AIDS infection and transmission reduced through inclusion of ARVs in repatriation kits and support to 10 health zones in main return areas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Protection: (a) prevention of statelessness through improved access to personal documentation and legal assistance; (b) Security measures to increase protection of survivors; (c) activities to reduce stigma of survivors; (d) support for the protection of vulnerable and war-affected children (including CAAGs), (e) family reunification; (f) Pre and post-return protection monitoring to ensure that return and reintegration takes place in safety and dignity; (g) promotion of durable solutions to the plight of refugees in Congolese soil.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Social and economic empowerment promoted through increased access to skills and vocational training, with a particular focus on women, youth and other vulnerable groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Individual, household and community incomes increase as a result of livelihoods and income-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**25**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.3</th>
<th>Agricultural productivity and long-term food security promoted through support for food processing, alternative fuel and cooking methods, seed distribution, strengthening of agricultural production capacities, market rehabilitation and cash voucher / food for work schemes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Increased local production and increased employment through the “Purchase for Progress” initiative to encourage improved agricultural practices, improved transport infrastructure and better access to markets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3. Key causes of conflict at community level successfully mitigated or prevented.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>Local reconciliation and peacebuilding promoted through participatory conflict analyses, community and inter-ethnic dialogue, communication and sensitization campaigns, and strengthening of local mechanisms and capacities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Conflicts related to housing, land and property disputes are reduced and addressed through the establishment of mediation centers in 50 return areas, support for the deployment of professional local mediators, and provision of technical assistance for the development of policy and legislation on land administration and urban spatial development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Reduction in armed violence and proliferation of small arms and light weapons achieved through voluntary disarmament schemes, support for the creation of alternative livelihoods, and strengthening of provincial and local capacities to address weapons proliferation and use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- # sensitization sessions conducted

**Partners:**

- Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga
- UNDP, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT
Objective 5: COMBATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Outcomes</th>
<th>Outcome Indicators</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
<th>Areas of Intervention</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME 1: Combating impunity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 The justice system offers adequate services to children survivors of sexual violence.</td>
<td>National level / Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Jan – June 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and relevant judicial authorities MONUC/UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The capacities of judicial institutions are strengthen and a criminal justice policy centred on sexual violence is developed.</td>
<td># of directives and guidelines regarding international standards of children;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td># of qualified staff assisting children in courts and tribunals;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of infrastructures installed in No. of courts and tribunals.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ToR for specialised investigation bodies is adopted, the specific roles and the coordination as laid out in the penal procedure framework is enforced.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establish the procedure of nomination process of personnel of sexual violence specialised corps within each province.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A centralised system registering cases of sexual violence, shared with the police, the courts and the tribunals is operational.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No. of female employees within the judicial personnel is increased.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard training modules for judicial military and civilian personnel are developed.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of infrastructures of prosecutor's offices, courts and tribunals rehabilitated. No of open cabinet consultations by the judges for survivors and lawyers. No. of registry and secretary supported.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A joint circular is agreed and published between the Justice and the Health ministries.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of legal and medical trainings for physicians and medical staff.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of staff qualified in psychology to attend further training in clinical psychology and psycho legal expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.2 A judicial expertise on sexual violence is developed and a ‘fast track’ procedure is established to investigate, prosecute and judge sexual violence cases.</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Level / Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Jan – June 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and relevant judicial authorities, Ministry of Interior and Provincials Inspections of the PNC UNJHRO, UNFPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 In line with A.2, the SV focal points in tribunals are trained.</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Level / Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Jan – June 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of justice and justice authorities MONUC/OHCHR REJUSCO, UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.4 A standardized medical certificate (in accordance with the Road Map) is adopted, distributed and applied</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Level / Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Jan – June 2010</td>
<td>Justice and Health Ministries, relevant judicial authorities, UNJHRO REJUSO, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.5 Directives regarding the psycho-legal expertise of sexual violence survivors are developed</td>
<td></td>
<td>National level/Coverage of the Eastern</td>
<td>Jan – June 2010</td>
<td>Justice and Health Ministries, relevant judicial authorities, UNJHRO, REJUSO, WHO,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of social workers and psychologists working with the judicial system.</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
|   | # of meetings  
# evaluation reports. | 1.1.6 *Staffing* and mission coordinating the activities relevant to the combating against impunity for sexual violence cases | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | MONUC/UNJHRO |
| 2.1 Access to justice for survivors is improved. | # of NGOs and paralegals supported in each rural region.  
Adoption and use of standardised material.  
# of filed cases forwarded by paralegals to lawyers. | 2.1.1 Capacities and logistic of those in first contact with the survivors are reinforced. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | # of public information campaigns on survivors rights: radio spots, posters, leaflets | 2.1.2 Advices to survivors regarding their rights and procedures to bring their cases to justice are given. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | # of survivors and witnesses and those who assist them transported.  
# of alleged perpetrators transported to detention centers | 2.1.3 Logistic help to facilitate transport of survivors, witnesses and alleged perpetrators is provided. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | # of investigation teams deployed.  
# of defence lawyers and judges in mobile courts  
# of investigation and training kits distributed  
# of mobile courts set up. | 2.1.4 Deployment of mobile investigation teams and mobile courts. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | # of CIATs, secretaries, registries, prosecutions and courts reinforced in rural regions. | 2.1.5 The judicial institutions are decentralised to rural areas. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | # of escorts, in house surveillance systems, secure living shelters, etc.  
# of cases of protection, confidentiality and safety measures during trials.  
Standard training material provided.  
# of cases and jurisprudence on threats of sexual violence. | 2.1.6 Systems for the protection of threatened survivors, witnesses and judicial actors are set up. | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
|   | Circular on exoneration adopted | 2.1.7 Survivors are declared exempt from legal fees (in accordance with the Road Map). | 2009–2011 | Justice ministries, relevant legal authorities, UNJHRO. |
| 3.1 The application of the 2006 Law on Sexual Violence is effective | Circular adopted | 3.1.1 Clarification of the implementation of the 2006 law. | National level / Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | Justice ministries, relevant legal authorities, UNJHRO. |
|   | Review study documenting the application of the penal code and procedure. | 3.1.2 Analysis of judgment and sexual violence cases | Eastern DRC | 2009–2011 | UNJHROPNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs. |
### OUTCOME 2: Prevention and Protection against sexual violence.

#### 2.1 Threats are prevented or mitigated and vulnerability and exposure to sexual violence is reduced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Definition of indicators on data collection and a policy (SOPs) for personnel gathering information</td>
<td>2.1.1 The profiles of the perpetrators, survivors and the threats are identified.</td>
<td>SK, NK, Ituri, etc.Territoires etc Shabunda Masisi, Mwengia, Lubero etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- # of profiles developed per type of crimes, survivors and perpetrators in the region.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009–2010 Cluster protection : HCR, UNFPA, Oxfam Québec, NRC, Pain pour les Déshérités, Arche d'Alliance, ASADHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- # of risk assessment developed per situation</td>
<td>2.1.2 Common analysis of sexual violence risks</td>
<td>SK, NK, Ituri, etc.Territoires etc Shabunda Masisi, Mwengia, Lubero etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Information is synthesized and coordinated</td>
<td>SK, NK, Ituri, etc.; Territoires etc; Shabunda Masisi, Mwenga, Lubero etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Best practices in prevention by implicated local communities are reinforced and practical measures to reduce the vulnerability are implemented</td>
<td>South Kivu; Irumu territory, Ituri district; MASISI, RUTSHURU, NYIRAGONGO, WALIKALE territories and the town of KARISIMBI, Haut Uele.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5</td>
<td>Directives against sexual violence are operational</td>
<td>National level / Eastern stabilisation region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.6</td>
<td>Programmatic activities are adapted to limit sexual violence risks.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.7</td>
<td>Campaigns on sensitization and information against sexual violence are reinforced</td>
<td>Ituri, Haut&amp;Bas Uélé, NK, SK and North Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Impact of sexual violence on individuals and communities is reduced.</td>
<td>Moba, Pweto and Kalémie; all SK and NK territories;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Social stigma aof survivors is prevented and reduced</td>
<td>All territories of SK and NK; Djugu, Mahagi, Irumu (Ituri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>Sexual violence is prevented through advocacy</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>Regulations of the disciplinary orders to prevent sexual violence implemented.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
identified.

• Comparison of No. of report of cases referred to justice and No. of reported cases.
• # of modules developed
• # of trainings conducted
• # of awareness sessions

• Unique training modules are validated
• # of training sessions
• # of specialised cells against sexual violence created in CIAT and sub CIATs
• # of daily monitoring activities carried out.
• # of reception and audition facilities improved and adapted to survivors of sexual violence
• # of cases referred to the social services

3.1.2 Anti sexual violence cells of the National Congolese Police are created inside each police station office and each sub-office in accordance with the A2 activity Combating impunity on specialized sexual violence judicial corps.

Eastern DRC 2009–2011 UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNJHRO/

• # of rooms rehabilitated and adapted for the assistance of survivors
• # cases referred to other services
• # awareness sessions
• # of penal sanctions imposed on police officers and disseminated

3.1.3 Improved assistance of survivors in the preliminary phase of enquiry

Eastern DRC 2009–2011 UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNJHRO

3.1.4 National Congolese Police agents are aware of the detrimental effects of sexual violence.

Eastern DRC 2009–2011 UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNDP

3.2 Special procedures to assist the survivors of sexual violence are included in the DDR process

• # of identified cases referred to a specialised program on SV

3.2.1 Women who are survivors of sexual violence are separated from the armed groups and receive specialised programs


3.3 Vetting is implemented

• # of persons excluded from the support of MONUC

3.3.1 Individuals against whom there are substantial allegations of HR abuses are excluded from MONUC support structures

Eastern DRC 2009–2011 SSR coordination/UNJHRO

• # of persons removed for army ranks

3.3.2 Individuals against whom there are substantial allegations for committing HR abuses are removed from the army

Eastern DRC 2009–2011 SSR coordination/UNJHRO

OUTCOME 4: Multi-sectoral response to survivors of sexual violence

4.1 Survivors of sexual violence can access essential services

• # of health zones with a functional reference system % health zones per province

4.1.1 Responsibility and coordination of actors involved in multi-sectoral response per health zone

Eastern DRC 2010–2011 The Focal Points; the relevant ministries (Gender, Social Affairs Justice and Health Ministries, and all their subdivisions; sexual violence

• # of appointed focal points managing the reference system per health zone

4.1.2 Coordination of services is facilitated by focal points

Eastern DRC 2010–2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1 Essential services</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of distributed leaflets ; No of referred survivors identified through the reference system</td>
<td>4.1.3</td>
<td>Potential survivors are aware of how and where to seek assistance</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 working groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral coordination), UNFPA (medical sub-component coordination), UN agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of cases who access services by using agreed forms</td>
<td>4.1.4</td>
<td>Agreement on a standardize form and its regular use</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of service providers who apply SOP according to the follow up evaluation</td>
<td>4.1.5</td>
<td>A clear orientation system exists in each entry point so that survivors are aware of available services in medical care, psychosocial support, legal counselling and reintegration assistance</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Essential services adhere to standards of quality and are available</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of protocol document</td>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>A practical analysis on actual practices in the health centres informs the revision of the medical protocol</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a revised national medical protocol, integrating STI treatment, PEP, and vaccinations.</td>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>The National Protocol on Medical Assistance for Survivors of Sexual Violence gives clear directives on clinical management of rape in particular and medical care following sexual violence, on the documentation of cases, on appropriate behaviour towards adult and child survivors, and provides guidance on referral to complementary services</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existence of standard procedures in the medical treatment of sexual violence survivors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existence of a checklist for the clinical management of sexual violence survivors</td>
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<tr>
<td># of trained health service providers.</td>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>The technical capacity of personnel (women and men) and institutional capacity of health care structures in each health zone of the targeted areas are reinforced</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td># of trained female health service providers</td>
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<tr>
<td># of survivors benefiting from medical care (disaggregated by age and sex groups)</td>
<td>4.2.4</td>
<td>Availability of quality medical care services (Rehabilitation of health structures: Obj. 3.1.1 of Return, Recovery and Reintegration)</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.5</td>
<td>An analysis of current practices in psychosocial support and mental health care informs the development of MHPSS standards.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.6</td>
<td>Standards on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support provide clear directives on quality of MHPSS care for adult and child survivors.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.7</td>
<td>Personnel working in mental-health and psychological support are trained on the national standards</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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<td>4.2.8</td>
<td>Quality psychosocial services are available.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.9</td>
<td>An analysis of current practices in the area of legal aid informs the standards on access to justice services for Sexual Violence survivors</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.10</td>
<td>The National Standards for Legal Aid are harmonised (with the approaches of the Legal Clinics, and the Free Consultation Office of the Bar Association.) With Component Combating Impunity.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.11</td>
<td>The capacities of the legal service providers and structures are</td>
<td>Eastern DRC</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of women professionals and para-legals hired</td>
<td>reinforced. With Component Combating Impunity.</td>
<td>National and Provincial Bar Associations, the Legal Clinics, NGOs, UNJHRO (Coordination Office), UNICEF/UNJHRO/Batonier</td>
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<td># of survivors who receive legal counselling; no of survivors who file a complaint; no of cases that receive judgement (disaggregated by sex and age)</td>
<td>4.2.12 Availability of quality legal counselling</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries (Justice Ministry) and their sub divisions; the UNJHRO; the sexual violence working groups; NGOs; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidation of best practices related to social and economical reintegration.</td>
<td>4.2.13 A practical analysis of current practices in the field of social and economical reintegration informs the development of national standards on social and economical reintegration</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries and their divisions; sexual violence working groups; NGOs; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance component)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of a Reintegration Protocol</td>
<td>4.2.14 National Standards on Reintegration with a survivor-centred approach are adopted and published</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries and their divisions; sexual violence working groups; NGOs; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)</td>
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<tr>
<td># of trained service providers (disaggregated by sex); # evaluations conducted</td>
<td>4.2.15 The capacities of the personnel and the structures offering services of social and economical reintegration are reinforced and their approaches are standardised</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries (Gender and Social Affairs Ministries) and their divisions; sexual violence working groups; NGOs; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td># of survivors reintegrated in their communities/families; # of children reintegrated in schools; no of people benefiting from economic reintegration assistance; % of persons continue the activity 6 month after the end of the support program; % of positive mediation cases (disaggregated by age and sex)</td>
<td>4.2.16 Quality and durable reintegration support services are available.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries (Genre and Social Affairs Ministries) and their divisions; sexual violence working groups; NGOs; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td># of service providers trained (disaggregated by sex); % of positive results according to monitoring tools (e.g. pre and post test improvement, spot check after 6 months)</td>
<td>4.2.17 Actors adhere to IASC guidelines</td>
<td>Eastern DRC 2010–2011 Relevant ministries (Genre, Social Affairs, Justice Health Ministries) and their divisions; sexual violence working groups; NGOs, UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUTCOME 5: Data and Mapping</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5.1</strong> A unique and harmonised system of data collection on sexual violence is in place and operational</td>
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<tr>
<td>• # of existing data collection systems inventoried.</td>
<td><strong>5.1.1</strong> Existing data collection systems are inventoried</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of an updated inventory of actors intervening on sexual violence in each targeted zone</td>
<td><strong>5.1.2</strong> A mapping of actors, interventions and uncovered needs is updated and completed for each targeted zones</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of a study mentioning zones with uncovered needs</td>
<td><strong>5.1.3</strong> Information needs on prevention and response to sexual violence and indicators to collect are determined</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creation of a list of SMART indicators related to each component of the Strategy on prevention and response to sexual violence.</td>
<td><strong>5.1.4</strong> The steps on sexual violence prevention and response are validated as Standard Operating Procedures.</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of SOP on data collection steps for the different components of prevention and response to sexual violence</td>
<td><strong>5.1.5</strong> Technical, material and operational capacities of actors and synergies are reinforced.</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• # of actors trained in data collection by thematic</td>
<td><strong>5.1.6</strong> Data gathering and transmission is effective.</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Proportion of actors implicated in data collection</td>
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<td>• No of new territorial synergies implemented</td>
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<td>• Proportion of equipped synergies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Proportion of actors of data collection who received data collection tools</td>
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<td><strong>5.2</strong> The processing, storage and analysis of data on sexual violence is realised</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Creation of an integrated and functional database on sexual violence prevention and response</td>
<td><strong>5.2.1</strong> An integrated database for sexual violence prevention and response is created and operational</td>
<td>Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Locations</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2.2</td>
<td>The processing and analysis of sexual violence data is realised</td>
<td>Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3</td>
<td>Knowledge on sexual violence and interventions is improved</td>
<td>34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>Information sharing on sexual violence is ensured</td>
<td>Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>Effective coordination of the Component is ensured</td>
<td>Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
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## Annex 2. Indicative budget

### INDIкатIVE UNSSSSS BUDGET – PHASED 2009 – 2012

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. IMPROVEMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening of FARDC capacities, internal control and discipline</td>
<td>90,350,000</td>
<td>22,090,000</td>
<td>68,260,000</td>
<td>29,800,000</td>
<td>26,700,000</td>
<td>11,760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support for disengagement of armed groups and their integration into the FARDC or DDR</td>
<td>71,465,000</td>
<td>2,578,000</td>
<td>68,887,000</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
<td>1,422,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Transport of FARDC, PNC and ex-combatants</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>6,178,000</td>
<td>3,822,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>822,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Security</strong></td>
<td>171,815,000</td>
<td>30,846,000</td>
<td>140,969,000</td>
<td>47,800,000</td>
<td>44,700,000</td>
<td>14,004,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>III. RESTORATION AND STRENGTHENING OF STATE AUTHORITY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Rehabilitation of strategic road axes and bridges</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
<td>115,590,000</td>
<td>84,410,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>24,410,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Support the deployment of the National Police (including border police, PIR and integration of AG police)</td>
<td>46,668,000</td>
<td>18,758,080</td>
<td>27,909,920</td>
<td>11,847,920</td>
<td>10,500,000</td>
<td>5,562,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Support the deployment of civil administration</td>
<td>15,840,000</td>
<td>2,718,969</td>
<td>13,121,031</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>3,121,031</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Support measures to curtail illicit trade of natural resources</td>
<td>9,172,000</td>
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<td>9,172,000</td>
<td>3,172,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Support the deployment of justice and penitentiary personnel</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
<td>10,531,160</td>
<td>13,468,840</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>4,468,840</td>
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<td><strong>Total State Authority</strong></td>
<td>295,680,000</td>
<td>147,598,209</td>
<td>148,081,791</td>
<td>55,019,920</td>
<td>52,968,840</td>
<td>37,093,031</td>
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<td><strong>IV. RETURN, REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Basic social needs and services restored in areas of return</td>
<td>217,600,000</td>
<td>27,700,000</td>
<td>189,900,000</td>
<td>36,200,000</td>
<td>76,500,000</td>
<td>77,200,000</td>
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<td>Economic recovery promoted through creation of employment and enhanced agricultural productivity</td>
<td>60,170,000</td>
<td>29,771,000</td>
<td>30,399,000</td>
<td>8,060,000</td>
<td>11,060,000</td>
<td>11,279,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote local peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict resolution</td>
<td>34,106,000</td>
<td>6,100,000</td>
<td>28,006,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>4,006,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total RRR</strong></td>
<td>311,876,000</td>
<td>63,571,000</td>
<td>248,305,000</td>
<td>59,260,000</td>
<td>96,560,000</td>
<td>92,485,000</td>
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<td><strong>V. COMBATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fight Against Impunity for Cases of Sexual Violence</td>
<td>11,545,000</td>
<td>2,784,587</td>
<td>8,760,413</td>
<td>5,210,067</td>
<td>3,550,346</td>
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<td>Prevention and Protection of Sexual Violence</td>
<td>11,520,000</td>
<td>3,027,271</td>
<td>8,492,729</td>
<td>5,294,283</td>
<td>3,198,446</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform and Sexual Violence</td>
<td>8,196,014</td>
<td>310,554</td>
<td>7,885,460</td>
<td>5,505,000</td>
<td>2,380,460</td>
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<td>Multi-Sectoral Response for Survivors of Sexual Violence</td>
<td>41,549,550</td>
<td>16,107,000</td>
<td>25,442,550</td>
<td>16,153,880</td>
<td>9,288,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data and Mapping</td>
<td>5,739,000</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>5,653,000</td>
<td>3,690,000</td>
<td>1,963,000</td>
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<td><strong>Total Combating Sexual Violence</strong></td>
<td>78,549,564</td>
<td>22,315,412</td>
<td>56,234,152</td>
<td>35,853,230</td>
<td>20,380,922</td>
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<td><strong>GLOBAL TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>857,920,564</td>
<td>264,330,621</td>
<td>593,589,943</td>
<td>197,933,150</td>
<td>214,609,762</td>
<td>143,582,031</td>
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*Estimation of funding gap is tentative and will be further revised based on alignment of existing programmes supported by the international community*
Annex 3. Geographical priorities under STAREC
A UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED INITIATIVE

FAO
ILO
IOM
UNDP
UNFPA

UNHABITAT
UNHCR
UNICEF
WFP
MONUC

IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

SUPPORTED BY:

BELGIUM
GERMANY
JAPAN
SPAIN
SWEDEN

UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM
THE NETHERLANDS
WORLD BANK

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