Annex I - Sud Irumu Priority Zone, Ituri Province

List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CISPE</td>
<td>Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETD</td>
<td>Local Entities/ ‘Entités Territoriales Décentralisées’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARM</td>
<td>Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation (Stabilization Coherence Fund, “trust fund”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSSS</td>
<td>International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHRO</td>
<td>Joint Human Right Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E Cell</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Cellule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>North Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search For Commom Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Stabilization Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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</table>
1 Presentation of Annex I – Sud Irumu (Ituri Province)

This Annex presents an assessment of the expected status of ISSSS programming in Sud Irumu during the second half of 2017 and the first months of 2018 (Section 2) This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that also projects are take into account in the mapping that are at this point still “in the pipeline”, but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future.

The Annex also presents a summarized overview of the ISSSS monitoring data for Sud Irumu that covers the period of June / July 2016 to December 2016 (Section 0). This is the first period for which a meaningfully complete set of monitoring data for the ISSSS was available. The data therefore serves as a baseline against which results from future data collection rounds will be compared.

Finally, the Annex also offers a set of tentative and preliminary observations on the ISSSS baseline data, also (but not only) when considered in the context of the combined scope of the stabilization projects that are currently operating and are planned for Sud Irumu (Section 4). It is important to understand, however, that these observations are by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. On the contrary, they are meant to help stakeholders to continue the informed debate about trends and programming options in the priority zone. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Sud Irumu (Ituri Province)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Sud Irumu ‘priority zone’. Specifically, this section:

- Provides a brief description of the different programmes / interventions that are currently being implemented in Sud Irumu in association with the ISSSS; i.e., which means that they are either financed through the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (aligned programmes);
- Presents an overview of how these interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five substantive Pillars; and offer some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed.
- Gives slightly more in-depth views of the Pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming, based on the status of ISSSS projects of June / July 2017, with some additional reflections on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Sud Irumu

Table 11 lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Sud Irumu priority zone, with information on the respective lead organizations, the expected implementation period and the projects’ thematic focus.

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1 A more detailed and visual presentation of the results data for Sud Irumu for that period can be found in the “data file” for Sud Irumu that is available upon request.
2 This report was originally intended to be published in March / April 2017, with only about three month lag from the end of the reporting period. However, some of the data that this report is based on only became available at the end of May / early June 2017. Reporting therefore had to be pushed back.
Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and SCF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Title (Lead Organization)</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
<th>Thematic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Pamoja Kwa Amani - Ensemble pour la Paix (UNHABITAT)</td>
<td>Ongoing (May 2017 to May 2019)</td>
<td>Increased and inclusive support for the stabilization and security strategy at Community level; Improved land governance and accountability; Enhanced transparency in the exploitation and management of mineral resources in the priority area; Functionality, performance and quality of chieftain and sector services (ETD) are strengthened; Strengthened security governance; Social cohesion and resilience; Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>CISPE (IOM)</td>
<td>Ongoing (November 2015 to April 2019)</td>
<td>Contribute to the improved mutual accountability and capacity of Congolese state institutions and civil society to address and mitigate the main drivers of conflict in selected intervention zones in Ituri and North Kivu, and to reinforce the legitimacy of these institutions and its agents, who are perceived as enabling security actors by men, women, boys and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPLUP (UNHABITAT)</td>
<td>Ongoing (June 2016 to December 2018)</td>
<td>Focused on community based participatory land use planning to improve the security of land rights, the project is centred on the following core components: a) A platform for promoting dialogue around land governance both at the community and provincial level; b) Ownership by the political/administrative authorities; c) Research for consensus on land planning and usages; d) Development of appropriate tools for an integrated and participatory management of economic space and land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall project landscape in Sud Irumu

Taken together, the above-mentioned projects are set to address results from all five substantive pillars of the ISSSS:

- Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue), Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority), and Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict) is relatively advanced, in that more than half of the results components of these three pillars are covered by at least one project.
- Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians (PoC)) and Pillar 5 (SGBV prevention) is developing in Sud-Irumu, in that less than half of the results components of each of these pillars are currently targeted by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in Sud Irumu.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, PZ Sud Irumu (Ituri Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Status of programming
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue around the implementation of the ISSSS in order to ensure required support for the ISSSS among the population (women, girls, boys and men) and among traditional and formal authorities.</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Eventually, monitoring will also include the tracking of other managerial and procedural aspects of ISSSS implementation. These are going be part of “Pillar 0” of the ISSSS logical framework.

4 Complete: All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; Advanced: Most result elements are addressed by projects; Developing: A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; None: No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.
**Pillar 4**: Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at-risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.  

**Pillar 5**: Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender-based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.

Figure 1 below provides a more detailed picture of the results that are addressed either by one (smallest circle), two (medium circle) or three (largest circles) of the ISSSS projects in Sud Irumu; either currently, or in the near future. The results that are marked in red font are presently not covered at all.

*Figure 1: Outlook on ISSSS Programming in the Sud Irumu Priority Zone (Ituri) (July 2017); all programmes*

As can be seen, all three of the projects in Sud Irumu work on the basis of action plans that are to be developed in consultation and with the participation of the population (Intermediate Outcome 1.1.1). Although CISPE and CPLUP are not necessarily applying the Democratic Dialogue approach in its entirety, this does mean that the two aligned, bi-laterally funded projects (CISPE, CPLUP) are applying key principles...
from that approach to their sector-specific interventions. All three projects also make use of participatory dialogue platforms as a space to create their overarching (SCF) or sector-specific (CISPE, CPLUP) action plans and to provide oversight of their implementation, in keeping with the respective approach of the ISSSS.

Currently not clearly reflected in the intervention logic of the projects operating in Sud Irumu are ISSSS results that require some form of “upwards advocacy”; i.e., communicating and disseminating lessons and experiences from work done at the local level to the provincial or national level. The situations in Pillar 2 (concerning security sector reform) or Pillar 3 (concerning local governance reform) illustrate this.

The sections below provide a more detailed look at the project coverage in each of the five Pillars in Sud Irumu.

**Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)**

ISSSS programming in Sud Irumu covers the development of overarching, cross-sectoral local action plans (SCF), as well as that of sector-specific action plans (land, security) (CPLUP, CISPE). This is coupled with the set-up and support of overarching oversight mechanisms (dialogue platforms) (SCF) and sector specific platforms and oversight or consultation mechanisms (again, for land, security). Programming (SCF) also foresees to facilitate the translation of sectoral priorities into sector policy and principles.

The main limitation may be the links to provincial and national levels (Intermediate Outcome 1.1.3). Many of the priorities identified in the Sud Irumu compact involve, directly or indirectly, action from national and provincial-level authorities. This may include the need for legislative / policy changes, and the reallocation of budget, human, and capital resources.

Several risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix have the potential to adversely affect projects under Pillar 1. In the current political climate in the DRC, the national and provincial political context (including the indefinite delay of local elections) is likely to affect efforts meant to put in place a legitimate participatory process in Sud Irumu.

Table 3 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame Pillar 1, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 1</strong></td>
<td>Support for the ISSSS at community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 1.1</strong></td>
<td>Local stabilization processes aligned with community priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.1</td>
<td>Joint action plans developed and approved by communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.2</td>
<td>Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.3</td>
<td>National authorities commit to &amp; act upon ‘Sector Compacts’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 1.2</strong></td>
<td>Local groups support stabilization process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.2.1</td>
<td>Oversight mechanisms of stabilization process set-up and functioning;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ISSSS programming for Sud Irumu is currently addressing Pillar 2 primarily through support to the “Comités de Base” (CdB) of the FARDC (and the PNC), and support of the “Conseils Locals de Proximité” (CLSP). The SCF-funded project for Sud Irumu intends to use these committees as conduits to improve relationships (i.e., accountability) between security forces, local administrations and the population, and also to raise awareness for Human Rights (HR) and Protection of Civilians (PoC) principles.

ISSSS programming does include efforts to improve FARDC – community relationships. However, related results components to help address the internal dynamics and incentive structures that influence behaviour of FARDC personnel are not currently covered (such as Intermediate Outcomes 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). Similarly, the intervention logic of the projects working on FARDC performance does not yet clearly include efforts to communicate experiences and lessons from the project’s local engagement with FARDC personnel to national leaders, to link local-level work to the national Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The ISSSS risk matrix identifies several factors that may affect implementation under the ISSSS Pillar 2. Slow or no progress in national reforms of the security sector may make it more difficult to bring local advances in PoC performance to bear at a larger scale. Persisting ties of soldiers with armed groups, or FARDC internal challenges, such as poor living conditions or mistreatment of soldiers by superiors also may make it more challenging for ISSSS programmes to bring about sustained changes in predatory behaviour by the FARDC.

Table 4 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame Pillar 2 and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

**Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud Irumu, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.O. 2</td>
<td>FARDC Performance in PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O.2.1</td>
<td>Operational FARDC PoC principles &amp; procedures applied &amp; enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1</td>
<td>PoC Awareness &amp; skills among FARDC field commanders &amp; soldiers (SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1</td>
<td>PoC awareness &amp; skills among FARDC commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.2</td>
<td>FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced &amp; aligned w. PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.3</td>
<td>Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.4</td>
<td>Lessons on PoC experiences &amp; resource requirements communicated to nat. FARDC leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O 2.2</td>
<td>Cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC (SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.1</td>
<td>Social &amp; econ. integration of soldiers into host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.2</td>
<td>Redress mechanisms f. local authorities &amp; communities (SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.3</td>
<td>Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory &amp; profiteering)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Programming in Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)**

ISSSS programming covers most results components of Pillar 3 in Sud Irumu. Efforts to improve accountability and responsiveness of State institutions tie into the related efforts under Pillar 1 (democratic dialogue) and to a certain extent Pillar 2 (FARDC PoC Performance; specifically accountability). “Plans locaux de paix et de développement” are meant to become central reference
documents to guide stabilization efforts in the PZ. ISSSS programming also intends to improve access to relevant state-provided services as a means to increase the role and presence of the ‘regular’ Congolese State, in relation to overall administrative service, justice, land administration and security (Overall Outcome 3.1). Finally, ISSSS programming in Sud Irumu is covering at least some of the results components associated with the developing a “coherent regulatory, legal (and administrative) framework for local governance. Projects are prepared to train local authorities on the concepts of taxation, decentralization and public resource management (Overall Outcome 3.3).

Not currently addressed in Sud Irumu is the need for bigger financial allocations from the national level to the ETDs to finance an expansion of publicly provided services (Intermediate Outcome 3.1.3). Also, not currently covered are efforts to clarify the relationships between traditional and formal authorities in the priority zone (Intermediate Outcome 3.3.2).

Multiple risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix have the potential to affect projects working in Pillar 3 of the ISSSS. In particular the current national political context (centralisation of power, associated w. obstructionism and lack of reforms, including in financial areas (payroll)) could hamper and counteract project work.

Table 5 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 3, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.O. 3</td>
<td>Increased beneficial role and presence of “regular” Congolese State in local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 3.1</td>
<td>Improved access to relevant state-provided services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.1</td>
<td>Improved performance of state agents in service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.2</td>
<td>Availability / access to physical infrastructure &amp; other assets f. service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.3</td>
<td>Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 3.2</td>
<td>Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.1</td>
<td>Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.2</td>
<td>Local population &amp; civil society act on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.3</td>
<td>Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (incl. no corruption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 3.3</td>
<td>Enabling, coherent regulatory / legal framework for local governance in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.1</td>
<td>Local authorities / ETDs prepared for devolution and financial retrocession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.2</td>
<td>Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.3: Lessons for increased local State presence acted on by national authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming in Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

Pillar 4 programming in Sud Irumu covers most of the associated result components; in principle, aiming at providing support for short-term income stabilization (Overall Outcome 4.1), and for the improvement of economic conditions for longer-term economic development and stabilization (Overall Outcome 4.2), offering assistance in specifically for improved access to land (reduced land conflicts, better access to land

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5 This is a necessary part of efforts envisioned by the ISSSSS strategic framework to help develop a coherent and enabling framework for local governance.
governance; land-use planning). ISSSS programming also foresees support to strengthen social linkages and coherence within and among communities *(Overall Outcome 4.3)*.

Not currently covered is the creation of greater opportunities for “wage employment” in the Sud-Irumu, associated with the long-term stabilization of the local economies *(Intermediate Outcome 4.2.5)*.

Table 6 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 4, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

**Table 6: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud Irumu, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.1</strong> Increased participation in employment schemes &amp; short-term income stabilization</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.1.1 Improved availability of livelihood &amp; start-up grants and cash-for-work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.1.3 Improved access to services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.2</strong> Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.1 Increased sustained access to markets</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.2 Improved and secure access to land, natural resources</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu (A): CPLUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.3 Improved access to credit (all groups)</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.4 Improved access to training opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.5 Improved access to wage employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.3</strong> Social linkages within and between communities strengthened</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.3.1 Psycho-social needs of vulnerable / marginalized groups in community addressed</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.3.2 Inter- &amp; intra community trust increased</td>
<td>(SCF): Sud Irumu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Programming in Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)**

Gender mainstreaming in ISSSS programming (SCF) in Sud Irumu is meant to help change harmful social norms that are associated with sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This is complemented by additional programming that focuses specifically on SGBV prevention and the improvement of access to services for SGBV survivors. Projects in Sud Irumu do intend to help improve overall relations between the FARDC (and the PNC) and the population; through resurrection and strengthening of the Comités de Base (CdB) of the PNC and the FARDC; and by strengthening the “Conseils Locaux de Proximité” (CLSP).

However, ISSSS programming in Sud Irumu does not currently include specific efforts to reduce involvement of security sector actors in committing acts of SGBV or to increase trust in the security forces (both PNC and FARDC) to better prosecute SGBV cases *(Overall Outcome 5.2)*. None of the projects target the internal dynamics that are thought to influence behaviour of FARDC personnel towards communities, and women in particular. ISSSS programming is also not specifically addressing access to justice *(Intermediate Outcomes 5.3.4 and 5.3.5)* or services *(Intermediate Outcome 5.3.3)* for SGBV survivors.6

Table 7 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 5 and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented or is planned.

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6 The SSU will verify these observations with the respective project partners; any necessary revisions will be presented in the next monitoring report.
Table 7: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud Irumu, Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 5</strong></td>
<td>Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.1</strong></td>
<td>Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.1.2</td>
<td>Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.1.3</td>
<td>Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.2</strong></td>
<td>Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.2.1</td>
<td>Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.2.2</td>
<td>Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.3</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.1</td>
<td>Increased public awareness of laws &amp; standards; roles &amp; responsibilities to combat SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.3</td>
<td>Improved support services for SGBV survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.4</td>
<td>Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.5</td>
<td>Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3  ISSSS Results Data – Sud Irumu

This section of the report contains a summary “data sheet” for those indicators of the ISSSS logical framework for which data was available for the first reporting round. A more detailed, exhaustive and visual presentation of the data can be found in the separate data file for the Sud Irumu priority zone.

Table 8: ISSSS Results Data, Pillar 1 to 3, June 2016 – December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Location / Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sud Irumu 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 1</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 2</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1_i</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1_ii</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1_iii</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in POC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 1</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 2</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 1</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 2</th>
<th>Sud Irumu 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of HH depending on traditional activities as their main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, hunting, animal husbandry)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men indicating they have ‘good’ or ‘very good’ access to markets</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men that declare they have ‘good’ or ‘very good’ access to their land</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who indicate they have access to credit (if required)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who indicate that people in their area ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ participate in cultural activities or ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who indicate that people in their area ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who indicate that people in their area ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ work together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that groups or individuals in their neighborhood/village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them, in spite of occasional competition</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that the population in their neighborhood/village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals contrivest with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his/her own objective</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that survivors of sexual violence are ‘good’ or ‘very good’ relationship across different groups of people in their lives</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife/spouse</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife/spouse</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men that declare that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved in the family, i.e., without intervention of the authorities</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their community</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men reporting that they would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence if this woman had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result of this incidence</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence if this woman had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result of this incidence</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who have sought out information about issues related to gender based violence over the last three months (seeking information)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who themselves have participated in meetings on issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (discussion and debate)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who themselves have participated in other actions to combat gender based violence over the last three months (direct action)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who ‘agree’ that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in the village / PNC ‘as well’ or ‘better’ as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are ‘better’ than those of a year ago</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men who think that today’s efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are ‘better’ than those of a year ago</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4_ii  % of women and men reporting that they know how to access support services for SGBV survivors</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9: ISSSS Results data Sud Irumu, Pillar 4 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016**

Table 10: Selected ISSSS Results Data Sud Irumu - by gender, Pillar 1 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>Indicator 1.2 (Av. Security): % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas “well” or “very well” (average for security and safety).</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 2_R (a): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year.</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 2_R (ii): % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 3.1_i (b): % of women and men who indicate they have “good” or “very good” access to a police station or sub-station</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 3.1_i (c): % of women and men who indicate they have “good” or “very good” access to the national civil judicial system</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 3.2_i: % of women and men who indicate that they find it “very” of “extremely acceptable to pay ‘official taxes’ (i.e., ‘real taxes’, not ‘invented taxes’).</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>Indicator 4.2_ii: % of women and men that declare they have “good” or “very good” access to land</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.2_iii: % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.2_iii: % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 12 months</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 3.2_ii: % of women and men who “agree” that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 3.2_ii: % of women and men who “agree” that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his / her own objective</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men who “agree” that the population across different groups of people in their lives</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household.</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence.</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence.</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i: % of women and men who “agree” that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (a): % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (b): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (c): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (d): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (e): % of women and men who have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (f): % of women and men who have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (g): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (h): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (i): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (j): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The table includes data for indicators for which responses by women and men in at least one of the two polls (June 2016 and December 2016) differed by more than the margin of error of +/- 5%.
4 Observations and issues to consider based on programming scope and results data

Pillar 1 – Democratic Dialogue

Negative views on current and future peace and security, and on the ability of the international community and the Government to affect positive change create challenging circumstances for the launch of democratic dialogue in Sud Irumu in order to increase popular support for the ISSSS (Specific Objective 1). Pessimism prevails among the population of the Sud Irumu Priority Zone on the peacefulness of its own communities, with approximately seventy to eighty percent of people seeing their village as only “a little” to “not at all” peaceful (Indicator 1.iii), and with 9 out of 10 adults in the priority zone expecting an unchanged situation or even less peaceful conditions in the future (Indicator 1.iv). Approximately eighty percent of people currently see no or only a small contribution of ‘peace projects’ (stabilization projects) to improvements in their villages / communities (Indicator 1.1.iii). About the same number of people doubt the capacity of the Government of the DRC to help improve the situation with regard to security, socio-economic welfare and social cohesion (Indicator 1.2).

The population in the Chefferies / Secteurs of ‘Bahema Mitego’, ‘Bahema Boga’, and ‘Banyali Tchabi’ (Sud Irumu 1) tends to assess the current security situation in their communities more negatively than people in Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi (Sud Irumu 2), both in terms of the current situation and prospects for greater peace in the coming year (Indicators 1.iii and 1.iv). Less than 10% of the population in Sud Irumu 1 (Indicator 1.iv) expect more peaceful conditions in their community in a year’s time, compared to about thirty percent in Sud Irumu 2. The more negative views of the population in the Sud Irumu 1 also extend to the ability of ‘peace projects’ and the Government of the DRC to bring about positive change towards greater stability, peace and economic well-being (Indicator 1.2 (a – h)).

Possible considerations for programming– Pillar 1

As in other priority zones, the largely negative views on the past stabilization projects increase the significance of the participatory approach of the ISSSS; i.e. to use the consultation and dialogue mechanism during the start-up phase of projects in Sud Irumu to establish the legitimacy of the stabilization process as a whole. At the same time, these circumstances may also increase the pressure for projects to follow-up dialogue with concrete actions and gains in order to convince a largely sceptical population of the overall value of the stabilization process.

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8 See graph on Indicators in data file for Sud Irumu.
9 Sub Priority Zone « Sud Irumu 1 “
10 Sub Priority Zone “Sud Irumu 2 “
11 Data from the perception surveys seems to be at odds with information on security incidents from the Monusco Force for the same time timeframe, where the number of recorded incidents is in Sud Irumu 1 (‘Bahema Mitego’, ‘Bahema Boga’, and ‘Banyali Tchabi’) is far lower than the figures reported for Sud Irumu 2 (Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi) (see Indicator 2_i)
Efforts under the ISSSS in Sud Irumu to improve the performance of the FARDC in the protection of civilians (PoC) and improve community – FARDC relations (Specific Objective 2) are facing a population that regards the FARDC as an important provider of security, but that also has reservations about the capacity and will of the FARDC to make itself accountable for crimes committed by its own soldiers.

Roughly 4 out of 10 adults in the PZ think that the FARDC makes a big or very big contribution to their personal security. Ten percent of people saw no contribution of the FARDC in this regard (Indicator 2.iii (a)). For just under half of the population in Sud Irumu, the FARDC is the main provider of security in their villages, followed directly by “God”, “ourselves” and “nobody”. By contrast, not even 1 out of 10 people saw the PNC fulfil the role of main security provider.12

The relative importance of the FARDC as security provider notwithstanding, roughly a quarter of people in Sud Irumu feel at least some degree of insecurity when meeting FARDC soldiers on the street. This is about the same for women as it is for men (Indicator 2.1.ii). The accountability of the FARDC for crimes committed against civilians is also receiving mixed reviews in the priority zone. While approximately 9 out of 10 women and men find it is possible to register complaints about crimes committed by the FARDC (Indicator 2.2.2.i), about half of the population doubts that actual efforts are underway to hold the perpetrators accountable. About one quarter of the population think that soldiers go unpunished for any crimes or infractions they commit (Indicator 2.2.2.iii). Women in Sud Irumu are more doubtful than men in this regard (Indicator 2.2.2.ii). The share of women who think FARDC accountability efforts are ongoing is only about half to two-thirds the size of that of men.

In Sud Irumu 2, the population tends see the FARDC as making a comparatively greater contribution to their personal security than is the case in Sud Irumu 1 (Indicators 2.iii (a)). They also tend to feel comparatively less affected in their security when meeting FARDC soldiers on the street (Indicator 2.1.ii). Feeling insecure in Sud Irumu 2 tends to be associated more often with the presence of armed groups. This correlates with the actual higher incidence of crimes committed by armed groups (in particular by the FRPI) against the civilian population in that zone (Indicator 2.i).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 2

Doubts among the population, and in particular among women in Sud Irumu that the FARDC is committed and able to hold perpetrators of crimes against civilians in its own ranks to account may point to the need work with the FARDC to improve its own disciplinary and oversight structures (Overall Outcome 2.1), and to address the lower-level results that are associated with the internal accountability mechanisms (Intermediate Outcomes 2.1.1 – 2.1.4). None of these ISSSS results are currently covered by ISSSS projects in the Sud Irumu priority zone.

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12 See graphs on the topics under “Triangulation of Indicators to ‘FARDC Performance in Protection of Civilians’” in data file for Sud Irumu.

13 The clear majority of security incidents in Sud Irumu were attributed to the FRPI (i.e., 98 out of a total of 118 recorded for the entire priority zone). Only 2 incidents were attributed to the FARDC, both of these occurring in Sud Irumu 2. However, there were 14 incidents in Sud Irumu as a whole whose perpetrator remained unknown (Indicator 2.i).
With ISSSS efforts in Sud Irumu to establish a greater beneficial local presence of the regular Congolese State (Specific Objective 3) about to start, most people in the priority zone consider the State to be largely ineffective and unable to carry out most of its core functions. About half the population consider access to state-provided services to be bad or very bad\(^\text{14}\). Only about 2 out of 10 people find their access to be “good” or “very good”. Across Sud Irumu as a whole, men tend to have slightly better access to services and are more willing than women to pay taxes (Indicator 3.2.2\(_\text{ii}\)).

Perceptions on services access and on the ability of the State to ensure security are slightly less negative in Sud Irumu 2 than in Sud Irumu 1 (Indicator 3.1\(_\text{i}\) (a – c); Indicator 3.2\(_\text{i}\)). The population in Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi (Sud Irumu 2) is also somewhat more willing to pay official taxes as part of their civic duties and responsibilities (Indicator 3.2.2\(_\text{ii}\)).

As in other priority zones, the population by and large does not trust national and provincial officials to represent their priorities, with less than 1 out of 10 adults thinking that officials currently do a good or very good job in this regard (Indicator 3.2\(_\text{i}\) (a, b)). Perceptions on the role local authorities in this area are slightly less negative (Indicator 3.2\(_\text{i}\) (c)). As mentioned elsewhere, however, the data available to the SSU at this point does not allow to assess to what extent ethnic affiliation influences the attitudes towards their local leaders\(^\text{15}\).

**Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3**

The situation in Sud Irumu seems to underscore the importance of addressing the role and presence of the Congolese State in the zone not only locally, but to also target at provincial and national level those systemic organizational and institutional bottlenecks that have been constraining the capacity of the local authorities and of deconcentrated and decentralized entities of the State to improve its performance. The question of resource availability at local level and related components of Overall Outcome 3.3 (enabling framework for local governance) to facilitate an expanded role of the State are either not being addressed by ISSSS projects, or are covered in a relatively narrow manner, focused only on specific sectors and issues (i.e., land). It may be beneficial to consider how the ISSSS can address these issues more comprehensively. It also may be appropriate to examine the gender-specific barriers that reduce access to services more for women than for men.

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**Pillar 4 – Socio-economic resilience to conflict**

ISSSS programming to improve the equitable flow of socio-economic resources (Specific Objective 4) in Sud Irumu starts from a low level, with significant differences in the resources and services that are available to men as opposed to women. At least 1/3 of the households in Sud Irumu earn no regular income (Indicator 4\(_\text{i}\)) and only 1 out of 10 people have had a paid job for at least a week during the three month prior to the surveys (Indicator 4.2.5\(_\text{i}\)). Approximately sixty percent of households depend primarily on traditional economic activities (agriculture, fishery, hunting, animal husbandry) (Indicator 4.2.5\(_\text{i}\)).

\(^{14}\) This includes administrative services, police and the national judicial system.

\(^{15}\) Data that would help to shed more light on this question has been collected by a joint UNDP-MONUSCO project, but has not yet been made available to the SSU / the M&E Cell.
About one third of the population have good or better access to markets (Indicator 4.2.1_iv), forty percent of people they the same about their access to land (Indicator 4.2.2_ii) and approximately ten to twenty percent of adults can access credit if and when they need it (Indicator 4.2.3_i). Access to credit and land are slightly higher in Bahema Mitego, Bahema Boga, and Banyali Tchabi (Sud Irumu 1) than in Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi (Sud Irumu 2).

Compared to other ISSSS priority zones (e.g. Kitchanga), geographic differences in Sud Irumu in economic conditions tend to be somewhat smaller across most indicators. Gender differences, however, appear to me more pronounced: Fewer women than men find they have good or better access to land (Indicator 4.2.2_ii) or to credit (Indicator 4.2.3_i). Women in Sud Irumu are also less likely than men to have paid work (Indicator 4.2.5_i).

In both sub-zones, all but a small minority of people seem to feel comfortable maintaining relatively loose social contact with members of ethnic groups other than their own, for example when attending cultural events, or places of worship (Indicator 4.3_i (a, b)). More lasting relations, such as marriages across ethnic lines, occur ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ for about 8 out of 10 people (Indicator 4.3_i (d)). This notwithstanding, ethnic affiliation does affect the quality of relationships between people, more so in Sud Irumu 1 (Bahema Mitego, Bahema Boga, Banyali Tchabi) than in Sud Irumu 2 (Bahema Sud, Walendu Bindi) (Indicator 4.3.2_i (a – e)).

Pillar 5 – SGBV Prevention

Sud Irumu has the highest number of incidents of sexual violence recorded by the MONUSCO Force among the three currently active priority zones. Over the period from July to December 2016, a total of 10 cases were recorded by MONUSCO; 9 out of these 10 cases were attributed to the armed groups; one case was linked to the FARDC (Indicator 2_i). About one third of women in in Sud Irumu, and a quarter of men know someone who survived an incident of sexual violence (Indicator 5_i (a)).

Sexual violence is more common in the Chefferies / Secteurs of Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi (Sud Irumu 2) than in Bahema Mitego, Bahema Boga, and Banyali Tchabi (Sud Irumu 1). Eighty percent of cases recorded by MONUSCO in the second half of 2016 occurred in Sud Irumu 2. 4 out of 10 people here know a woman who has experienced sexual violence, compared to 2 out of 10 people in Sud Irumu 1 (Indicator 5.iii (a)).

Attitudes in Sud Irumu towards women who survived SGBV are broadly similar to those in other ISSSS priority zones. However, they do differ between the Sud Irumu’s two sub zones, especially with regard to the willingness of families to accept pregnant or injured survivors of sexual violence back into their households. In Sud Irumu 2 (the sub-zone with higher reported numbers of SGBV), eighty to ninety percent of people would welcome SGBV survivors back into their communities or their households, independent of any resulting pregnancies or injuries. In Sud Irumu 1, this is the case for only about seventy percent of the population (Indicator 5.1_ii (a – c)). Adults in Sud Irumu 2 are also more likely to know how to access

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16 7 out of 10 households in Sud Irumu 1; 5 out of 10 households in Sud Irumu 2.
17 It is not possible to estimate the total incidence of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally of all incidences. Assuming that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.
18 Kitchanga, Ruzizi, Sud Irumu.
support services for SGBV survivors. That notwithstanding, only a quarter of the population in Sud Irumu as a whole know how to seek help following cases of sexual violence (Indicator 5.3.3_v).

### Possible considerations for programming—Pillar 5

Considering the comparatively high incidence of sexual violence in Sud Irumu it may be necessary to consider if and how the currently low coverage of Pillar 5 by ISSSS projects can be expanded. It needs to be emphasized that many of the related results of Pillar 2 (i.e., those aimed at strengthening the FARDC’s internal disciplinary and oversight structures (Overall Outcome 2.1)) are currently also not covered by stabilization projects.
1 Presentation of Annex II – Kitchanga (North Kivu Province)

This Annex presents an assessment of the expected status of ISSSS programming in Kitchanga during the second half of 2017 and the first months of 2018 (Section 2). This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that projects that are at this point still “in the pipeline”, but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future are also taking into account in the mapping.

The Annex also presents a summarized overview of the ISSSS monitoring data for Kitchanga that covers the period of June / July 2016 to December 2016 (Section 3)\(^{19}\). This is the first period for which a

\(^{19}\) A more detailed and visual presentation of the results data for Kitchanga for that period can be found in the “data file” for Kitchanga, which is available upon request.
meaningfully complete set of monitoring data for the ISSSS was available. The data therefore serves as a baseline against which results from future data collection rounds will be compared.20

Finally, the Annex also offers a set of tentative and preliminary observations on the ISSSS baseline data, also (but not only) when considered in the context of the combined scope of the stabilization projects that are currently operating or are planned for Kitchanga (Section 4). It is important to understand, however, that these observations are by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. On the contrary, they are meant to help stakeholders to continue the informed debate about trends and programming options in the priority zone. Questioning, revising and refining is report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process.

2 Status of ISSSS programming in Kitchanga (North Kivu Province)

This section provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Kitchanga ‘priority zone’. Specifically, this section:

- Provides a brief description of the different programmes / interventions that are currently being implemented in Kitchanga in association with the ISSSS; i.e., which means that they are either financed through the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (aligned programmes);
- Presents an overview of how these interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five substantive Pillars; and offer some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed.
- Gives slightly more in-depth views of the Pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming, based on the status of ISSSS projects of June / July 2017, with some additional reflections on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

**Overview of the ISSSS interventions in Kitchanga**

Table 11 lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Kitchanga priority zone, with information on the respective lead organizations, the expected implementation period, and the projects’ thematic focus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Title (Lead Organisation)</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
<th>Thematic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pamoja Kwa Amani na Maendeleo <em>(UNHABITAT)</em></td>
<td>Ongoing (ending in April 2019)</td>
<td>Land governance, social cohesion, socio-economic reintegration, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 This report was originally intended to be published already in March / April 2017, with only about three month lag from the end of the reporting period. However, some of the data that this report is based on only became available at the end of May / early June 2017. Reporting therefore had to be pushed back.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Title (Lead Organisation)</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
<th>Thematic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform (SSR)) (Phase 4; Extension) (SFCG)</td>
<td>Ongoing (ending in May 2018)</td>
<td>Increasing knowledge and awareness among Congolese security forces and civilians about their rights, roles and mutual responsibilities to improve relationships and build confidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC (CISPE) (IOM)</td>
<td>Ongoing (ending in April 2019)</td>
<td>I) Promotion of inclusive, dialogue-based conflict resolution mechanisms; and II) Enhance state-community relations through improved security services performance and raised perception of services within communities. III) Contribute to the improved mutual accountability and capacity of Congolese state institutions and civil society; Reinforce the legitimacy of these institutions and its agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development (FARM)</td>
<td>To commence in 2017</td>
<td>Improving the food security of target populations by addressing grievances among marginalized groups, promote inclusive democratic dialogue and conflict management systems, stronger inter-communal relationships, and sustainable agricultural practices, thus improving land access and agricultural markets, leading to increased stability and greater access and availability of food.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The overall project landscape in Kitchanga*

Taken together, the projects mentioned in Table 11 are set to address all five substantive pillars of the ISSSS, albeit at differing degrees of intensity:

- Presently, only the project coverage of Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) is relatively advanced, in that more than half of results components of the pillar are covered by at least one project (see Figure 2).
- Project coverage for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians (PoC)), Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority), Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict) and Pillar 5 (SGBV prevention) is still developing in Kitchanga. Less than half of results components of each of these Pillars are currently targeted by at least one project.

Table 12 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in Kitchanga.
Table 12: Status of Programming in the Kitchanga Priority Zone (North Kivu), all programmes, 2nd half of 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS</th>
<th>Coverage of ISSSS results framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue to ensure a political and community-based transformation process of the targeted conflicts.</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 4</td>
<td>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 5</td>
<td>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 below provides a more detailed picture of the results that are addressed either by one (smallest circle), two (medium-small circle), three (medium-large circles) or four (largest circle) of the ISSSS projects in Kitchanga; either currently, or in the near future. The results that are marked in red font are presently not covered at all.

As can be seen, most of the projects in Kitchanga work on the basis of action plans that are to be developed in consultation and with the participation of the population (Intermediate Outcome 1.1.1). This means that the two aligned, bi-laterally funded projects (CISPE, SSR) are emulating for their sector-specific interventions the overarching Democratic Dialogue approach (Pillar 1 of the ISSSS) of the SCF-funded project in Kitchanga. Similarly, projects also make use of participatory dialogue platforms as a space to create their overarching (SCF) or sector-specific (CISPE, SSR) action plans and to provide oversight over their implementation, in keeping with the approach of the ISSSS.

The sections below provide a more detailed look at the project coverage in each of the five Pillars in Kitchanga.

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21 **Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No result elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.
Figure 2: Overview of Programming in the Kitchanga Priority Zone (North Kivu), all programmes, 2nd half of 2017

Large circle: 4 projects; medium-large circle: 3 projects; medium-small circle: 2 projects; small circle: 1 project; red font: not covered at all.
Programming in Kitchanga under Pillar 1 focuses primarily on the development of joint action plans on stabilization and oversight mechanisms at the community level, particularly through the FCS programme run by International Alert (focused entirely on Pillar 1) (see Table 11).

In their original form, none of the projects supported the creation of actionable Sector Compacts at the provincial level (that is being spearheaded by the SSU under its “good offices” responsibilities); or on the continued commitment by national authorities to implement these. The focus was rather on community-level activities and consensus-building rather than on encouraging legislative or political action by the government. However, in revision of the FCS project on Pillar 1 (led by International Alert) in that was completed in June 2017, the partners added a result on provincial and national engagement. This new version will be reflected in greater detail in the next monitoring report. Also, the SSU has discussed the issue of sector compacts with the UNHABITAT consortium to attempt to lay the groundwork for future programming intermediate outcomes 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 in the priority zone.

Pillar 1 of the ISSSSS has been contentious in Kitchanga, leading to political tensions with Congolese authorities. If this tensions continue, progress on Democratic Dialogue as a foundation of work in other Pillars of the stabilization strategy may be severely hampered.

Table 3 below shows a portion of the ISSSS logframe pillar 1, and lists the projects that are contributing to the overall outcomes (O.O) and intermediate outcomes (I.O) under this first pillar. The table also highlights the “good offices” work of the SSU related to sector compacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.O. 1</td>
<td>Support for the ISSSS at community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 1.1</td>
<td>Local stabilization processes aligned with community priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.1</td>
<td>Joint action plans developed and approved by communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.2</td>
<td>Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.3</td>
<td>National authorities commit to &amp; act upon 'Sector Compacts'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 1.2</td>
<td>Sustained community support for stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.2.1</td>
<td>Oversight mechanisms of stabilization process set-up and functioning;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming in Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians (PoC))

Only one programme (SSR, implemented under the leadership of SFCG) is currently contributing to Pillar 2 results in Kitchanga (see Table 14). The programme’s overall objective is to foster mutual trust and confidence between the FARDC (and the PNC) and communities due to improvements in FARDC conduct. Activities are currently concentrated primarily in increasing the awareness of the FARDC regarding their rights and responsibilities, along with targeted trainings and incentives to reinforce and reward positive behavioural change.

Project coverage in Pillar 2 currently is not yet clearly addressing FARDC-internal (or PNC-internal – see Pillar 3) incentive structures to try to influence behaviour of FARDC commanders and soldiers towards the
civilian population; nor the integration of local lessons into wider national policy agenda (e.g., Security Sector Reform).

Several deeply entrenched risk factors could derail the progress of the SSR programme in Kitchanga, including poor overall conditions for FARDC soldiers, counteracting efforts to improve their performance on Protection of Civilians and thus relations with communities. In addition, disruptive events continue to occur in Kinshasa (such as the May 2017 attack of the FDLR on the town of Kitchanga) 22, further reducing faith that the FARDC will protect civilians.

Table 4 below lists a portion of the ISSSS logframe pillar 2, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitchanga, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.O. 2</th>
<th>FARDC Performance in PoC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.O.2.1</td>
<td>Operational FARDC PoC principles &amp; procedures applied &amp; enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1</td>
<td>PoC Awareness &amp; skills among FARDC field commanders &amp; soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1 (a)</td>
<td>PoC awareness &amp; skills among FARDC commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1 (b)</td>
<td>FARC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced &amp; aligned w. PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.2</td>
<td>Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.3</td>
<td>Lessons on PoC experiences &amp; resource requirements communicated to nat. FARDC leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2</td>
<td>Cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.1</td>
<td>Social &amp; econ. integration of soldiers into host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.2</td>
<td>Redress mechanisms f. local authorities &amp; communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.3</td>
<td>Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory &amp; profiteering)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming in Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Current Pillar 3 programming in Kitchanga focuses on improving the performance of state agents in the following areas: Police, Justice, Administration and Land management. CISPE’s focus on Results-Based Financing will link performance of state agents to payments in an effort to change structures and behaviours over time (see Table 15).

There is currently no focus on strengthening the framework for local governance at national and provincial level, which may hamper the long-term sustainability of current programming.

The primary risks are the continued delays to local and provincial elections (which undermines accountability) and existing patronage links in NK that prevent the equitable distribution of access to services across all communities.

Table 5 below is a portion of the ISSSS logframe pillar 3, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

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### Table 15: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitchanga, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 3</strong></td>
<td>Increased beneficial role and presence of “regular” Congolese State in local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.1</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to relevant state-provided services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.1</td>
<td>Improved performance of state agents in service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.2</td>
<td>Availability / access to physical infrastructure &amp; other assets f. service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.3</td>
<td>Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.2</strong></td>
<td>Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.1</td>
<td>Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.2</td>
<td>Local population &amp; civil society act on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.3</td>
<td>Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (incl. no corruption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.3</strong></td>
<td>Enabling, coherent regulatory / legal framework for local governance in place 3.3.1: Local authorities / ETDs prepared for devolution and financial retrocession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.1</td>
<td>Local authorities / ETDs prepared for devolution and financial retrocession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.2</td>
<td>Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.3</td>
<td>Lessons for increased local State presence acted on by national authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Programming in Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

The main focus of programming in Kitchanga under Pillar 4 is to improve secure access to land – a historically contentious issue – and to support local economic activities, particularly for the youth (see...
At present, no work is being undertaken on creating full-time employment opportunities. However the FARM project led by Mercy Corps intends to contribute to several of these results once the project is operational in 2018, such as access to credit to support income generation, and access to markets. These elements are essential to the long-term sustainability of equitable resource flows among at-risk populations.

The ISSSS Kitchanga conflict analysis highlighted ‘mobilisation around land and identity’ as one of the key risk factors affecting stabilization. Historical tensions in the area between the banyarwanda and ‘autochtone’ populations have the potential to hinder progress in improving access to land and natural resources.

Table 6 below presents a portion of the ISSSS logframe pillar 4, and lists the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.
Table 16: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitchanga, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 4</strong></td>
<td>Equitable resource flow (income earning &amp; economic opportunities; socio-economic support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.1</strong></td>
<td>Increased participation in employment schemes &amp; short-term income stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.1.1</strong></td>
<td>Improved availability of livelihood &amp; start-up grants and cash-for-work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.1.3</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.2</strong></td>
<td>Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.2.1</strong></td>
<td>Increased sustained access to markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.2.2</strong></td>
<td>Improved and secure access to land, natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.2.3</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to credit (all groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.2.4</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.2.5</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to wage employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.3</strong></td>
<td>Social linkages within and between communities strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.3.1</strong></td>
<td>Psycho-social needs of vulnerable / marginalized groups in community addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 4.3.2</strong></td>
<td>Inter- &amp; intra community trust increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming in Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)

At present 1 programme in Kitchanga focuses on programming under Pillar 5 (FCS led by UN Habitat) (see Table 17)\(^{23}\). Activities are focused on raising awareness on the harmful effects of negative gender norms and building the capacity of community leaders and youth for preventing SGBV. Elements of Pillar 5 related to combatting impunity within the justice system for SGBV crimes and to improving adequate services to SGBV victims/survivors are not covered at all in Kitchanga.

A lack of significant programming on the reduction of SGBV cases in Kitchanga renders associated risk factors more likely to materialize. Raising awareness of harmful gender norms is important, but the lack of efforts to tackle the impunity around SGBV through the military or justice systems makes sustained progress on Pillar 5 less likely.. This may lead to the growing disillusionment of women and girls in particular regarding the contribution of stabilization to reducing SGBV.

Table 7 below is a portion of the ISSSS logframe pillar 5, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

Table 17: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitchanga, Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 5</strong></td>
<td>Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.1</strong></td>
<td>Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 5.1.2</strong></td>
<td>Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 5.1.3</strong></td>
<td>Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.2</strong></td>
<td>Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 5.2.1</strong></td>
<td>Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.O. 5.2.2</strong></td>
<td>Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{23}\) The harmonization the log frame of another project, Living peace in DRC (implemented by the Living Peace Institute), was in progress when this report was prepared. The project will be included in the mapping in the next monitoring report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O.O. 5.3</th>
<th><strong>Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.1</td>
<td>Increased public awareness of laws &amp; standards; roles &amp; responsibilities to combat SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.3</td>
<td>Improved support services for SGBV survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.4</td>
<td>Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.5</td>
<td>Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This section of the report contains a summary “data sheet” for those indicators of the ISSSS logical framework for which data was available for the first reporting round. A more detailed, exhaustive and visual presentation of the data can be found in the separate data file for the Kitchanga priority zone, which is available upon request.

### Table 18: ISSSS Results Data Kitchanga, Pillar 1 to 3, June 2016 – December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Location / Period</th>
<th>Kitchanga 1</th>
<th>Kitchanga 2</th>
<th>Kitchanga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (a): Establish peace in Eastern Congo</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (b): Reduce poverty</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (c): Increase employment</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (d): Combat corruption</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (e): Unify the different ethnic groups</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (f): Improve the lives of Congolese</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (g): Ensure security</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (h): Combat sexual violence</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2_i: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>22 incidents</td>
<td>6 incidents</td>
<td>28 incidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2_ii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC of crimes by FARDC have the opportunity to complain</td>
<td>7 incidents</td>
<td>0 incidents</td>
<td>7 incidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2iii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>37 incidents</td>
<td>4 incidents</td>
<td>41 incidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1_ii: % population (women and men) who report that the presence of the military causes them to feel insecure (&amp; triangulation)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1_i(a): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1_i(b): % population (women and men) who report that the presence of the military causes them to feel insecure (&amp; triangulation)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2_i: % of women and men who agree that the victims of crimes by FARDC have the opportunity to complain and / or are punished for their crimes (disaggregated by gender and sub-priority zone)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2ii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1_i(c): % of women and men who report that the presence of the military causes them to feel insecure (&amp; triangulation)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1_i(d): % of women and men who indicate that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kitchanga 1: Chefferie of Bwito (Ruthsuru Territory); Kitchanga 2: Chefferies of Bashali (Masisi Territory) and small part of Kisimba (also known as Wanianga; i.e., areas around Pinga (also Masisi Territory).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2_i. % of women and men who believe that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in the family', i.e., without involvement of the authorities</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2_i (a). % of women and men who believe that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife/grospous</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2_i (b). % of women and men who 'agree' that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his/her own objective</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2_i (c). % of women and men who 'agree' that the police to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' or 'very good'</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2_i (d). % of women and men who believe that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in the family', i.e., without involvement of the authorities</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (a). % of women and men who themselves have participated in meetings on issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (seeking information)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (b). % of women and men who themselves have participated in meetings on issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (discuss and debate)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (a). % of women and men who themselves have participated in other actions to combat gender-based violence over the last three months (direct action)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (b). % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (c). % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC 'as well' or 'better' as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (d). % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' or 'very good'</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (e). % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC 'as well' or 'better' as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (f). % of women and men who think that today's efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are better than those of a year ago</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i. % of women and men who report that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household.</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (b). % of women and men who say that they know &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to markets</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (c). % of women and men who indicated they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to land</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (d). % of women and men who indicated that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; participate in cultural activities or ceremonies, with men being part at the same time</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (e). % of women and men who indicate that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (f). % of women and men who indicated that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; participate in cultural activities or ceremonies, with men being part at the same time</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (g). % of women and men who indicated that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; work together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (h). % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (i). % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that the police / PNC &quot;as well&quot; or &quot;better&quot; as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (j). % of women and men who believe that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in the family', i.e., without involvement of the authorities</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (k). % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife/grospous</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3_i (l). % of women and men who think that today's efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are better than those of a year ago</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 19: ISSS Results Data Kitchanga, Pillar 4 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016**

Kitchanga 1: Chefferie of Bwito (Ruthsuru Territory); Kitchanga 2: Chefferies of Bashali (Masisi Territory) and small part of Kisimba (also known as Wanianga; i.e., areas around Pinga (also Masisi Territory).)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Gender / Period</th>
<th>Femme</th>
<th>Homme</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1: % of women and men stating that their villages / neighborhoods are ‘very’ / ‘extremely’ peaceful</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1: % of women and men expecting that their village / neighborhood will be more peaceful in one year</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1: % of men and women who state that peace consolidation projects are ‘very good’ or ‘extremely good’ at addressing the most important issues to their area</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2: % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2: % of women and men (in areas where FARDC are deployed) who think the FARDC makes a “big” or “very big” contribution to their security</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2: % of women and men who agree that FARDC are ‘unpunished’ (for their crimes)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1: % of women and men who indicate they have ‘good’ or ‘very good’ access to administrative services of the Congolese State</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1: % of women and men who indicate they have ‘good’ or ‘very good’ access to a police station or sub-station</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3: % of women and men who “agree” that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3: % of women and men who “agree” that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his / her own objective</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3: % of women and men who state that they have a “good” or “very good” relationship across different groups of people in their lives</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3: % of women and men who state that they have a “good” or “very good” relationship between people in village or quarter</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.3: % of women and men who state that they have a “good” or “very good” relationship with people of own ethnic group</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor (“victime”) of sexual violence</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who believe that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who state that a child as a result of the violence.</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence.</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who agree that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who agree that PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be ‘good’ of ‘very good’</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC “as well” or “better” as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1: % of women and men who think that today’s efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are ‘better’ than those of a year ago</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Selected24 ISSSS Results Data Kitchanga - by gender, Pillar 1 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016

24 The table includes data for indicators for which responses by women and men in at least one of the two polls (June 2016 and December 2016) differed by more than the margin of error of +/- 5%.

Kitchanga 1: Chefferie of Bwito (Ruthsuru Territory); Kitchanga 2: Chefferies of Bashali (Massi Territory) and small part of Kisimba (also known as Wanianga; i.e., areas around Pinge also Massi Territory).
4 Observations and issues to consider based on programming scope and results data

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

Engagement of the population in the ISSSS / stabilization efforts in Kitchanga needs to be facilitated in the context of currently negative views on peace and stability at the local level. This is especially pronounced in the Chefferie of Bwito (Territoire Rutshuru) (Kitchanga 1), where about half of the population sees a complete absence of peace in their villages. Views are slightly more positive in the Chefferies of Bashali and Kisimba (around Pinga) (Kitshanga 2) (Indicator 1.iii). Up to the end of 2016, more than three quarters of adults in the priority zone found that stabilization projects had made no or only small contributions to improve the situation in their communities (Indicator 1.1.iii).25 Across the zone, the population also overwhelmingly discounted the ability of the Congolese State to help improve their lives in particular in economic terms, such as a reduction of poverty or increased employment. Unexpectedly, attitudes were significantly more positive towards the State’s efforts to prevent sexual violence. Between 2 (Bwito) and 4 (Bashali) out of 10 people in Kitchanga thought the State was performing well or better in this regard (Indicator 1.2 (h))

Overall, views on the current security situation were more positive in Bashali and surrounding areas (Kitchanga 2) than in Bwito (Kitchanga 1); while expectations of (further) improvements in the coming year were comparatively lower.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 1

In light of the largely negative views on the past stabilization projects, the participatory approach and consultation and dialogue mechanism of the ISSSS possibly gain in importance. ISSSS projects have the opportunity to use their start-up phases to build greater support for the stabilization effort.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)

Baseline data points to considerable differences in the performance of the FARDC in the protection of civilians (Specific Objective 2) across the Kitchanga priority zone. With MONUSCO data suggesting an overall more secure environment in the Chefferie of Bashali and surrounding areas (Kitchanga 2) than in Bwito (Kitchanga 1) (Indicators 2_i (a), (b), (c)), about a quarter of the population in Bashali saw the FARDC make a ‘big’ or ‘very’ big contribution to their personal security, compared to only about 1 out of 10 people in Bwito (Indicator 2.iii (a)). Twice as many people in Bashali and surroundings than in Bwito had been personally helped by the FARDC over the last year (Indicator 2.ii (a)). By and large, Bashali’s population

25 Implementation of the ISSSS had not fully commenced at that point. The start of project operations over the coming months can be expected to provide more opportunities to engage with the population in Kitchanga to solicit required support.
did not feel greater insecurity when encountering FARDC patrols, while this was the case for over 4 out of 10 people in Bwito (Indicator 2.1 ii).

Perception data also suggests differences in the ability of the population of the two zones to hold FARDC perpetrators accountable for infractions or crimes. Across Kitchanga, a majority considered it possible for victims of crimes committed by the FARDC to register complaints (Indicator 2.2.2_i). In Bwito (Kitchanga 1), however, a comparatively smaller share of the population thought that this went hand-in-hand with actual ongoing efforts by the FARDC to hold perpetrators accountable (Indicator 2.2.2 ii). A larger share of the population of Bwito expected FARDC perpetrators to go unpunished (Indicator 2.2.2 iii).

**Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2**

The clear contrast in FARDC – civilian relations between Kitchanga’s two sub-zones might offer a worthwhile opportunity to examine more closely the factors contributing to these differences. Data in this report cannot support this examination. In principle, a host of circumstances could have led to the observed differences, among them the fact that the SSR (SFCG) programme has now been operating in Kitchanga for several years. A closer examination of the project’s operations (and of other possible factors) might help to gain more insight into what has worked, and what has not.

**Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)**

ISSSS efforts to establish a greater and more beneficial presence of the “regular” Congolese State (Specific Objective 3) in Kitchanga commence against the backdrop of overall negative, but still surprisingly varied opinions on the role of the State in the priority zone so far. People in both zones by and large do not think that national and provincial elected officials currently do a good job in representing their interests (Indicator 3.2_i (a) & (b)). Views are also consistently negative across both Kitchanga sub-zones regarding the State’s ability to manage economic issues (Indicator 1.2 average on economic issues).

Also, only 1 out of 10 people in Kitchanga (and less than 1 out of 10 in certain cases) consider their access to services such as police, administrative services or the judicial system to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’, while 4 to 5 out of 10 think their access is ‘bad’ or worse (Indicator 3.1_i (a-c)).

Notable exceptions in this regard are the positive opinions of an unexpectedly large share Kitchanga’s population of the State’s capacity and performance in areas related to security and safety. Approximately 3 to 4 out of 10 people thought the State had performed well and better when it came to preventing sexual violence (Indicator 1.2 (h)). Such positive views were particularly prevalent in Bashali (Kitchanga 2), and also extended to the role of the state in ensuring security overall. Here, still 2 to 3 out of 10 people in the subzone thought the State managed this area well or very well (Indicator 1.2 (g)).

Finally, in both Kitchanga sub-zones, views on the local authorities at Chefferie level are significantly more positive than those of the provincial or national authorities. Between 20 to 40 percent of adults felt their

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26 It is also interesting to note that a greater percentage of people in Bashali and surroundings (Kitchanga 2) than in Bwito (Kitchanga 1) consider the FARDC to be the main provider of security in their villages (see graph “Triangulation of Indicators to ‘FARDC Performance in Protection of Civilians’” in Kitchanga data file).

27 Opinions on access to administrative and police services seem to be somewhat better in Bashali and surrounding areas than in Bwito; however, the differences in the poll results are too small to be statistically significant, considering the margin of error of the HHI polls of +/- 5%.
interests to be well or very well represented at this level (Indicator 3.2_i). It is important, however, to be careful in the interpretation of these numbers. It is not clear at this point if this support cuts across ethnic lines or if it is largely confined to members of the group that holds the local positions of authority.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

The negative views on the population in Kitchanga on the State’s role in managing all but some areas (security being somewhat of an exception, see below) emphasise the importance of addressing state performance not exclusively at the local level. The design of the ISSSS acknowledges this, i.e., that achieving the goal of strengthening the role of the Congolese State locally is tied to the actions, priorities and structures of stakeholders (individuals and organizations) at national and provincial level. Concretely, this means that the establishment of a coherent national administrative, legal, financial and regulatory framework for local governance (Overall Outcome 3.3) might need to be addressed more strongly by future projects or ‘good offices’ work of the SSU.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 3

1) Monitoring data for Pillar 3 reinforce that it might be worthwhile examining the factors that are contributing to comparatively positive views of the State’s role in managing issues related to safety and security, in particular in the Chefferie of Bashali and surroundings (Kitchanga 2). Again, the data in this report do not fully support such closer examination, but certainly point to possible avenues for further analysis. For example, approximately 1 to 2 out of 10 adults of Kitchanga’s population consider the national police (PNC) to be the primary provider of security in their communities. While this share is still small, it is significantly higher than in Ruzizi or Sud Irumu. The factors behind this difference could be investigated in future reports.

2) It is important to examine perception data such as the one on Indicator 3.2_i above (representation of interests by local authorities) also through the lens of ethnic affiliation, to assess the extent to which support cuts across ethnic lines. This data is available in principle from the joint UNDP-MONUSCO project, but had not yet been shared with the SSU in time or this report.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

The establishment of more equitable flows of socio-economic resources (Specific Objective 4) starts from a low level in Kitchanga. About half of the population here had no regular monthly income (Indicator 4_i) in the second half of 2016. Wage labour plays a very small role in the local economy (Indicator 4.2.5_i). Eighty to ninety percent of households across Kitchanga depend on traditional economic activities, such as agriculture and animal husbandry, fisheries and hunting (Indicator 4_ii).

Data do suggest similarities, but also considerable differences between Kitchanga’s two sub-zones in some enabling factors for economic recovery. Access to credit is extremely low across the entire priority zone

28 See “Triangulation of Indicators to ‘FARDC Performance in Protection of Civilians’” in the Kitchanga Data File.
29 See “Triangulation of Indicators to ‘FARDC Performance in Protection of Civilians’” in the Data Files for Sud Irumu and Ruzizi.
30 See also the opportunities for further monitoring and learning for Pillar 2 above.
However, in Bashali and surroundings (Kitchanga 2) a comparatively high share of adults (about 5 out of 10 adults) find their access to land and to markets to be good or better. In Bwito, by contrast, this is only the case for 1 to 2 out of 10 people. Sixty to seventy percent of adults here have bad or very bad access to land; Forty percent have bad or very bad access to markets (Indicators 4.2.1 iv and 4.2.2 ii).

In Bashali (Kitchanga 2), social relationships appear to be more strictly defined along ethnic lines than is the case in Bwito (Kitchanga 1). In both zones, all but a small minority of people seem happy to maintain relatively loose social contact with members of ethnic groups other than their own, for example when attending cultural events, or places of worship (Indicator 4.3 i (a, b)). In Bwito, this willingness to engage across ethnic lines remains essentially unchanged even when these contacts become closer, more personal and longer lasting, as is the case in marriage. In Bashali, by contrast, the share of adults who feel comfortable with these more intimate inter-ethnic social relationships drops somewhat; from about 9 out 10 adults to 7 to 8 out of 10 people (Indicator 4.3 i (d)). Adults in Bashali are also less likely to maintain a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ relationship with people who may belong to another ethnic group than adults in Bwito. Differences in ethnic affiliation significantly reduce the chance of good or very good social relationships among the population in Bashali, while this is less the case in Bwito (Indicator 4.3.2 i (d)).

### Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4

Baseline data suggest a possible need for exploring opportunities to improve opportunities to earn cash-incomes over the short-term (Intermediate Outcomes 4.1.1); and to help improve conditions for local economic recovery in Kitchanga over the medium to long-term, for example to help improve low access to credit (Intermediate Outcome 4.2.3), training opportunities and, ultimately, wage employment (Intermediate Outcome 4.2.5).

### Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 4

Across the two sub-zones in Kitchanga, stabilization projects seem to face substantially differing conditions and dynamics for their efforts to improve equitable access to land. It might be interesting for the SSU and the M&E Cell to engage with the relevant projects to understand any variations in approach these projects might be employing to adequately respond to these differences.

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31 As was the case for numbers of quality of representation of interests through local authorities, it is not clear from the data in this report what factors contribute to the comparatively higher land access in Bashali. If the more detailed data from the UNDP-MONUSCO joint project are made available to the SSU, this question can be investigated further.
Observations – Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)

ISSSS efforts to reduce levels of SGBV (Specific Objective 5) to start under somewhat differing circumstances across the Kitchanga priority zone. Lower levels of crimes against civilians in Kitchanga 2 (Bashali and surroundings) compared to Bwito (Kitchanga 1) (see Indicator 2.1) coincide with a comparatively lower number of people in the former zone who indicate to know a survivor of sexual violence (Indicator 5.iii (a, b)). At the same time, attitudes towards gender and sexual violence are more traditional in Bashali than in Bwito. A smaller share of the population in Bashali considers consent between partners to be ‘always necessary’ before sexual intercourse (Indicator 5.1.i (a)). About forty percent of the population in Bashali consider cases of sexual violence to be better resolved ‘in the family’, without involvement of the authorities, as opposed to thirty percent of people in Bwito (Indicator 5.1.i (d)).

Baseline data point to possible small improvements in the relationship between the population and security forces, in particular the police over the last year. However, men are more likely than women to report such improvements (Indicator 5.2.iv). Men in Kitchanga are also more likely to know how to access support services for SGBV survivors than women (Indicator 5.3.3.v).

Possible considerations for programming– Pillar 5

Baseline data suggests that the relationship between security forces and the population and also access of SGBV survivors to services remain volatile, suggesting that it may be important to consider expanding ISSSS support to these two areas, while taking into account in particular the perspective of women on service access and the relationship to those in charge of ensuring their security (i.e., Overall Outcomes 5.2 and 5.3).

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar

Data in Bashali (Kitchanga 2) on SGBV incidences and gender norms present somewhat of a puzzle; as somewhat less negative statistics on SGBV seem to go along with more traditional attitudes towards women and their place in society and in relationships. It might be worthwhile investigating further how these variables work together in Kitchanga, and what, if any, programming implications might need to be derived from this for the future.

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32 It is quite likely that both data sources lead to an underreporting of actual incidences of sexual violence. The Monusco database (Force section) reports 1 case of sexual violence for the six month from July 2016 until December 2016 in the entire Kitchanga priority zone. Additional data (such as from JHRO) that should be available for the next report will allow better triangulation of this information from the different sources.

33 I.e., about 6 out of 10 people in Bashali, compared to 8 out of 10 in Bwito.

34 There might be a variety of reasons behind this apparent contradiction, including the possibility that more traditional values make it less likely that cases of sexual violence are identified as such by those affected; and that survivors are less likely to come forward.
Annex III - Ruzizi Priority Zone, South Kivu Province

List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CISPE</td>
<td>Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETD</td>
<td>Local Entities/ ‘Entités Territoriales Décentralisées’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARM</td>
<td>Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation (Stabilization Coherence Fund, “trust fund”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSSSS</td>
<td>International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHRO</td>
<td>Joint Human Right Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E Cell</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Cellule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>North Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search For Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Stabilization Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Presentation of Annex III – Ruzizi (South Kivu Province)

This Annex presents an assessment of the expected status of ISSSS programming in Ruzizi during the second half of 2017 and the first months of 2018 (Section 2). This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that also projects are take into account in the mapping that are at this point still “in the pipeline“, but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future.

The Annex also presents a summarized overview of the ISSSS monitoring data for Ruzizi that covers the period of June / July 2016 to December 2016 (Section 3)³⁵. This is the first period for which a meaningfully

³⁵ A more detailed and visual presentation of the results data for Ruzizi for that period can be found in the “data file” for Ruzizi, which is available upon request.
complete set of monitoring data for the ISSSS was available. The data therefore serves as a baseline against which results from future data collection rounds will be compared.

Finally, the Annex also offers a set of tentative and preliminary observations on the ISSSS baseline data, also (but not only) when considered in the context of the combined scope of the stabilization projects that are currently operating or are planned for Ruzizi (Section 4). It is important to understand, however, that these observations are by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. On the contrary, they are meant to help stakeholders to continue the informed debate about trends and programming options in the priority zone. Questioning, revising and refining is report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Ruzizi (South Kivu Province)

This section of provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Ruzizi ‘priority zone’. Specifically, this section:

- Provides a brief description of the different programmes / interventions that are currently being implemented in Ruzizi in association with the ISSSS; i.e., which means that they are either financed through the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (aligned programmes);
- Presents an overview of how these interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five substantive Pillars; and offer some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed.
- Gives slightly more in-depth views of the Pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming, based on the status of ISSSS projects of June / July 2017, with some additional reflections on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Ruzizi

Table 21 lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Ruzizi priority zone, with information on the respective lead organizations, the expected implementation period, and the projects’ thematic focus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Title (Lead Organization)</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
<th>Thematic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Construisons ensemble pour la Paix (International Alert)</td>
<td>July 17 – June 19</td>
<td>Promoting an inclusive dialogue process to address the roots causes of conflicts, consolidate peace and create the conditions for stables institutions and economic recovery in the project area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform (SSR)) (Search for Common Ground (SFCG))</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Increasing knowledge and awareness among Congolese security forces and civilians about their rights, roles and mutual responsibilities to improve relationships and build confidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 This report was originally intended to be published already in March / April 2017, with only about three month lag from the end of the reporting period. However, some of the data that this report is based on only became available at the end of May / early June 2017. Reporting therefore had to be pushed back.
Expanding Community Resilience to Violence in Ruzizi and Fizi (Peace Direct)

Based on the concept of Community Based Reintegration (CBR) the goal is to create economic opportunities for the most vulnerable population that contribute to sustainable development and peace.

Maji ya Amani Program (IRC, SFCG, ZOA) (Alignable)

Reducing conflict between competing ethnic groups and increasing stability in the Ruzizi Plain through increased and more equitable access to land and water for household and agricultural use, and improved governance around the management of these resources.

The overall project landscape in Ruzizi

Taken together, the projects mentioned in Table 21 are set to address all five substantive pillars of the ISSSS, albeit at differing degrees of intensity:

- Presently, the project coverage of Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 2 (FARDC PoC performance) and 4 (socio-economic resilience) is relatively advanced, in that more than half of results components of each of these pillars are covered by at least one project (see Figure 2).
- Project coverage for Pillars 2 (Restoration of State Authority) and Pillar 5 (SGBV prevention) is still developing in Ruzizi. Less than half of results components of each of these Pillars are currently targeted by at least one project.

Table 22 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in Ruzizi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue around the implementation of the ISSSS in order to ensure required support and legitimacy for the ISSSS among the population (women, girls, boys and men) and among traditional and formal authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 4</td>
<td>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 5</td>
<td>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 below provides a more detailed picture of the results that are addressed either by one (small circle), or two (large circles) of the ISSSS projects in Ruzizi; either currently, or in the near future. The results that are marked in red font are presently not covered at all.

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**Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.
Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

The SCF funded project in Ruzizi is preparing to facilitate community-level democratic dialogue to frame subsequent stabilization support across sectors, and is also foreseeing several activities to facilitate buy-in and support of provincial (South Kivu) and national authorities into local stabilization processes. In addition, the SSU is engaging with the provincial government to develop a sector compact, under its responsibilities for ‘Good Offices’.

In the current political environment in the DRC, risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix, such as obstruction and other roadblocks from national, provincial (and other) authorities should be considered as likely detractors for the democratic dialogue process in the short-to medium term. This may have the potential to create scepticism among communities towards this process.
Table 23 below shows a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 1, and lists the projects that are contributing to the overall outcomes (O.O) and intermediate outcomes (I.O) under this first pillar. The table also highlights the “good offices” work of the SSU related to sector compacts.

Table 23: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 1 Support for the ISSSS at community level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 1.1 Local stabilization processes aligned with community priorities</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.1 Joint action plans developed and approved by communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.2 Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts</td>
<td>SSU Good Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.1.3 National authorities commit to &amp; act upon ‘Sector Compacts’</td>
<td>(SCF) Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 1.2 Local groups support stabilization process</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 1.2.1 Oversight mechanisms of stabilization process set-up and functioning;</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)

The scope of Pillar 2 support in Ruzizi, delivered through the SCF-funded project and the ‘SSR’ project led by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) targets better application of operational procedures and principles in keeping with the Protection of Civilians (SSR); and also seeks to improve relationship between security forces (PNC, FARDC) and communities (SCF-Ruzizi and SSR).

At this time, Pillar 2 programming in Ruzizi currently is not yet clearly addressing FARDC-internal (or PNC-internal – see Pillar 3) incentive structures that are influencing the behaviour of soldiers and commanders towards civilians; nor are project under the ISSSS currently addressing the integration of local lessons into wider national policy agenda (e.g., Security Sector Reform) (see Intermediate Outcomes 2.1.2 and 2.1.4 below).

Given the current gaps in the scope of project support, several risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix that originate from within the FARDC organization, such as soldiers’ ties to armed groups, poor pay / living conditions, frequent mistreatment of soldiers, might function to counteract programme efforts to instil PoC awareness; and to improve relations between FARDC and communities.

Table 24 below lists a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 2, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

Table 24: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 2 FARDC Performance in PoC</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.O. 2.1.1 Operational FARDC PoC principles &amp; procedures applied &amp; enforced</td>
<td>(A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1 (a) PoC Awareness &amp; skills among FARDC field commanders &amp; soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.1 (b) PoC awareness &amp; skills among FARDC commanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.2 FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced &amp; aligned w. PoC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.3 Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations</td>
<td>(A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.1.4 Lessons on PoC experiences &amp; resource requirements communicated to nat. FARDC leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 2.2 Cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.1 Social &amp; econ. integration of soldiers into host communities</td>
<td>(A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.2 Redress mechanisms f. local authorities &amp; communities</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi (A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 2.2.3 Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory &amp; profiteering)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Current Pillar 3 programming in Ruzizi aims at better training state agents (in land management, security (PNC)) and providing physical infrastructure and assets (land management) to help improved access and quality of these services. Projects currently also foresee support to increase the awareness of state agents of their professional roles and responsibility (i.e., in security) and to bolster the capacity for oversight / participatory planning (in the area of land governance, security), both of these with the aim of improving state accountability and responsiveness towards its citizens. The SCF project is also planning to use lessons from its local work on land issues support to try to inform the development of a national land management / governance framework.

Programming in Ruzizi under Pillar 3 is not currently addressing the limited financing that is available to local authorities / ETDS to expand and improve service delivery; as key prerequisite for greater access to services. Linkages of local efforts to national reforms are also not yet clearly addressed in the area of security.

The current national political context, risk from the ISSSS risk matrix such as centralisation of power, associated w. obstructionism and lack of reforms, including in financial areas (payroll) are likely to affect the work of the ISSSS and the associated projects.

Table 25 below lists a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 3, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

Table 25: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 3</strong>&lt;br&gt;Increased beneficial role and presence of “regular” Congolese State in local governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.1</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Improved access to relevant state-provided services</strong>&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.1&lt;br&gt;Improved performance of state agents in service delivery</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi (&lt;br&gt;(A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.2&lt;br&gt;Availability / access to physical infrastructure &amp; other assets f. service delivery</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.1.3&lt;br&gt;Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.2</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.1&lt;br&gt;Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning</td>
<td>(SCF): Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.2&lt;br&gt;Local population &amp; civil society act on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.2.3&lt;br&gt;Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (incl. no corruption)</td>
<td>(A): SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 3.3</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Enabling, coherent regulatory / legal framework for local governance in place</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.1&lt;br&gt;Local authorities / ETDS prepared for devolution and financial retrocession</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.2&lt;br&gt;Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 3.3.3&lt;br&gt;Lessons for increased local State presence acted on by national authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 The partners are preparing a workshop to align the project’s activities in the security sector to the national security approach.

39 Although two out of the three intermediate outcome associated with the overall outcome are addressed, one important prerequisite for expanding access to services (i.e., greater availability of resources to finance that expansion) are not addressed. This is why it was judged that the Overall Outcome is not addressed.
Current Pillar 4 programming in Ruzizi covers most of the result components of Pillar 4 related to short-term income stabilization, medium- to longer term economic recovery and social cohesion within and between communities. Currently not covered is the intent of the ISSSS to increase the availability of opportunities for “wage employment” in Ruzizi (Intermediate Outcome 4.2.5).

Stabilisation programming in Ruzizi is potentially vulnerable to several risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix, such as misgivings about perceived inequalities in resource distribution, or vulnerabilities caused by security events (e.g., affecting access to markets), or macro-economic shocks.

Table 26 below lists a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 4, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.O. 4</strong></td>
<td>Equitable resource flow (income earning &amp; economic opportunities; socio-economic support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.1</strong></td>
<td>Increased participation in employment schemes &amp; short-term income stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.1.1</td>
<td>Improved availability of livelihood &amp; start-up grants and cash-for-work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.1.3</td>
<td>Improved access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.2</strong></td>
<td>Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.1</td>
<td>Increased sustained access to markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.2</td>
<td>Improved and secure access to land, natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.3</td>
<td>Improved access to credit (all groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.4</td>
<td>Improved access to training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.2.5</td>
<td>Improved access to wage employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 4.3</strong></td>
<td>Social linkages within and between communities strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.3.1</td>
<td>Psycho-social needs of vulnerable / marginalized groups in community addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 4.3.2</td>
<td>Inter- &amp; intra community trust increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming for Pillar 5 (Prevention of SGBV)

Currently foreseen in Pillar 5 ISSSS programming in Ruzizi focuses on change of gender- and SGBV-related norms, employing dialogue, awareness campaigns; but also (in the case of the SCF programme) the development of a gender action plan to guide planning of specific activities. Beyond that, one programme (SSR) is engaged in working directly with security actors on awareness raising on gender and SGBV to seek a reduction of cases of SGBV perpetrated by PNC and FARDC.

Not clearly covered are Pillar 5 components that aim at working directly with the justice system and with other service providers to ensure the adequate access of SGBV survivors to the justice system, to improve the quality of the judicial process and to make available other support services to survivors and their families. This includes to an extent both the military judicial system and the civil courts.

Pillar 5 programming aimed at norm changes has to contend with a deeply embedded culture of impunity around SGBV in the security services. Achieving cultural and norm changes may also be made more difficult by that fact that ISSSS projects currently do not plan to address the internal incentive structures
that can lead FARDC soldiers and officers to retain links to armed groups, and to shift their alliances opportunistically from one to the other (see also programming observations for Pillar 2 in Ruzizi).

Table 27 below is a portion of the ISSSS log frame pillar 5, and shows the projects contributing to its O.O and I.O. It also highlights the results where no intervention is currently being implemented/planned.

Table 27: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / outcome</th>
<th>Associated project / programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5</strong></td>
<td>Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.1</strong></td>
<td>Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.1.2</td>
<td>Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.1.3</td>
<td>Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.2</strong></td>
<td>Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.2.1</td>
<td>Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.2.2</td>
<td>Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.O. 5.3</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.1</td>
<td>Increased public awareness of laws &amp; standards; roles &amp; responsibilities to combat SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.3</td>
<td>Improved support services for SGBV survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.4</td>
<td>Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. 5.3.5</td>
<td>Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3 ISSSS Results Data – Ruzizi

This section of the report contains a summary "data sheet" for those indicators of the ISSSS logical framework for which data was available for the first reporting round. A more detailed, exhaustive and visual presentation of the data can be found in the separate data file for the Ruzizi priority zone.

**Table 28: ISSSS Results Data Ruzizi, Pillar 1 to 3, June 2016 – December 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Location / Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruzizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_i (c): % of women and men who indicate that national elected officials represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' (average)</td>
<td>13% 17% 3% 9% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_i: % of women and men who indicate that their villages / neighborhoods are 'very' or 'extremely' peaceful</td>
<td>13% 17% 3% 9% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_j: % of women and men who expect that their village / neighborhood will be more peaceful in one year</td>
<td>13% 17% 3% 9% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_k: % of men and women who state that peace consolidation projects are 'very good' or 'extremely good' at addressing the most important issues to their area</td>
<td>13% 17% 3% 9% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_l: % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas &quot;well&quot; or &quot;very well&quot; (average for economic issues)</td>
<td>13% 17% 3% 9% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_i (a): No. of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by armed groups against women, girls, boys and men.</td>
<td>0 incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_i (b): No. of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men.</td>
<td>2 incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_j: % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year</td>
<td>7% 4% 7% 0% 0% 9% 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_k: % of women and men (in areas where FARDC are deployed) who think the FARDC makes a &quot;big&quot; or &quot;very big&quot; contribution to their security</td>
<td>11% 13% 19% 20% 0% 0% 10% 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_l: % of local / provincial / national elected officials who report that the presence of the military causes them to feel insecure (&amp; triangulation)</td>
<td>21% 14% 17% 5% 25% 26% 21% 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_m: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing.</td>
<td>55% 52% 57% 54% 26% 43% 73% 55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2_n: % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for their crimes).</td>
<td>39% 39% 40% 43% 24% 25% 47% 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3_i (a): % of women and men who state that peace consolidation projects are &quot;very&quot; or &quot;extremely&quot; acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes').</td>
<td>26% 29% 22% 23% 38% 40% 22% 27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ruzizi 1: Chefferie / Secteur Plaine de Ruzizi, Bavira; Ruzizi 2: Secteur d’Itombwe; Ruzizi 3: Uvira Ville.*
Table 29: ISSSS Results Data Ruzizi, Pillar 4 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Location / Period</th>
<th>Ruzizi</th>
<th>Ruzizi 1</th>
<th>Ruzizi 2</th>
<th>Ruzizi 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.2.1_i: % of women and men indicating they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to markets</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (a): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; participate in cultural activities or ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (b): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (c): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; work together with members of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (d): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area &quot;often&quot; or &quot;sometimes&quot; intermarry with members from other ethnic groups</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (a): % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (b): % of women and men who indicate that the population in their neighborhood / village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them; in spite of occasional competition</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (c): % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his / her own objective</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (d): % of women and men who believe that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved &quot;in the family&quot;, i.e., without involvement of the authorities</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_ii (a-1). % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_ii (a-2). % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their community</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_ii (b): % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that groups or individuals in their neighborhood / village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them; in spite of occasional competition</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_ii (c): relationship with people of own ethnic group</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_ii (d): relationship with people of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' or 'very good'</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who declare that they have &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; access to credit, if required?</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ruzizi 1: Chefferie / Secteur Plaine de Ruzizi, Bavira; Ruzizi 2: Secteur d’Itombwe; Ruzizi 3: Uvira Ville.
Table 30: Selected ISSSS Results Data Ruzizi - by gender, Pillar 1 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1_iii: % Women and men stating that their villages / neighborhoods are 'very' / 'extremely' peaceful</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.iv: % of women and men expecting that their village / neighborhood will be more peaceful in one year</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2 (Av. Security): % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas &quot;well&quot; or &quot;very well&quot; (average for security and safety)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (a): Establish peace in Eastern Congo</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (e): Unify the different ethnic groups</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 (h): Combat sexual violence</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2_i: % of women and men who agree that the victims of crimes by FARDC have the opportunity to complain (disaggregated by gender and sub-priority zone)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.2_iii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for their crimes)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1_i (b): % of men and women who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to a police station or sub-station</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1_i (c): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to the national civil judicial system</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.2.2_ii: % of women and men who indicate that they find it &quot;very&quot; or &quot;extremely&quot; acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes').</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (a): % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3_i (b): % of women and men who &quot;agree&quot; that the population in their neighborhood / village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them; in spite of occasional competition</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i: % of women and men who state that they have a &quot;good&quot; or &quot;very good&quot; relationship across different groups of people in their lives</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i (a) relationship with parents, children, spouse</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i (b) relationship with neighbors</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i (c) relationship with people in village or quarter</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i (d) relationship with people of own ethnic group</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4.3.2_i (e) relationship with people, no matter their ethnic group</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (a): % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1_i (c): % of women and men who would accept back into their household a woman who is a survivor of sexual violence if this women had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result of this incidence</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.1.3_i (a): % of women and men who have sought out information about issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (seeking information)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2_i: % of women and men who ‘agree’ that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2.1_i: % of women and men who ‘agree’ that PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2.iv (a): % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' / 'very good'</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2.iv (b): % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC &quot;as well&quot; or &quot;better&quot; as survivors of other crimes</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5.2.iv (c): % of women and men who think that today’s efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are 'better' than those of a year ago</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40 The table includes data for indicators for which responses by women and men in at least one of the two polls (June 2016 and December 2016) differed by more than the margin of error of +/- 5%. 

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**Table 30:** Selected ISSSS Results Data Ruzizi - by gender, Pillar 1 to 5, June 2016 – December 2016.
4 Observations and issues to consider based on programming scope and results data

While as a whole is comparable for most ISSSS metrics to the other two priority zones covered in depth in this report, the Ruzizi priority zone stands out through greater geographic disparities between its three sub-zones than is the case for Kitchanga or Sud Irumu. For one, the zone includes Uvira Ville, a town with a population of approximately 400,000 (Ruzizi 1), which explains the difference in attitudes and perceptions related to access to land or access to markets. Beyond that, Ruzizi also consists of the Secteur d’Itombwe, which has a unique data profile among the zones covered in this first ISSSS programming round. It is defined, among other things, by even greater doubts about peace and stability in the presence and the likelihood of a more peaceful and stable future; greater wariness of key institutions of the Congolese state than is the norm in the other priority zones, and social relationships that are less likely to cross ethnic lines than in any of the other ISSSS priority zones and sub-zones.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

On the whole, negative views on the potential of peace now and in the future; and on the role of that either stabilization projects or the Government can play to affect change create a challenging environment to start democratic dialogue in the Ruzizi priority zone. Only ten to twenty percent of the population in Ruzizi consider their communities to be very or extremely peaceful (Indicator 1.iii). A similarly small share of the population expects more peaceful conditions in the medium-term future (Indicator 1.iv). Women tend to see chances for peace more pessimistically than men, both in the present and the future.

Confidence that peace consolidation (i.e. stabilization) projects can bring about positive change in their communities is low. Less than ten percent of the population finds that those projects are making good or very good contributions in this regard (Indicator 1.1.iii). Confidence in the ability of the governance to make a positive difference in their lives is slightly higher in comparison, but still does not suggest a very optimistic assessment of what the Congolese Government can do to make progress in stabilizing situation in the zone. Only about 2 out of 10 people in Ruzizi as a whole believe that the Government is managing issue related to security “well” or “very well”. Support for the Government’s management of economic affairs is lower, still (Indicator 1.2 (a – h)).

Views on current and future peace and stability are particularly negative in the Secteur d’Itombwe (Ruzizi 2). Here, about sixty to seventy percent find peace to be completely absent from their communities (see Indicator 1.iii in Ruzizi Data File). Only five percent of the population of Secteur d’Itombwe believe that this situation will have improved in a year’s time (Indicator 1.iv). Eighty to ninety percent of people in

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41 Kitchanga, Sud Irumu
42 Sub-zone Ruzizi 1 includes the Chefferies / Secteurs ‘Plaine de la Ruzizi’ and ‘Bavira’; Sub-zone Ruzizi 2 includes the Chefferies / Secteurs ‘Secteur d’Itombwe’; Sub-zone Ruzizi 3 is made up of Uvira Ville.
43 Across these metrics, women tend to be less optimistic than men.
44 Only about 2% of Ruzizi’s population consider the Government to perform “well” or better in this area.
45 As opposed to only five to fifteen percent who hold this negative view Ruzizi’s other two sub-zones.
46 See, for example, the situations in
the Secteur consider the Government to perform “badly” or “very badly” in the area of security in this sub-zone (*Indicator 1.2*), as opposed to fifty to sixty percent in Ruzizi’s other sub-zones\(^{47}\).

### Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 1

As in Sud Irumu and Kitchanga, the negative views on past stabilization projects increase the relative importance of the participatory democratic dialogue under Pillar 1. These same circumstances may also increase the pressure for projects to follow-up quickly with concrete actions in order to convince a largely sceptical population of the overall value of the stabilization process.

### Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 1

Responding to the unique situation in the Secteur d’Itombwe that among other things is characterized by the absence of peace and particularly low confidence in the Government may require a particular response from project partners. It may be beneficial to engage with those partners that are active in the sub-zone to more clearly identify the specific conflict drivers; and to ensure that they are sufficiently reflected in the monitoring framework of the ISSSS.

### Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in PoC)

Compared to the other two priority zones (Kitchanga, Sud Irumu) the FARDC plays less of a significant role in ensuring security in Ruzizi. Only a small minority of the populations finds that it has been helped by the FARDC over the last year; i.e., five percent, as opposed to approximately fifteen to thirty percent in the other two priority zones (*Indicator 2_ii (a)*)\(^{48}\). Fewer people also think that the FARDC is making big or very big contributions to security in their communities (*Indicator 2_iii (a)*).

As in the other Pillars, the Secteur d’Itombwe again stands out as a somewhat unique case among the ISSSS priority zones and sub-zones. Here, virtually nobody in the population has received help from the FARDC in the past year (*Indicator 2_ii (a)*)\(^{49}\); and more than eighty percent of people find that the FARDC has made no contribution to security in their community, as opposed to four and nine percent in Uvira Ville (Ruzizi 3) and Plaine de la Ruzizi and Bavira (Ruzizi 1), respectively\(^{48}\). At the same time, about a quarter of the population in Secteur d’Itombwe feels a heightened sense of insecurity when encountering FARDC patrols (*Indicator 2.1_ii*).

It is not immediately clear from the monitoring data what causes this difference in the role of the FARDC in Ruzizi. It does not seem to be the case that the FARDC itself is considered to be a principal source of insecurity more than in the other two priority zones. In fact, the military does not appear to affect perceptions of security to any significant degree, neither through its presence, nor its absence\(^{49}\). This interpretation is in principle supported by data from the MONUSCO Force that does not show any reported crimes against civilians committed by soldiers for the period from July to December 2016 in the

\(^{47}\) See Ruzizi Data File (available upon request).

\(^{48}\) See Indicator 2_iii (a) in the Ruzizi Data File (available upon request).

\(^{49}\) Triangulation of Indicator 2.1_ii in Ruzizi data file (available upon request).
priority zone (Indicator 2.1). While approximately twenty percent of the population in Ruzizi do feel somewhat more insecure when encountering FARDC patrols, this is about the same share as in Kitchanga and Sud Irumu (Indicator 2.1). Attitudes towards the FARDC’s efforts to hold its soldiers accountable for crimes they commit are somewhat more negative in Ruzizi than in Sud Irumu, but largely the same as in Kitchanga.

The views of women on the PoC performance of the FARDC do not significantly differ from those of men in Ruzizi.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

In order to be able to correctly interpret results data for Pillar 2 from the Ruzizi priority zone, it will be important to better understand the specific context that defines the relationship between the FARDC and the civilian population in the zone; and the particular relevance that support under Pillar 2 has in this context. This also includes the need to better understand the unique situation in the Secteur d’Itombwe, including the extent of the actual deployment of the FARDC there. Furthermore, it may be important to understand better how Search for Common Ground (SSR) and the International Alert (Construisons ensemble pour la Paix; SCF) are currently; or are planning to take into account these particular circumstances in their project approach.

Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Low levels of confidence in the performance of the Government in economic and security-related matters (see comments on Pillar 1 above), difficulties to access state-provided services provide a challenging starting point for Pillar 3 programming in Ruzizi. Circumstances may even be rendered more challenging by the considerable differences in the presence and authority of the State among Ruzizi’s three sub-zones.

Access to state-provided services tends to be best in Uvira Ville (Ruzizi 3), with about a quarter of the population assessing their access to be good or better (for administrative services, police and the national judicial system). Access is lowest in the Secteur d’Itombwe (Ruzizi 2). Here, virtually no one in the population has good or very good access to any of the three services; approximately eighty to ninety percent of people here find their ability to access these three services bad or very bad (Indicators 3.1_i (a – c)), giving the State an extraordinarily low profile in that sub-zone.

People in Ruzizi by and large do not find their interests and priorities to be represented by representatives of the Congolese State (Indicator 3.2_i), neither at national nor at provincial level. Only the local authorities in the three sub-zones enjoy a certain level of support from the population, led by the Secteur

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50 As mentioned elsewhere, this does not mean that no infractions or crimes by the FARDC were committed. The SSU M&E Cell will engage with the responsible unit of the Force to discuss the reliability of the process used to record security incidents.

51 The percentage of people who see improvements in the Army’s accountability for infractions against civilians is considerably smaller in the Secteur d’Itombwe than in Ruzizi’s other sub-zones. It is also notable that an unusually high percentage of people (approximately fifty percent) refused to answer questions on this topic during the survey (see Indicators 2.2.2_i – iii in the Ruzizi Data File, which is available upon request).

52 On average, approximately ten to twenty percent of the population in Ruzizi considers its access to administrative services, police stations and the judicial system to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’. Fifty to sixty percent on average find their access to be ‘bad’ or worse (Indicator 3.1_i (a – c)).
d’Itombwe (Ruzizi 2), were roughly 4 out of 10 adults find that the local authorities represent their interests well or very well. In Uvira Ville (Ruzizi 3) only close to twenty percent of the population approve of their local authorities in this regard *(Indicator 3.2_i)*.

Gender differences associated with Pillar 3 exist with regard to access to justice. Across the Ruzizi priority zone, the share of men who consider their access to the national judicial system to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’ is more than twice as high as that of women (i.e. over twenty percent for men; and under ten percent for women) *(Indicator 3.1_i (c))*.

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### Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

Currently, no ISSSS projects in Ruzizi are addressing the challenging task of facilitating the development of a coherent regulatory, legal, administrative and financial framework for local governance (Overall Outcome 3.3 and Intermediate Outcome 3.1.3). However, it is unlikely that State functions and State legitimacy can be restored in Ruzizi or any of the other priority zones without a more coherent governance framework in place to support this. The fact that data suggests that state services are all but entirely absent in part of the Ruzizi priority zone only further accentuates that issue.

It is not clear if and how any sector-specific stabilization program or projects alone can begin to address this issue without careful coordination with interventions in other sectors; and without the complement of carefully coordinated policy dialogue and political engagement at different levels and by different actors. It may be beneficial for the SSU and the Technical Secretariat to consider how the prerequisites for this kind of engagement can be created over time; and what responses might be available under the ISSSS if no progress can be made on this front.

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### Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 3

The SSU might consider tracking and examining the approaches for engaging with provincial and national authorities of the SCF project in Ruzizi (led by International Alert) and of other projects and actors with similar initiatives. As this type of engagement needs to occur across projects, actors and different levels, creating a better shared understanding of the factors that allow these types of efforts to succeed could be beneficial for a larger group of ISSSS partners.

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### Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

At the start of implementation, the ISSSS is faced with very diverse socio-economic conditions across Ruzizi. While in Secteur d’Itombwe (Ruzizi 2), almost one hundred percent of households depend primarily on traditional economic activities (agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, hunting) to make a living, this is the case for only 2 out of 10 households in Uvira Ville; and for 7 out of 10 households in the Chefferies / Secteurs ‘Plaine de la Ruzizi’ and ‘Bavira’ (Ruzizi 1) *(Indicator 4.ii)*. Access to markets is significantly better in Uvira Ville than in the other two sub-zones (Indicator 4.2.1_iv), while access to land is far lower than in the more rural areas *(4.2.2_ii)*. Access to credit and paid work is essentially non-existent in Secteur d’Itombwe. In Uvira Ville at least 1 out of 10 people have access to credit *(Indicator 4.2.3_i)*, and have had at least one week of paid work over the last three month (prior to each respective survey) *(Indicator 4.2.5_i)*.
Social, interpersonal relationships are commonly formed across ethnic lines in Uvira Ville (Ruzizi 3) and ‘Plaine de la Ruzizi’ and ‘Bavira’ (Ruzizi 1), while in Secteur d’Itombwe people tend to stay within the confines of their ethnic groups to attend cultural events, worship or work. Only 2 out of 10 people here find that marriage across ethnic lines happen often or even sometimes (Indicators 4.3.1 (a – c)). Ethnic affiliation also affects the quality of inter-personal relationship more strongly in Secteur d’Itombwe than is the case in the other two sub-zones (Indicator 4.3.2_i (a – e)).

Women in Ruzizi are much more likely than men to stay within their own ethnic groups when forming social relationships, be it in the context of cultural activities, worship, work or marriage.

**Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4**

Considering the differences in social integration between men and women in Ruzizi across ethnic lines, programmes may want to assess if it is necessary for support aimed at increasing social cohesion within and among communities to be directed specifically at women and their specific social barriers.

**Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 4**

Against the backdrop of the considerable socio-economic conditions across Ruzizi, it might be worthwhile to examine more closely how projects manage to adapt their support to the particular realities of each of the sub-zones; or conversely, if and how support under Pillar 4 affects the diverse target groups in the Priority Zone in differing ways.

**Observations – Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)**

Several indicators seem to suggest that the incidence of sexual violence in Ruzizi is the lowest among the three priority zones discussed in this report. Only 1 out of 10 people here report to know a woman is a survivor of sexual violence, while the corresponding percentages in Kitchanga and Sud Irumu are twice and three times as large, respectively (Indicator 5.iii (a))

While attitudes towards the necessity for consent before sex are roughly the same in Ruzizi as in the other priority zones, views on violence towards women are notably different: In Ruzizi, about seventy percent of the population reject the idea that it can be acceptable for a man to beat his wife (Indicator 5.1_i (b)). The same is true for only approximately half of the adult population in Sud Irumu and Kitchanga. Rejection of this type of violence is highest in Secteur d’Itombwe, where over eighty percent renounce violence in marriages. Women in Ruzizi are less likely to agree with intra-marital violence than men.

Families in Ruzizi are about as likely to accept survivors of sexual violence back into their communities and households as those in other priority zones, with approximately 8 out of 10 people indicating they would re-integrate survivors even if they had suffered injuries or had become pregnant (Indicators 5.1_ii (a – b)).

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53 Ruzizi has also the smallest percentage of people who report to be survivors of sexual violence themselves. The difference between priority zones is within the margin of error of the HHI perception poll, however, and thus cannot give a good indication of the actual differences in the population.

54 Approximately 6 out of 10 people consider consent to be necessary (Indicator 5.1_i (b)).

55 Only 1 out of 10 women find that it may be acceptable for a husband to beat his wife, whereas 2 out of 10 men consider this acceptable (Indicator 5.1_i (b)).
Acceptance is greatest in Secteur d’Itombwe. However, it needs to be noted that this is also the sub-zone with the comparatively lowest incidence of sexual violence among all of the sub-zones discussed in this report. It is not clear to what extent this plays a role in shaping the attitudes of its population.

Women in Ruzizi tend to have more negative views than men on the accountability of security forces for acts of sexual violence; and for their ability to appropriately investigate those incidents. Only fifteen percent of women consider the efforts of the police in Ruzizi in this regards to be good or better (Indicator 5.2.iv (a)) and only about 1 in 10 women have seen improvements in this area over the last year (Indicator 5.2.iv (c))

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Possible considerations for programming– Pillar 5

Baseline data on the occurrence of sexual violence and the contributing factors and main perpetrators in Ruzizi is not conclusive enough to judge if the low degree of project coverage of Pillar 5 is appropriate, or if more project support should be made available to help prevent and respond to cases of sexual violence in the priority zone. It may be necessary to revisit this question in subsequent monitoring reports and engagements with project partners.