

# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION SUPPORT STRATEGY (I-SSSS)



PROMOTING A SECURE AND STABLE  
ENVIRONMENT IN AREAS AFFECTED BY  
ARMED CONFLICT

## INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK (IPF)

2009 – 2012

### DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

## Executive summary

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The eastern provinces of the DRC have suffered from intermittent but serious violence over the last six years, even as the remainder of the country has stabilized. Foreign armed groups are still active, violence against civilians remains at high levels, and an estimated two million people are displaced from their homes.

However, a window of opportunity has recently opened for political progress. One major armed group (the CNDP) and a number of smaller militias agreed in March 2009 to integrate their cadres into Government structures. Relations with Uganda and Rwanda have also improved, and reinvigorated military operations are now ongoing against the two largest armed groups: the FDLR (in North and South Kivu) and the LRA (in Uganda and Province Orientale).

Against this background, the Government finalized its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) in June 2009. To support STAREC, the United Nations system and key partners have revised the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) first developed in 2008 to better align it with Government priorities. This document – the Integrated Programme Framework – explains the resulting strategy and programmatic priorities.

The revised UNSSSS – now known as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) – comprises five key objectives:

1. **Improving security:** Create a protective environment for civilians by strengthening the security forces, and improving discipline and control; supporting the demobilization and reintegration of armed groups.
2. **Supporting political dialogue:** Help national and provincial governments to advance peace processes and implement key commitments under existing agreements.
3. **Strengthening the state:** Re-establish essential public services in areas formerly controlled by armed groups; transferring security to civilian police, and building up the rule of law.
4. **Facilitating return, reintegration & recovery:** Support the safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees, address priority social needs and key sources of conflict, and kick-start economic recovery.
5. **Combating sexual violence:** in each of the above areas, mainstream more effective prevention and response to sexual violence as contemplated in the Comprehensive Strategy on Sexual Violence.

Interventions focus on a limited number of high-priority areas critical to the overall stability of the East. These comprise areas formerly under the control of armed groups; vital economic / transport arteries; and areas which could produce a significant peace consolidation “ripple effect” for their regions.

The total funding requirements for the ISSSS are estimated at approximately 800 million USD of which 139 million USD has already been programmed as at December 2009. To help allocate resources in a flexible and effective manner, a common fund management mechanism – the Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility – has been established. The fund is managed by the UN, the GoDRC and interested donors.

This document provides an overview of the strategy and programmatic contributions through which the international community intends to support the priorities of the GoDRC ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan’. It also describes modalities for the coordination of international stabilization efforts in eastern DRC, and the management of the common fund management facility and associated structures, which together will seek to maximize the coherence and collective impact of international support.

The ISSSS *Integrated Programme Framework* is also closely aligned with the United Nations national strategy for DRC, as articulated in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). Within this framework, the IPF provides the detailed programmatic and operational strategy for achieving strategic objectives of UN support in Eastern DRC specifically.

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## I. The situation in the East

### Challenges to peace

#### **Six years after the 2003 peace accords, the Eastern provinces remain volatile.**

The eastern provinces have suffered from intermittent cycles of violence following the peace accords that put an end to the political crisis in 2003, and the establishment of a democratic government in 2006.

Tensions have mainly been due to the presence of foreign and local armed groups hindering state control and preying on the civilian population. The upsurge of violence in North Kivu and Ituri in late 2008 as a result of the resumption of hostilities by the CNDP and FRPI militias created massive unrest,<sup>1</sup> reversing the fragile progress made in peacebuilding during recent years.

Although important progress has since been made, the situation remains fragile. There is a significant risk of further violence and conflict, especially due to the continued presence of the FDLR and LRA and efforts by the GoDRC to disarm these groups.

#### **The activities of foreign and indigenous armed groups have led to the collapse of state authority in vast areas.**

Decades of misgovernance in the DRC have led to weak, unreliable security services, which are subject to parallel chains of command or private use by politicians and businessmen, prone to mutiny and coup attempts, and corrupt and predatory in nature.

As a result, government authority has been severely challenged by the wars and rebellions of the last two decades. Local militia and foreign-backed rebel movements were able to take over vast areas of Congolese territory and (in some cases) install parallel administrative structures.

Since 2003, the withdrawal of foreign armies and the integration of Congolese armed groups into the security forces have gradually led to formal unification, but there remains a substantial residual presence of foreign and indigenous rebel groups and criminal networks.

This situation challenges the ability of the central government to govern, levy taxes, restore the rule of law and protect its borders and citizens. It has also led to large-scale violence against civilians in

areas where the state has attempted to suppress rebellions.

#### **Complex layers of interests continue to undermine peace building efforts.**

**Economic dynamics:** Decades of state absence, war and instability have transformed the socioeconomic environment. Markets, trading centres, routes, national parks, mining centres and key border crossings are subject to violent competition between residual rebel groups, marauding bandits, local identity based militia, poachers and elements of the official armed forces. This environment has driven youth and economically active elements of the population to seek protection or socio-economic emancipation in joining militias.

**Ethnic violence:** Tensions over resources and political power have often led to the manipulation of ethnic identities to fuel armed conflict. The return of IDPs and refugees and the renewed cultivation of land may lead to new incidents of violence or ethnic cleansing, unless robust arrangements to protect vulnerable groups and restore inter-community dialogue are in place.

**Land conflicts** are also rife, generated by decades of corruption, demographic changes, different cultural traditions of land tenure and misappropriation of land by powerful businessmen and warlords.

**Sexual violence:** Is perpetrated by armed groups, security forces and increasingly by civilians. It represents a human rights, public health and development problem that fuels local conflict dynamics.

**Legitimacy of the state:** In areas where the GoDRC has deployed its agents, they are often faced with local resistance. In many cases, they have started to coexist with local armed groups and criminal networks and are either unable to impose state authority or unwilling to give up their own private interests. Their indiscipline limits effectiveness, and does not build confidence in the central government.

**Inaccessibility:** Many areas are simply inaccessible, due to insecurity or lack of roads and basic infrastructure. This enables insurgent activity, and makes the establishment of economic activity, state security and law enforcement much more difficult.

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<sup>1</sup> CNDP (*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*) and FRPI (*Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri*).



## The current environment

### Recent developments have opened a window of opportunity to consolidate peace.

By mid-2009 violence and threats to stability have been considerably reduced. This is due to:

- Improvements in diplomatic relations with Rwanda and Uganda, thereby limiting foreign support to armed groups.
- The January 2009 cease-fire with the CNDP, the arrest of Laurent Nkunda and the integration of various armed groups into the national armed forces.
- Joint operations against the major foreign armed groups: with Uganda (against the LRA) and Rwanda (against the FDLR).
- The March 2003 peace agreements between the GoDRC, the CNDP and most other armed groups in the Kivus which created a framework for reconciliation.

The GoDRC has now re-occupied most of the areas previously controlled by armed groups in North Kivu, and ex-combatants are being progressively integrated into the FARDC or demobilized and reintegrated into community life.

### There are credible political frameworks to achieve this.

The Nairobi Communiqué in November 2007 demonstrated the willingness of the DRC and Rwanda to address the FDLR problem. This agreement led to joint DRC–Rwandan operations against the FDLR in early 2009.

The signing on 23 January 2008 of the Actes d'Engagement (also known as the Goma process) provided a framework for ending conflict in the Kivus. While the relevance of the *Actes d'Engagement* was undermined by the resumption of conflict in North Kivu in August 2008, it still serves as an overarching political framework for national and international efforts.

The 23 March Agreements signed between the government, the CNDP and eight Mayi-Mayi groups provide specific political solutions to the conflict within this broader framework.

### Efforts to consolidate peace are at a critical juncture.

Political settlements remain fragile, and the current situation is characterized by:

- A delicate power-sharing formula where elements of armed groups are being integrated into the GoDRC, but with considerable uncertainty over their loyalties and the sustainability of the process.

- A delicate political and military balance due to continuing mutual suspicion on all sides, despite widespread agreements between armed groups to disengage.
- A resurgence of violence by the FDLR in North and South Kivu following the Joint Operations of January/February 2009, and continued attempts by the FARDC (with MONUC support) to counter these actions.
- Continued widespread violence in Haut-Uele District in the context of operations against the LRA.
- Continued harassment and violence against civilians by FARDC units, including by new deployments to areas previously controlled by armed groups.
- High levels of violence by rebel groups against the civilian population, including child recruitment and sexual violence.
- Each of the above factors impeding the return of over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

Furthermore, local and national elections are expected in the next several years. This represents an opportunity to improve the legitimacy and responsiveness of the state, but could also be destabilizing. Spoilers who have resorted to violence and intimidation in the past may threaten the process and/or return to violence if their interests are not met.

### International support for stabilization efforts is critical to consolidate gains.

The challenges for the GoDRC are enormous and can only be tackled in a progressive manner and at critical locations. Among the key challenges:

- The FARDC, assisted by MONUC, needs to remove illegal armed groups from these areas and protect the population, allowing for civilian police and state agents to deploy unchallenged.
- A gradual demilitarisation of stable areas will then need to follow, with the garrisoning and removal of the military.
- The arrival of civilian law enforcement services to clamp down on criminals, regulate commerce and trade and administer justice.
- Restoring access to the hinterland, where residual militia are seeking sanctuary will depend on the consolidation of legitimate security in main arteries first.
- The illicit trade and private taxation of commodities needs to be brought to an end, not only by the imposition of legitimate law enforcement services and the harmonisation

of a credible taxation system but also through agreements with neighbouring countries.

- People who have been uprooted by war, both refugees and the internally displaced, and the fighters who engaged in it all need to voluntarily return and begin their lives again.
- The state needs to be made credible enough to support their protection, security and the delivery of basic social and economic services particularly health and education in order to improve the deplorable social indicators in DRC.

## Stabilization initiatives

### STAREC – The government’s plan for the East

The GoDRC elaborated its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) in June 2009. This plan identifies a number of priorities for the short to medium term, grouped under three components:

- Security and restoration of state authority: Strengthening of FARDC operational capacities; disengagement of armed groups and their integration into security forces or demobilization; protection of civilians, including action against sexual violence; bolstering police, justice and local administration services; and action against the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Humanitarian and social assistance: Support to the voluntary return of Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons, socio-economic reintegration of these populations; and the protection of civilians including actions to combat sexual violence.
- Economic recovery: Support to road rehabilitation and revival of vital economic sectors, such as agriculture, husbandry, small industry; revival of economic relations with Burundi and Rwanda.

STAREC was developed on the basis of pre-existing stabilization interventions supported by the international community and the “Amani Programme” for disengagement and demobilization.

Building on on-going efforts in the Kivus and Ituri, the Plan also targets the districts of Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele in Orientale Province, Maniema Province, and the North Tanganyika district of Katanga province.

## The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

Following the development of the Government’s plan, national and international partners agreed that the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), developed in 2008, should be adapted as the primary mechanism for international assistance within this framework.

The UNSSSS has accordingly been renamed as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS). Substantively, it has been revised to focus on four key areas and a cross-cutting component:

- Security
- Political processes
- Restoration of state authority
- Sustainable return and reintegration
- Sexual violence

In order to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of international efforts in support to the GoDRC, the ISSSS has also been expanded to comprise three main components:

- A strategy: The Integrated Programme Framework (IPF), which sets out objectives and underlying programs to support STAREC priorities.
- A funding facility: The Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility (SRFF) which provides a flexible mechanism for managing international funds for stabilization programs.
- A secretariat: The Stabilization Support Unit (SSU) which will support coordination, fund management, program design and monitoring / reporting.

### *Relationship of the ISSSS to other frameworks*

ISSSS interventions are transitional activities which:

- **build on** emergency assistance under the Humanitarian Action Plan;
- **prioritize and accelerate** recovery and development activities that are key enablers for stabilization; and
- **fill gaps** critical to stabilization that are not already covered by other frameworks.

To ensure continuity of effort, ISSSS activities will be closely coordinated with those in other sectors, including the humanitarian clusters, the reform committees and the government’s thematic groups.

With respect to:

- Humanitarian activities: annex 5 sets out in detail the demarcation between activities under the Humanitarian Action Plan and fundable by the Humanitarian Pooled Fund versus those under the ISSSS and eligible for the Stabilization and Recovery Fund.
- The UN national transition strategy: Within the UN's Integrated Strategic Framework, the ISSSS provides a detailed programmatic framework for achieving UN objectives in Eastern DRC specifically.

## II. Overview of the ISSSS

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### Objectives

The overall objective of the ISSSS is to support national efforts to promote a secure and stable environment in key conflict-affected areas of Eastern DRC.

As such: The ISSSS aims to address specific root causes and consequences of conflict, support the implementation of peace initiatives at local level, and help stabilize areas where conflict has recently ceased. As a transitional strategy, the ISSSS will focus on urgent needs and priorities within a minimum time-frame of three years.

Five key areas of support have been identified, including a cross-cutting component.

#### (1) Improve security

Reduce threats to life, property and freedom of movement by:

- strengthening security forces (army and national police) in areas formerly controlled by armed groups;
- supporting the disengagement and disbanding of armed groups through either demobilization or integration into security forces; and
- improving operational and internal control systems for FARDC units to reduce rates of abuse of civilians, including sexual violence.

#### (2) Support political processes

Support national and provincial governments to advance peace processes by:

- helping to improve diplomatic relations between the DRC and key neighboring countries;
- identifying and sanctioning spoilers, serious human rights abusers and those involved in sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo; and
- supporting political leaders to follow through on commitments made under the Communiqués and other key agreements.

#### (3) Strengthen state authority

Restore and strengthen the state in areas where it has been weak or non-existent by:

- ensuring reliable road access;
- deploying police, courts and prisons to uphold the rule of law and ensure public order; and

- re-establishing decentralized administrative services.

#### **(4) Facilitate return, reintegration, and recovery**

Ensure the voluntary and safe return of refugees and IDPs, and sustainable socio-economic reintegration in their areas of origin, by:

- addressing priority social needs, restoring basic social services and infrastructure (including schools, health centers, and markets, among others);
- promoting employment generation and agricultural productivity; and
- facilitating local reconciliation and conflict resolution linked to housing, land and property issues.

#### **(5) Combat sexual violence**

Strengthen prevention, protection and responses to sexual violence by:

- combating impunity and improving access to justice;
- preventing, mitigating threats and reducing vulnerability to sexual violence;
- addressing sexual violence in security sector reform processes;
- improving access of survivors to multi-sectoral services; and
- improving data collection and mapping of cases of SV.

## **Guiding principles**

### **Align with GoDRC priorities.**

The development and implementation of the ISSSS will be fully aligned with the strategic and programmatic priorities articulated in STAREC and with longer-term interventions and planning frameworks, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Priority Action Plan and the Country Assistance Framework.

At the operational level, international efforts within the ISSSS will be closely coordinated with the GoDRC at central and provincial/district levels to ensure that targeting and sequencing of interventions are coordinated and in conformity with national and local priorities and needs.

At the implementation level, projects will be developed with appropriate linkages to on-going or planned long-term development and institutional capacity reform and development programs.

Close collaboration with national actors in the implementation of projects and programs will ensure (a) the proper targeting and sustainability of capacity strengthening efforts; and (b) promote transfer of knowledge and expertise between international and national actors.

### **Seize windows of opportunity.**

Eastern DRC is characterized by simultaneous conflict and 'post-conflict' dynamics, which vary considerably between individual provinces and districts.

This context necessitates an unconventional approach to security, stabilization and recovery efforts, an approach which:

- produces immediate and visible results; positive 'peace dividends' for the Congolese population that help address local conflict dynamics;
- responds quickly to priority needs, supporting the rapid implementation of peace agreements;
- exploits openings to stabilize key areas and generate positive political momentum, and thereby alter the 'calculus' of conflict in a given area; and
- concentrates efforts and resources in areas which are currently stable in order to reduce their vulnerability to broader negative forces.

At the same time, a focus on quick and visible results should not come at the expense of longer-term sustainability. As noted above, ISSSS interventions will be in line with the principles and orientations of key reform plans for the army, the police and the justice system.

### **Concentrate resources in the right places.**

ISSSS support to STAREC will focus on a limited number of high-priority areas. These include: areas severely affected by conflict; vital economic or transport arteries; areas formerly under the control of armed groups; and areas which if stabilized, would produce a significant "ripple effect" across a broader area.

Between July 2008 and June 2009, the efforts of the UN and its partners were focused in six 'priority axes' in Ituri District and the Kivus (mapped in Annex 3). Activities will continue to focus on these areas, but eventually expand, subject to available funding, to cover additional priority areas identified in the GoDRC Plan, including Haut and Bas-Uele, Maniema and North Katanga.



Efforts in the target areas are inter-dependent. Lack of adequate security, for instance, inhibits the ability of the state to provide vital services, and precludes economic recovery. Likewise, a lack of support for equitable economic reintegration or restoration of basic social services can lead to the resumption or new forms of localized conflict and violence.

This means that implementation must be tailored to realities at the provincial, district or territorial levels, which will determine the specific sequence of actions needed to achieve security, state-building and reintegration/recovery objectives, and ensure convergence across sectors for given geographical areas

### Remain flexible.

Implementation arrangements must take into account the volatility of the environment and the need to rapidly re-align and adapt interventions, resources and capacities towards opportunities as they arise. Concretely, this means:

- flexible planning and operational frameworks;
- the ability to rapidly acquire and re-orient human and logistical resources; and
- funding arrangements which allow for re-allocation and re-prioritization of resources.

### Respect humanitarian space.

The implementation of the ISSSS requires interaction between military and humanitarian actors. While there are benefits to this joint

approach, there is also the risk that key humanitarian principles such as impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence may be undermined. ISSSS actions are therefore guided by the 'The Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions'<sup>2</sup> and the IASC Reference Paper: "Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies".<sup>3</sup>

### Strategic orientations in target provinces

North & South Kivu	Orientale	Maniema & Katanga
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Disband armed groups (Congolese and foreign) through political and military pressure; support disengagement of combatants and demobilization or integration into army and police.</li> <li>■ Restore and strengthen state authority and public services in areas vacated by armed groups; curtail illicit exploitation of natural resources.</li> <li>■ Support return and reintegration of approximately 2 million IDPs and refugees.</li> <li>■ Link interventions with key political frameworks: Goma Accords, Nairobi Communiqué, Tripartite Agreements, 23 March Agreements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Neutralize remnants of active militias (notably the FRPI), and extend security and access to conflict-affected areas. In other areas, consolidate current stabilization and post-conflict recovery efforts.</li> </ul> <p>For Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Improve security and protection of civilians in areas affected by the conflict with the LRA.</li> <li>■ Strengthen state security and administration capacities, in particular police, justice and local administration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Mitigate remaining &amp; potential threats to security and stability, notably ex-combatants who have not yet been effectively reintegrated into civilian life.</li> <li>■ Consolidate the authority and presence of state security and administrative services in fragile areas.</li> <li>■ Particular emphasis on supporting economic recovery in strategic areas, including areas of refugee returns, and promoting local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts to mitigate possible conflict triggers.</li> <li>■ Reduce vulnerability of Maniema and North Katanga to conflict dynamics in adjacent provinces (especially North and South Kivu).</li> </ul>

## Major risks

Experience to date has highlighted a number of issues which condition the future success and overall impact of international efforts to stabilize Eastern DRC. These include:

- continued volatility in the political and security environment, which threatens the viability and sustainability of interventions and reverses the return of IDPs;
- a difficult operating environment, which stretches the logistical and operational capacities of partners;
- the uncertain political will of relevant actors within national and provincial governments.
- the practical difficulties faced by the GoDRC in integrating large numbers of new personnel into the army and civilian administration;
- limits to the capacity of international actors to produce results quickly, and to re-align efforts to adapt to changing conditions; and
- limited national capacities to implement necessary reforms in the army, police and justice system.

While these are serious challenges, they are not insurmountable. STAREC and the common funding mechanisms established to support it should help to strengthen partnerships, and address these challenges in a coordinated, coherent and innovative manner.

## Benchmarks for success

The benchmarks against which the success of the ISSSS will be measured include:

- GoDRC security services have sufficient capacity to restore and maintain law and order in former conflict areas without resort to international peacekeeping assistance.
- The professionalism of the FARDC is strengthened through the completion of the initial phases of security sector reform; including an action plan to end recruitment of children.
- Armed groups are sufficiently weakened that they do not pose a significant threat to peace and stability.
- Essential state functions are re-established in former conflict areas, meaning improved access to justice, the restoration of law and order, and the provision of essential social services.
- Violations of human rights and impunity for violence against civilians, including sexual violence, are significantly reduced.

- Conditions are in place for the majority of IDPs and refugees to voluntarily return to their homes and begin the process of reconciliation and socio-economic reintegration.
- Basic social services, including schools, health centers and water and sanitation infrastructure are successfully restored in durable return areas targeted and there is an improvement in social indicators.
- Economic productivity improved in return areas, leading to employment creation and improved food security.
- Conflicts related to socioeconomic, ethnic and land, housing and property issues are significantly reduced.

### III. Progress to date

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From mid-2008 to mid-2009, partners working within the framework of the SSSS have achieved the following:

#### Improving security

Strengthening the army: Support to FARDC operations against the FDLR and to consolidation of integrated units. Construction of 7 temporary garrisons and works to transform 3 of these into durable buildings.

Demobilizing combatants: Support for integration of over 20,000 combatants into the FARDC, and demobilization and reintegration of a projected additional 3,500 combatants.

Deploying police: Ongoing support to training and deployment of 1,500 rapid intervention police in areas vacated by armed groups.

#### Strengthening state authority

Re-opening key access roads: On-going rehabilitation of six priority roads with a total combined length of over 600 kms. Creation of 3,000 jobs for local inhabitants, including ex-combatants.

Deploying police: 300 territorial police deployed in areas vacated by CNDP; an additional 280 to be deployed shortly in South Kivu and Ituri. Deployment of MONUC Joint Monitoring Teams to monitor performance and provide support.

Rebuilding administration: Construction of over 50 police posts, courts, prisons and local administration buildings is underway, to be followed by UN support for the deployment of relevant state officials.

#### Supporting return and recovery

Return and reintegration: Two joint projects by UNICEF/UNDP/FAO reintegration and community recovery program started in South and North Kivu targeting over 300,000 people. UNICEF PEAR Plus programming targeting 160,000 in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga. UN-HABITAT has launched a program to support mediation of housing, land and property conflicts.

Kick-starting economic recovery: USAID-funded program for job creation and rehabilitation of social infrastructure in 45 localities underway in South Kivu.

### IV. Component strategies

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#### Component 1. Improve security

Domestic and foreign armed groups still control unacceptably large parts of eastern DRC. Over 20 groups and about 20,000 combatants operate in Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and northern Katanga.

National security forces have largely failed to disband these groups due to a variety of structural problems. At the same time, security forces are themselves the biggest single cause of violations against civilians.

#### Current priority issues

Following agreements in early 2009, a number of domestic armed groups have nominally been integrated into the army and are being utilized in military operations against foreign armed groups (notably the FDLR and the LRA).

This situation presents several serious challenges:

- Over-militarization: An estimated 60,000 FARDC elements in the Kivus, including combatants recently integrated into the army without any prior vetting.
- Military confrontations and predatory activities by combatants that are causing continuous protection incidents and large population displacements in areas that were previously stable.
- Military and civilian criminal justice systems that lack the capacity to investigate or prosecute crimes, resulting in an environment of generalized impunity.
- Army integration remains fragile and depends on progressive improvement in relations between DRC and Rwanda. Issues of ranks and salaries remain a concern, with a high number of newly integrated troops still not officially enlisted.
- Domestic armed groups that yet need to be integrated into the army or demobilized. Some disgruntled groups that have turned away from the integration process, forging new alliances with the FDLR and/or other armed groups.

#### Component strategy

The overall objective for the security component is to reduce threats to life, property and freedom of movement.

The key interventions to achieve this are as follows:

**(i) Strengthen FARDC capacities**

Urgently enhance the professionalism, discipline and operational effectiveness of deployed FARDC units. This support will be closely aligned with the medium and long-term actions foreseen in key reform plans.<sup>4</sup>

International support will be planned in close collaboration with the Ministry of Defense, the FARDC hierarchy and provincial authorities, and will be implemented within the phased approach foreseen in the STAREC. This comprises:

- A preparatory phase to evaluate FARDC deployments and operational needs.
- A second phase focused on the redeployment and temporary garrisoning of certain units; conditioning operational support on respect of human rights, child rights and IHL; vetting and right-sizing of the army; improving the living conditions of FARDC and their dependents; complementary training; improvement of internal control mechanisms and support to military justice.
- A third phase to further strengthen capacities of key battalions including full training, provision of non-lethal equipment for operations (conditional on respect of human rights and IHL), training on prevention of sexual violence and garrisoning.

**(ii) Support disengagement**

For armed groups which are yet to disengage, provide support to registration and processing of combatants at *regroupement* centers.

Additionally, provide support to:

- integration of eligible combatants into the army or national police;
- community reintegration of ex-combatants eligible for demobilization but not the *Programme Nationale DDR* (PNDDR);
- early identification and extraction of children associated with armed groups; and
- focal points to assist and support reintegration of female ex-combatants and their dependants.

At the same time, the international community will support GoDRC efforts to avoid a security vacuum through deployment of Rapid Intervention Police.

**(iii) Protect civilians in conflict areas and disengagement zones.**

Support the GoDRC to protect civilians in conflict areas and zones from which armed groups are disengaging. The key dimensions of this work are captured in the UN's Joint Protection Strategy, with the following key objectives:

- prevent, mitigate and anticipate protection risks by improving the UN's monitoring and analysis capacity;
- institutionalize joint contingency planning and improve coordination; and
- enhance the UN's reaction to protection priorities.

Military support will be provided through regular patrolling, as well as temporary deployments to increase the reach of MONUC in insecure areas. Civilian support will be provided through temporary deployments of multi-disciplinary Joint Protection Teams.

## Component 2. Support political processes

The political context in which international partners have operated in the DRC is derived from the following international and national developments:

- the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
- the 2003 Sun City Agreements;
- the 2006 elections;
- the 2007 Nairobi Communiqué;
- the 2008 Goma Actes d'Engagement;
- the resumption of conflict in 2008 between FARDC and CNDP;
- the March 2009 agreements between the government, CNDP and other Armed Groups.

None of these agreements has been fully implemented. Instead, each has created new dynamics which have helped move the DRC forward, but left some parties believing themselves poorly served by the slow steps to replace violence with political processes. Nonetheless, in the context of the stabilization of the east, the recent rapprochement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda has changed for the better the prospects for the gradual dismantling of most armed groups.

## Current priority issues

From the UN's perspective, the international community needs to engage with the political context at several levels:

<sup>4</sup> The *Revised Army Reform Plan* and the *Plan Intermediaire d'Urgence*.

- monitor and encourage national and regional processes set up to foster accountable and internationally acceptable governance;
- ensure that the momentum from the March 23rd agreements is not lost and they are implemented by all parties;
- expose links between political and military players and illicit traffic in weapons, minerals, charcoal and other resources; and
- identify and try to help solve localized conflicts which may retard progress at the provincial level.

### **Component strategy**

The overall objective of this component is to support national and provincial governments to advance peace processes and implement objectives identified in the Communiqués and other key agreements.

Key interventions are as follows:

#### ***(i) Improve regional relations***

Improve diplomatic and bi-lateral relations with key neighboring countries through constructive dialogue.

#### ***(ii) Sanction political spoilers***

Investigate, identify and sanction spoilers, i.e. people involved in hate-speeches, serious human rights violations, sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo.

#### ***(iii) Support pacification***

Encourage and support political leaders to follow through on commitments that pave the way for the stabilization and pacification of eastern DRC.

### **Component 3. Restore and strengthen state authority**

In many areas in the East, state control extends barely beyond the roads that surround large population centers. Some areas remain under the control of armed groups that have established parallel administrative structures.

### **Current priority issues**

In 2009, administrators and militants from some armed groups have been nominally integrated into state structures. However, a real restoration of the state will require recycling of these elements: vetting, training and redeployment elsewhere.

Newly recruited and trained elements will be needed in many cases, and control and taxation systems must be established to collect revenues for the state. This will be particularly important in the context of proposed new decentralization laws to increase decision-making authority at the local level.

### **Component strategy**

The overall objective for this component is to support the progressive restoration and strengthening of essential public services in areas where armed groups have formerly exerted control or where state presence has historically been weak.

Assistance provided within this component is expected to contribute to a resumption of normal civilian life, and to a reduction in impunity and acts of violence against civilians through the extension of law and order and access to justice. Although focused on the rapid restoration of state authority, international support will be aligned with longer-term institutional reform and capacity development processes and support frameworks.

Key interventions are as follows:

#### ***(i) Rehabilitate key access roads***

Road rehabilitation will boost commercial activity, permit State access, and deny safe haven to armed groups. Priority will be given to road axes that have experienced recurrent waves of conflict as well as those linking eastern and western DRC in order to promote national unity. In addition, the use of labor-intensive methods is intended to create rapid income-generation opportunities for the local population and vulnerable subgroups.

#### ***(ii) Support the screening, training and deployment of officials***

Support services including: territorial and border police; military and civilian courts; corrections; decentralized and customary local authorities; and state services responsible for regulating trade in natural resources.

#### ***(iii) Rehabilitate state infrastructure***

Support local authorities to rehabilitate or rebuild essential infrastructure in priority areas, and provide necessary equipment and logistical support for the proper functioning of public services. Particular emphasis will be placed on provision of permanent hard-wall office space and housing.

#### ***(iv) Monitor, and provide capacity building and mentoring support***



Accompany the deployment of state officials with capacity building measures. These will include:

- training sessions on technical areas of responsibility;
- strengthening planning, budgeting, management and decision making;
- reinforcing dialogue and cooperation between State authorities, civil society and other interest groups; and
- deployment of experts at field level to monitor, mentor and backstop deployed officials.

## **Component 4. Facilitate return, reintegration and recovery**

OCHA estimates that there are still some 2 million persons displaced in eastern DRC. Displacement is not only a symptom, but also a cause of conflict as families lose their land, homes, and livelihoods, and communities are torn apart. The 'durable' return of IDPs in conditions of safety and dignity could, therefore, help reduce the risk of violent conflict and promote reconciliation.

At the same time:

- Over 60,000 Congolese refugees have voluntarily returned from Tanzania since 2005.
- An unconfirmed number of refugees from Uganda have started returning in 2009 to areas in North Kivu and Ituri District.
- A Tripartite Agreement between DRC, Rwanda and UNHCR is scheduled to be signed before the end of 2009, with UNHCR expecting to repatriate some 160,000 refugees from Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in the next two years if the security situation continues to improve.

### **Current priority issues**

The need to undertake urgent early recovery-related activities in return areas is evident in view of the ongoing humanitarian needs in many areas. Given the long years of conflict, it is important that these activities are accompanied by peace and reconciliation initiatives to reduce local tensions among returning communities, and a focus on the swift reintegration of ex-combatants as well as community development projects to help promote recovery and make the shift from relief to development assistance.

### **Component strategy**

The overall objective of this component is to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees

and IDPs, and their sustainable socio-economic reintegration in areas of origin.

Activities will focus on those areas where security and accessibility have improved to allow for the durable return of IDPs. This will be linked with pre-defined benchmarks for safe<sup>5</sup> and dignified<sup>6</sup> return of civilian populations; and efforts to ensure that IDPs and refugees are free to choose their areas of return.<sup>7</sup>

Within these target areas, the RRR component is divided into four sub-components:

#### ***(i) Prepare for voluntary and safe return***

Preparatory activities to create a protective environment conducive to return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. Focus will be on: (a) assessing potential return areas; (b) sensitizing refugees and IDPs and facilitating well-informed decisions on return; and (c) ensuring the absorptive capacity and willingness of receiving communities.

#### ***(ii) Support basic needs and restore basic social services***

It is clear that needs remain enormous in return areas even a long time after people return home,<sup>8</sup> and that early recovery assistance is needed to help transition from relief to development. Efforts will focus on the following activities:

- Transitional shelter
- Health services
- HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
- Water, sanitation and hygiene
- Education
- Protection and child protection
- Prevention and response to sexual violence
- Food security

#### ***(iii) Boost livelihoods and economic productivity***

<sup>5</sup> In which displaced people can return under conditions of legal, physical and material security.

<sup>6</sup> In which displaced people are not harassed either on departure, en route or upon arrival, are not separated from their family members, are allowed to return without preconditions, are accepted and welcomed by national and local authorities and local populations, and their rights and freedoms are fully restored so that they can start a meaningful life with self-esteem and self-confidence.

<sup>7</sup> The majority of IDP return movements in the DRC are 'spontaneous' and therefore 'assisted' returns will only be considered in exceptional cases for vulnerable groups.

<sup>8</sup> See Quarterly Analytical Report: Humanitarian Situation in IDP Return Areas, July to September 2008, UNICEF [www.pear.cd](http://www.pear.cd)

Support for creation of livelihoods (particularly in the agriculture sector) and jump-starting economic productivity is essential for reducing vulnerability and preventing new forms of conflict. Efforts will focus on enhancing communities' assets and capabilities to re-energize local economies and improving food security; reduce individual and collective vulnerability through income-generating activities and measures to enhance economic productivity.

#### **(iv) Local peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict resolution**

Strengthen community capacities through participatory decision-making mechanisms, including a focus on dialogue and the peaceful resolution of differences. Priority interventions will include strengthening of conflict resolution mechanisms (especially property disputes), promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, and measures to reduce armed violence at community level (including community disarmament).

### **Organization of work**

Although divided into four sub-components, the RRR component will be coordinated as one programmatic strategy at provincial and local levels to ensure a comprehensive, integrated, and ultimately sustainable approach.

RRR interventions will be delivered in two ways:

- individual/family assistance provided on the basis of assessed vulnerabilities; and
- community-based assistance: rehabilitation of basic services such as schools and clinics and roads, community empowerment projects, community-based sexual violence prevention, etc.

Special attention will be given to a number of vulnerable groups. These include female-headed households, victims of sexual violence, pregnant and lactating women, separated / abducted women, handicapped individuals (including amputees and war-wounded), orphans, the infirm and elderly as well as the orphans and widows of security forces, children associated with armed groups and unaccompanied minors.

### **Component 5: Combat sexual violence**

Sexual violence has become a prominent feature of the protracted conflict in the East. Violence is perpetrated by militias, governmental security forces and increasingly by civilians.

To help establish a more coherent and consistent response to this problem, the UN developed in

2008 the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in cooperation with the GoDRC and in consultation with relevant national and international partners. The Strategy has been endorsed by the international community and by the government of DRC.

The Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence is fully mainstreamed in the various components of the STAREC and the ISSSS. For clarity of reference, it has also been programmatically integrated as the 5<sup>th</sup> thematic component of the ISSSS and will serve in this regard as the framework for the implementation of specific SV interventions in Eastern DRC. The strategy will be reported on and monitored in stand-alone fashion, but also as part of the broader framework of the STAREC/ISSSS.

The Strategy will also serve as the strategic/operational framework of the *Strategie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Violences Basees sur le Genre* developed by the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, in respect to those activities specifically related to Sexual Violence and for areas affected by conflict and transition focusing on Eastern DRC, the National Strategy being a larger conceptual framework addressing all types of gender based violence with a long term perspective.

### **Component strategy**

The overall objective of the Comprehensive Strategy is to create a common framework for all those involved in combating sexual violence in DRC, with a view to improving prevention and response to sexual violence and improved coordination and coherence.

The Comprehensive Strategy comprises five areas of intervention:

#### **(i) Combating impunity**

Four objectives are identified: (1) strengthen the capacities of judicial institutions and develop a criminal justice policy focused on sexual violence, (adopting a victim-centered approach); (2) improve access to justice for victims; (3) guarantee the effective application of the 2006 DRC Laws on Sexual Violence; (4) ensure reparation for victims of sexual violence.

#### **(ii) Prevention and protection**

The following objectives are central to addressing sexual violence as part of the broader protection of civilians agenda in the DRC: (1) prevent and/or mitigate threats and reduce vulnerability and exposure to sexual violence; (2) strengthen the

resilience of survivors of sexual violence; and (3) create a protective environment.

### **(iii) Security sector reform**

A vital facet of this component is to link with ongoing justice reform initiatives especially military justice, the demobilization and disengagement plans for armed groups and the reform of the FARDC.

To accomplish this, three objectives have been identified: (1) Accountability: security agents and forces need to both prevent and respond effectively to sexual violence and ensure that any perpetrators of SV crimes are held accountable; (2) Vetting: reform processes for security agents and forces need to incorporate mechanisms aimed at excluding individuals who lack integrity, in line with international human rights standards and best practices; and (3) DDR/*Brassage*: the disarmament and disengagement processes need to include special procedures to assist survivors of sexual violence.

### **(iv) Multi-sectoral response for survivors**

The primary aims of this component are to improve access of survivors of sexual violence to multi-sectoral services and to establish minimum standards for the provision of assistance.

The two overall objectives are: (1) improve the referral pathway for a multi-sectoral response for survivors of sexual violence at the community and local level and to coordinate the scaled-up delivery of services; and (2) develop a National Protocol for Multi-sectoral Assistance amongst the relevant DRC Ministries. This will consist of four sub-protocols on the provision of assistance in the following sectors: medical, mental health, judicial and reintegration.

### **(v) Data collection and mapping**

The aim of this component will be to coordinate the development and management of a system for an improved centralized database on sexual violence.

The expected result is to develop a database that allows for a clearer indication of the patterns of and response to sexual violence in the DRC, providing details on incidents, victims, perpetrators, and on judicial, medical, psychosocial responses, as well as reintegration, and protection. The system should also improve the centralization and analysis of data from several partners. This would also allow for a better platform to analyze trends and actual and potential hotspots.

## **V. Implementation**

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### **Programming**

The key programming tool for the ISSSS is the Results Framework (Annex 1). This defines expected outcomes outputs under the five components, and the activities that are expected to support these outcomes.

The Results Framework will be the main tool for:

- (a) managing the project design and approval process under the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility; and
- (b) measuring progress under the Strategy and adjusting work as needed.

The IPF will be revised on a yearly basis. However, a mid-year review of the Results Framework will allow for strategic and operational revisions to be made.

### **Resource mobilization**

The ISSSS budget (in annex 2) estimates resource requirements for the interventions set out in the Results Framework. The estimates are based on current interventions and are intended to be indicative only. Additional budgetary revisions will be made on the basis of further needs assessments in target provinces

The IPF is intended to serve as the general framework on the basis of which implementing partners will develop and submit detailed proposals and budgets to request funding.

Contributions to the ISSSS made through the Stabilization and Recovery Fund and/or parallel contributions supporting activities within the programme framework will be recorded to track and monitor support to these interventions. The ISSSS budget and tracking of allocations will be up-dated and shared every three months.

Other donor interventions in the eastern provinces related to but not specifically reflected in the programme framework will be monitored through the *Plateforme de Gestion de L'aide* managed by the Ministry of Planning.

### **The Stabilization and Recovery Fund**

The Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility (SRFF) is intended to: (1) provide a coherent strategic international framework for supporting and complementing GoDRC efforts to stabilize Eastern DRC, and allocating and managing resources to this end; and (2) ensure that the international community is able to respond quickly

and effectively to changes on the ground and address new priorities as they emerge.

The SRFF will be linked to the STAREC Steering Committee, from which it will receive broad strategic orientations, and to which it will report on financial allocations and delivery. The key features of the Fund Management Facility include:

- A common mechanism for allocating and managing financial resources from the international community in support of GoDRC stabilization and reconstruction priorities, including dual fund management arrangements (pooled and parallel funding modalities) and including the possibility of specific earmarking per component.
- A programmatic focus on short and medium-term interventions (2-3 years) intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development plans, while ensuring consistency and continuity between the different phases of international assistance.
- A streamlined governance structure for setting allocation priorities and disbursing funds against approved projects, optimized for speed and flexibility.
- Close integration with national coordination structures on stabilization to ensure: (a) that international funding allocations correspond to national priorities; and (b) participation of national actors in the development and monitoring of projects funded by international donors.
- Management of the Pooled Fund by a Funding Board comprised of contributing donors, and designation of the UNDP MDTF Unit (New York) as Administrative Agent for the receipt, administration and disbursement of funds.
- Organizations eligible to receive funds to include UN agencies, international and national NGOs, Government agencies, the private sector and other multilateral organizations with proven implementation capacity.

## Coordination of work

### Role of the United Nations

Within the STAREC framework, the United Nations has been requested by the GoDRC and international partners to support the coordination, management and delivery of international assistance.

The United Nations will accordingly organize its efforts around the following:

- **Coordination and oversight:** Support to overall coordination of international efforts within the STAREC / ISSSS framework. A key responsibility will be regular monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of international efforts.
- **Strategic and technical advice:** Support to development of strategies, policies and programs within the STAREC/ISSSS framework, with a particular focus on strengthening national capacities.
- **Project implementation:** The UN system will directly contribute to results within the STAREC framework in areas where it has a demonstrated in-house capacities and where national capacity is either weak or lacking. Direct implementation will not serve as a substitute for national engagement, and will be structured to ensure strengthening of national capacities and an eventual hand-over to appropriate GoDRC agencies.

## Systems and processes

The coordination and management of ISSSS activities will be closely linked to the national coordination structures established under the Government's STAREC plan.

### *At the Kinshasa level:*

- STAREC Oversight Committee: Chaired by the Prime Minister and composed by relevant Ministries and international partners. Provides strategic oversight and determines policy and priorities.
- STAREC Technical Teams: Working groups led by GoDRC counterparts with UN and international partners. Provide sectoral oversight, review and approve concept notes.
- Stabilization Funding Board: Review and approval of projects for funding. Oversight of delivery.
- Stabilization Donor Group: International community policy and programme oversight.
- UN Stabilization Policy Working Group of the IMPT: Internal UN policy oversight. Principals level.

### *At the regional level:*

- Inter-provincial STAREC coordination.
- Stabilization Programme Group (regional IMPT): Oversight and coordination of programme development, implementation / delivery, monitoring and evaluation; forum for decision-making and provision of guidance on programmatic issues.



### At the provincial level

- Joint Technical Committees (CTC): Oversight and operational coordination of STAREC activities. Composed of provincial and international partners.
- Provincial IMPTs: Oversight and operational coordination of ISSSS activities. Composed of lead UN entities and all implementing partners (UN and non UN).

### Component coordination.

The efforts of UN and international partners will also be coordinated at the sub-component level by designated MONUC sections and UN agencies selected on the basis of their established lead role functions and mandates in DRC.

Key functions of sub-component leads include:

- Ensuring the coherence and overall harmonization of international support within a given component and mobilizing other actors e.g. NGOs.
- Supporting the development of common criteria, standardized procedures for monitoring and evaluation, and joint program frameworks at the component level.
- Facilitating the development of territorial, district, provincial and regional strategies, identifying priorities, gaps and funding requirements.
- Serving as the focal point for the international community within the framework of the STAREC structures, and in particular the Technical Teams.
- Facilitating and supporting the development of project proposals within the STAREC framework, in close collaboration with the Technical Teams, the Stabilization Support Unit, Sexual Violence Unit and the Provincial Joint Technical Committees.

Component	Sub-component	Lead agencies for support
<b>1. Improve security</b>	1.1 Strengthening of FARDC capacities	MONUC SSR
	1.2 Disengagement of armed groups	MONUC DDR/RR
	1.3 Reintegration of combatants	UNDP
	1.4. Protection of civilians	MONUC POC/UNHCR
<b>2. Political processes</b>		MONUC PAD
<b>3. State authority</b>	3.1 Rehabilitation of roads	WFP (logistic cluster)
	3.2 Deployment of the police	UNPOL
	3.3 Deployment of	MONUC Rule

	justice personnel	of Law
	3.4 Deployment of local administration	MONUC Civil Affairs
	3.5. Control of natural resources	MONUC JMAC
<b>4. Return, reintegration and recovery</b>	4.1 Basic needs and basic services	UNHCR / UNICEF / WFP
	4.2 Livelihoods and economic productivity	UNDP / FAO / WFP
	4.3 Local peacebuilding	UNDP
<b>5. Combat sexual violence</b>	5.1. Impunity	MONUC/ OHCHR
	5.2. Protection and Prevention	UNHCR
	5.3. Security Sector Reform	MONUC SSR
	5.4. Multi-sectoral assistance	UNICEF
	5.5. Data and mapping	UNFPA

### Stabilization Support Unit

The Stabilization Support Unit, established within the Integrated Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC/RR in Goma, coordinates and supports the implementation of the ISSSS. The primary objective of the SSU is to ensure the programmatic and financial coherence and coordination of international support within the framework of the GoDRC Plan.

Specific functions include:

- providing strategic analysis and policy advice to provincial, national authorities, UN senior management and international partners on stabilization and recovery issues;
- coordinating operational oversight over implementation of stabilization and recovery interventions supported or implemented by the international community;
- serving as a resource on programmatic issues, including assisting the development and review of project proposals for funding and programmatic strategies;
- coordinating assessment of performance against stabilization and recovery objectives, and facilitating reporting to donors, the Security Council and other stakeholders; and
- promoting, in close collaboration with national authorities, enhanced awareness and understanding of stabilization.



## Measuring performance

Monitoring and evaluation of the ISSSS strategy will have three major components:

**Progress measures** at the outcome (sub-component) level under the ISSSS, and for the overall objectives of each component. Data on each outcome will be collected by partners with expertise and resources in that area.

**Periodic reporting** on progress measures. The Stabilization Support Unit will act as a technical secretariat to compile this information and present it for decision-making at the provincial, regional and national levels.

**Policy review** through the Stabilization Fund Board and STAREC Comité de Suivi. Robust data on outcomes will be used to evaluate progress under each component and against the objectives of the Strategy as a whole, and feed into the biannual review of the Results Framework and IPF.

## Annex 1. Results framework

### Objective 1: SECURITY

*Threats to life, property and freedom of movement are significantly reduced.*

Operational Outcomes	Outcome Indicators	Key Outputs	Areas of Intervention	Timeframe	Responsibilities
1. Threats posed by armed groups reduced through the sustainable integration of vetted combatants into the FARDC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targets for integration set pursuant to 23 March Agreements are met.</li> <li>% of these units which have gone through a credible vetting process.</li> </ul>	1.1 Identification, selection and training of combatants into the FARDC is successfully accomplished.	North Kivu, South Kivu	End 2009	TBD <b>Partners:</b>
		1.2 International support is conditional upon screening of FARDC elements for human rights violations. <sup>9</sup>	North Kivu, South Kivu	Jan 2010	MONUC OHCHR, EUSEC, <b>Partners:</b> Netherlands
2. Security improved and threats posed by armed groups neutralized through more effective and organized FARDC operations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># FARDC Battalions screened, trained, equipped and redeployed.</li> <li>% FARDC elements paid on time.</li> </ul>	2.1 Integrated FARDC units transferred to Brassage Centers for basic training, and supported through provision of food, medical and other services.	All areas Eastern DRC	Jan 2010 – 2011	MONUC Force, EUSEC <b>Partners:</b> EC
		2.2 Battalion-level training (MTP+) provided to FARDC units deployed in East.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	Jan 2010 – 2011	SMI <b>Partners:</b> MONUC DDR
		2.3 Redeployment of 15 FARDC trained battalions and their dependents facilitated through provision of food, medical and logistical assistance.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema	Jun 2010 – 2011	MONUC Force, OHCHR <b>Partners:</b> Tanzania
		2.4 Non-lethal operational support provided to FARDC units involved in Operations Kimia II and Rudia.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	2010 – 2011	MONUC Force
3. Security of local populations enhanced through improved FARDC conduct and discipline.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of allegations of HR violations reported through MONUC HR that implicate FARDC</li> <li>% FARDC units in purpose-built housing</li> </ul>	3.1 FARDC dependents are relocated to permanent barracks outside population centers.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema	Jan 2010	MONUC Force, IOM <b>Partners:</b> UK, Netherlands
		3.2 Permanent FARDC deployments in the East are housed in permanent barracks.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema	Dec 2010	UNDP, MONUC Force, IOM <b>Partners:</b> UK, Netherlands

<sup>9</sup> Component III, Obj B of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC.

		3.3 FARDC units have effective weapons control systems in place.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema	Dec 2010	UNDP <b>Partners:</b>
		3.4 FARDC units are paid their salary entitlements on full and in time.	All areas Eastern DRC	2009 – 2011	EUSEC <b>Partners:</b>
		3.5 Widows and families of combatants are relocated or repatriated to locations of their choosing.	All areas Eastern DRC	Dec 2010	<b>Partners:</b>
4. Impunity for human rights violations and crimes committed by FARDC soldiers significantly reduced.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># military prosecutors and judges trained</li> <li># prosecutions, convictions and their execution of sexual violence</li> <li># tribunals supported</li> <li># justice personnel trained</li> <li># of prosecutions and convictions</li> <li># FARDC anti-sexual violence cells</li> <li># FARDC females officers recruited</li> <li>Code of Conduct released and understood by 90% of officers and troops</li> </ul>	4.1 Military justice systems strengthened through technical and material support, including development of specialized expertise in SV.	All areas Eastern DRC	2009 – 2011	MONUC RoL, OHCHR <b>Partners:</b>
		4.2 Military justice systems strengthened through creation of <i>Parquets Secondaires</i> of the <i>Tribunaux de Grande Instance</i> and <i>Brigades judiciaires militaires</i> .			
		4.3 Relevant aspects of criminal law, humanitarian law and military law are mainstreamed into FARDC training.			
5. The professionalism and competency of the FARDC improved through the demobilization of excedent elements and their integration into social services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># combat battalions present in the two Kivus</li> </ul>	5.1 Elements of the FARDC are demobilized voluntarily or following a vetting process.	North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2011	
		5.2 Public service units created with demobilized / vetted combatants.			
6. Insecurity and acts of violence attributable to armed groups significantly decrease through their demobilization and reintegration into civilian life.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># reported clashes with security forces that involve groups committed to disengagement</li> <li># ex-combatants presenting for</li> </ul>	6.1 <i>Regroupement</i> centres are constructed and supported by transport, feeding, and registration of combatants.	North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2010	IOM, MONUC <b>Partners:</b> Germany, UK
		6.2 Ex-combatants who are ineligible for national DDR processes are demobilised through short-term employment and integration into community recovery projects.			UNDP <b>Partners:</b>

	demobilisation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% ex-combatants demobilised (compared with # who presented)</li> <li>No women ex-combatants identified and reintegrated in their communities</li> </ul>	6.3 Rwandan FDLR ex-combatants are demobilized and repatriated.			
		6.4 Children associated with armed groups are identified and extracted at the start of the disengagement process.			MONUC (CPS), UNICEF
		6.5 DDR programs include special measures for women associated with armed groups and their dependants.			
7. Violence against at-risk populations prevented or mitigated through direct protection measures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># reported incidents of violence against civilians</li> <li>Net # civilians displaced, month-on-month</li> </ul>	7.1 MONUC forces are deployed to “must protect areas” to deter violence against civilians.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri	2009 – 2010	MONUC (CAS), UNHCR
		7.2 Joint Protection Teams missions deployed to “must protect areas” to set-up local civil / military protection mechanisms.			<b>Partners:</b> MONUC (CAS), UNHCR
		7.3 A mapping of local conflicts and stakeholders is made.			<b>Partners:</b> MONUC (CAS), UNHCR
		7.4 MONUC patrols dismantle illegal barriers in course of their regular activities.			<b>Partners:</b> MONUC Force

### Objective 3: STATE AUTHORITY

*Public security, access to justice and administrative services progressively restored and strengthened in key affected areas*

Operational Outcomes	Outcome Indicators	Key Outputs	Areas of Intervention	Time-frame	Responsibilities (Output levels)
1. Reliable road access to key population centres is restored and maintained.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># km of roads meeting minimum vehicle speed spec</li> </ul>	1.1 Roads are cleared and rehabilitated through a combination of labour-intensive methods and mechanised rehabilitation.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga	2009 – 2011	UNOPS, MONUC Force, ACTED  Partners: Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, USA, UK, EC, DFID
		1.2 Essential road structures (culverts, retaining walls, bridges) are built using labour-intensive methods.			
		1.3 Local populations and local authorities have capacity to maintain durability and sustainability of roads.			

		1.4 Short-term employment opportunities created for local populations and ex-combatants through road rehabilitation.			
2. Public security restored in high-risk areas through temporary deployments of Rapid Intervention Police.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % population who believes is safe in their community</li> <li>• % population who believes it is safe to travel</li> <li>• % of allegations of HR reported through MONUC HR violations that are attributable to PNC/PIR</li> </ul>	2.1 Refresher training provided to three PIR battalions. 2.2 Support for three battalions: construction of temporary camps, communications, transport and logistics assistance. 2.3 Monitoring and backstopping of deployed units through UN Joint Monitoring Teams.	North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele	2009 – 2010	UNPOL, IOM, OHCHR  Partners: Germany
3. Public order and community security is established through a permanent policing presence.		3.1 Durable infrastructure (including family accommodation), non-lethal equipment and transport provided for new deployments of Police National Congolaise.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga	2009 – 2010	UNPOL, UNOPS, GTZ, OHCHR  <b>Partners:</b> Netherlands, Sweden
		3.2 800 Border Police are selected, screened trained and deployed, and supported through the construction of police stations and provision of equipment and logistics support.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2010	UNPOL, IOM  <b>Partners:</b> USA, Japan
		3.3 Operational support provided on a temporary basis by MONUC Formed Police Units.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2010	UNPOL
		3.4 Operational capacity of deployed police units improved through mentoring support by Joint Monitoring Teams.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2010	UNPOL, OHCHR  <b>Partners:</b> Sweden, Norway
4. Access to justice and prosecution of crimes improves through the restoration of the penal chain.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Average time in detention before trial</li> <li>• % of population who trust state authorities to resolve a dispute</li> </ul>	4.1 Competent judiciary and corrections personnel are selected and deployed. 4.2 Courts and prisons rehabilitated or constructed, and provided with essential equipment. 4.3 Skills and competencies of deployed justice and corrections staff enhanced through training and capacity development support.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga	2009 – 2011	MONUC (RoL, OHCHR), UNDP, REJUSCO, UNOPS  <b>Partners:</b> Netherlands, EC
5. Core administrative and technical public services are restored at decentralised levels of administration.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # members of the provincial governments are sensitized on local planning and budgeting process</li> <li>• Central legal taxes and other sources of</li> </ul>	5.1 Disseminate relevant laws and texts on decentralization, public finance and planning, among others. 5.2 Skills and competencies of local administrative personnel enhanced through training. 5.3 Assist local government to rationalize and strengthen finances.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga	2009 – 2011	MONUC (CAS), UNDP, UNOPS  <b>Partners:</b> Netherlands, UK



	<p>incomes are promoted among civil society and local population</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % hours per week that key local service providers are open to public</li> <li>• # of basic administrative transactions processed at local level</li> <li>• % hours per week that key local service providers are open to public</li> </ul>	<p>5.4 Facilitate and provide logistical assistance for the deployment of key designated State representatives.</p> <p>5.5 Support the rehabilitation of local administrative offices and provide basic equipment.</p>			
6. Exploitation of natural resources is steadily brought under government regulation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of <i>Centres de Negoces</i> established and of authorities deployed</li> <li>• % of increase in minerals transiting and being registered in the centre de negoces</li> <li>• % of increase in the revenues of legal tax collection in the centre de negoces.</li> <li>• Reports of mineral traceability issued</li> </ul>	<p>6.1 Key actors involved in the trade of natural resources are identified all along the production lifeline and findings are shared with GoDRC.</p> <p>6.2 Random checks at mineral outlets deter exploitation and permit better understanding of vectors of evacuation.</p> <p>6.3 In the framework of the pilot exercise, Centres de Negoce are established in extraction areas and reinforce traceability and taxability.</p> <p>6.4 Pilot exercise expanded to additional localities as minimum security is achieved in areas currently under the influence of armed groups.</p>	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu	2009 – 2011	<p>MONUC (JMAC)</p> <p><b>Partners:</b></p>

## Objective 4: RETURN, REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY

*Conflict-affected communities successfully reintegrate displaced populations, reconcile and begin socio-economic recovery.*

Operational Outcomes	Outcome Indicators	Key Outputs	Areas of Intervention	Time-frame	Responsibilities (Output levels)
1. Basic social needs of returning populations and receiving communities are met, including through restoration of key social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crude mortality rate</li> <li>• % coverage for key vaccinations</li> </ul>	1.1 <b>Health:</b> Support for strengthening of local health services and provision of direct medical assistance including provision of treatment and psychosocial support for victims of sexual	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga		<p>UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO</p> <p><b>Partners:</b> Dutch,</p>

infrastructure.	• % access to improved sanitation	and gender-based violence. <sup>10</sup>			SIDA, USAID, MDG Fund
		1.2 <b>Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH):</b> Improved quality of drinking water, expanded access to hygienic latrines and improved family hygiene practices.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga		UNICEF, UNHCR <b>Partners:</b>
		1.3 <b>Education:</b> Expanded access to education materials, training of teachers, rehabilitation of schools, increased participation of parents in school management, access to school meals ,and enhanced opportunities for youth for vocational training and participation in community life.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu		UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP <b>Partners:</b>
	• # of shelter committees • # of low-cost housing provided • % of urban refugees assisted through a micro-credit scheme	1.4 <b>Transitional shelter:</b> Support for local construction material production, organization of shelter committees, and provision of low-cost housing for urban refugees through a micro-credit scheme.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu		UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP <b>Partners:</b>
		1.5 <b>HIV/AIDS:</b> Rate of HIV/AIDS infection and transmission reduced through inclusion of ARVs in repatriation kits and support to 10 health zones in main return areas.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga		UNICEF, UNHCR <b>Partners:</b>
	• % of IDPs/Refugees with documentation • % of referral of victims of SV • % of areas of return covered by the protection monitoring • # community based protection measures	1.6 <b>Protection:</b> (a) prevention of statelessness through improved access to personal documentation and legal assistance; (b) Security measures to increase protection of survivors; (c) activities to reduce stigma of survivors; (d) support for the protection of vulnerable and war-affected children (including CAAGs), (e) family reunification; (f) Pre and post-return protection monitoring to ensure that return and reintegration takes place in safety and dignity; (g) promotion of durable solutions to the plight of refugees in Congolese soil.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Katanga		UNICEF, UNHCR <b>Partners:</b>
2. Conditions for economic recovery in return areas improved.	• # survivors who received reintegration assistance	2.1 Social and economic empowerment promoted through increased access to skills and vocational training, with a particular focus on women, youth and other vulnerable groups.	Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga		UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP <b>Partners:</b>
		2.2 Individual, household and community incomes increase as a result of livelihoods and income-			

<sup>10</sup> Component IV, Obj A of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC.

		generating opportunities, including through rapid-employment and micro-enterprise activities and cash voucher / food for assets and training activities.			
		2.3 Agricultural productivity and long-term food security promoted through support for food processing, alternative fuel and cooking methods, seed distribution, strengthening of agricultural production capacities, market rehabilitation and cash voucher / food for work schemes.			
		2.4 Increased local production and increased employment through the “Purchase for Progress” initiative to encourage improved agricultural practices, improved transport infrastructure and better access to markets.			
3. Key causes of conflict at community level successfully mitigated or prevented.	• # sensitization sessions conducted	3.1 Local reconciliation and peacebuilding promoted through participatory conflict analyses, community and inter-ethnic dialogue, communication and sensitization campaigns, and strengthening of local mechanisms and capacities.	Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, North Katanga		UNDP, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT  <b>Partners:</b>
		3.2 Conflicts related to housing, land and property disputes are reduced and addressed through the establishment of mediation centers in 50 return areas, support for the deployment of professional local mediators, and provision of technical assistance for the development of policy and legislation on land administration and urban spatial development.			
		3.3 Reduction in armed violence and proliferation of small arms and light weapons achieved through voluntary disarmament schemes, support for the creation of alternative livelihoods, and strengthening of provincial and local capacities to address weapons proliferation and use.			

## Objective 5: COMBATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Operational Outcomes	Outcome Indicators	Key Outputs	Areas of Intervention	Timeframe	Responsibilities
<b>OUTCOME 1 : Combating impunity</b>					
1.1 The capacities of judicial institutions are strengthen and a criminal justice policy centred on sexual violence is developed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of directives and guidelines regarding international standards of children;</li> <li># of qualified staff assisting children in courts and tribunals;</li> <li># of infrastructures installed in No. of courts and tribunals.</li> </ul>	1.1.1 The justice system offers adequate services to children survivors of sexual violence.	National level / Eastern DRC	Jan – June 2010	Ministry of Justice and relevant judicial authorities MONUC/UNICEF.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ToR for specialised investigation bodies is adopted, the specific roles and the coordination as laid out in the penal procedure framework is enforced.</li> <li>Establish the procedure of nomination process of personnel of sexual violence specialised corps within each province.</li> <li>A centralised system registering cases of sexual violence, shared with the police, the courts and the tribunals is operational.</li> <li>No. of female employees within the judicial personnel is increased.</li> </ul>	1.1.2 A judicial expertise on sexual violence is developed and a 'fast track' procedure is established to investigate, prosecute and judge sexual violence cases.	National Level/ Eastern DRC	Jan – June 2010	Ministry of Justice and relevant judicial authorities, Ministry of Interior and Provincials Inspections of the PNC UNJHRO, UNFPA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard training modules for judicial military and civilian personnel are developed.</li> <li># of infrastructures of prosecutor's offices, courts and tribunals rehabilitated. No of open cabinet consultations by the judges for survivors and lawyers. No. of registry and secretary supported.</li> </ul>	1.1.3 In line with A.2, the SV focal points in tribunals are trained.	National Level / Eastern DRC	Jan – June 2010	Ministry of justice and justice authorities MONUC/OHCHR REJUSCO, UNDP
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A joint circular is agreed and published between the Justice and the Health ministries.</li> <li>No. of legal and medical trainings for physicians and medical staff.</li> </ul>	1.1.4 A standardized medical certificate (in accordance with the Road Map) is adopted, distributed and applied	National Level / Eastern DRC	Jan – June 2010	Justice and Health Ministries, relevant judicial authorities, UNJHRO REJUSO, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of staff qualified in psychology to attend further training in clinical psychology and psycho legal expertise</li> </ul>	1.1.5 Directives regarding the psycho-legal expertise of sexual violence survivors are developed	National level/Coverage of the Eastern	Jan – June 2010	Justice and Health Ministries, relevant judicial authorities, UNJHRO , REJUSO, WHO,

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of social workers and psychologists working with the judicial system.</li> </ul>		DRC		UNICEF
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of meetings</li> <li>• # evaluation reports.</li> </ul>	<b>1.1.6</b> Staffing and mission coordinating the activities relevant to the combating against impunity for sexual violence cases	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	MONUC/UNJHRO
<b>2.1</b> Access to justice for survivors is improved.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of NGOs and paralegals supported in each rural region.</li> <li>• Adoption and use of standardised material.</li> <li>• # of filed cases forwarded by paralegals to lawyers.</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.1</b> Capacities and logistic of those in first contact with the survivors are reinforced.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of public information campaigns on survivors rights : radio spots, posters, leaflets</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.2</b> Advices to survivors regarding their rights and procedures to bring their cases to justice are given.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of survivors and witnesses and those who assist them transported.</li> <li>• # of alleged perpetrators transported to detention centers</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.3</b> Logistic help to facilitate transport of survivors, witnesses and alleged perpetrators is provided.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of investigation teams deployed.</li> <li>• # of defence lawyers and judges in mobile courts</li> <li>• # of investigation and training kits distributed</li> <li>• # of mobile courts set up.</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.4</b> Deployment of mobile investigation teams and mobile courts.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of CIATs, secretaries, registries, prosecutions and courts reinforced in rural regions.</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.5</b> The judicial institutions are decentralised to rural areas.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of escorts, in house surveillance systems, secure living shelters, etc.</li> <li>• # of cases of protection, confidentiality and safety measures during trials.</li> <li>• Standard training material provided.</li> <li>• # of cases and jurisprudence on threats of sexual violence.</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.6</b> Systems for the protection of threatened survivors, witnesses and judicial actors are set up.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Circular on exoneration adopted</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.7</b> Survivors are declared exempt from legal fees (in accordance with the Road Map).		2009–2011	Justice ministries, relevant legal authorities, UNJHRO.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Circular adopted</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.1</b> Clarification of the implementation of the 2006 law.	National level / Eastern DRC	2009–2011	Justice ministries, relevant legal authorities, UNJHRO .
<b>3.1</b> The application of the 2006 Law on Sexual Violence is effective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review study documenting the application of the penal code and procedure.</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.2</b> Analysis of judgment and sexual violence cases	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs.



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Setting-up reference criteria by the judicial authorities.</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.3</b> Implementation of the 2006 laws against sexual violence.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # criminological analysis of cases</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.4</b> Existing monitoring systems of cases of SV brought to justice are strengthened	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	MONUC/OHCHR, UNDP, REJUSCO, National and international NGOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of high ranking officials brought to justice</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.5</b> High Ranking military and civilian officers are brought to justice.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of disciplinary/penal sanctions against those who obstruct the judicial process</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.6</b> The disciplinary/penal sanctions against those who obstruct the judicial process are enforced.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
<b>4.1</b> The application of the 2006 Law on Sexual Violence is guaranteed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of defendants with established financial means</li> <li>• # of compensation payments</li> <li>• The compensation procedure is reviewed and simplified</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.1</b> The Effective reparation of survivors is guaranteed.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of payments of legal fees is recorded and published</li> <li>• # of executions of justice decisions <i>in solidum</i> with the government.</li> <li>• # of perpetrators pledging for forgiveness to their survivors and families.</li> <li>• # of systematic destitutions of defendants working in the public administration /or security services.</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.2</b> Other forms of reparation are applied.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of judgments to be distributed to the communities with the consent of the survivors.</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.3</b> Survivors' satisfaction and the guarantees of non-recurrence of crimes are ensured.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNJHRO, PNUD, REJUSCO National and international NGOs
	<b>OUTCOME 2: Prevention and Protection against sexual violence.</b>				
<b>2.1</b> Threats are prevented or mitigated and vulnerability and exposure to sexual violence is reduced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definition of indicators on data collection and a policy (SOPs) for personnel gathering information</li> <li>• # of profiles developed per type of crimes, survivors and perpetrators in the region.</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.1</b> The profiles of the perpetrators, survivors and the threats are identified.	SK, NK, Ituri, etc.Territoires etc Shabunda Masisi, Mwenga, Lubero etc	2009–2010	Cluster protection : HCR, UNFPA, Oxfam Québec, NRC, Pain pour les Déshérités, Arche d'Alliance, ASADHO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of risk assessment developed per situation</li> </ul>	<b>2.1.2</b> Common analysis of sexual violence risks	SK, NK, Ituri, etc.Territoires etc Shabunda Masisi, Mwenga, Lubero etc	2009–2011	UNICEF

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># analytical reports published and distributed.</li> <li># of coordination meetings with actors intervening in protection and prevention</li> </ul>	2.1.3 Information is synthesized and coordinated	SK, NK, Ituri, etc.Territoires etc Shabunda Masisi, Mwenga, Lubero etc )	2009–2011	UNCHR, MONUC/CAS, OHCHR, UNFPA, UNICEF, NRC, CARE Oxfam, Search for Common Grounds
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of networks within communities that are reinforced to better prevent and fight sexual violence</li> </ul>	2.1.4 Best practices in prevention by implicated local communities are reinforced and practical measures to reduce the vulnerability are implemented	South Kivu; Irumu territory, Ituri district; MASISI, RUTSHURU, NYIRAGONGO, WALIKALE territories and the town of KARISIMBI, Haut Uele.	2009–2011	Cluster Protection HCR, MONUC/CAS, , NRC, CARE Oxfam, Search for Common Grounds etc CAMPS/CELPA; SCUUK; COOPI; GAD; UNIFEM
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MONUC Directive against sexual violence</li> </ul>	2.1.5 Directives against sexual violence are operational	National level / Eastern stabilisation region	2009–2010	Cluster Protection/Force Commander MONUC/ODSRSG-ROL
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of humanitarian interventions and programmatic activities which limit risks and exposure to sexual violence.</li> </ul>	2.1.6 Programmatic activities are adapted to limit sexual violence risks.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNHCR, CARE, World Vision, OXFAM UK
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of sensitization campaigns conducted</li> <li># of persons targeted by sensitisation messages</li> </ul>	2.1.7 Campaigns on sensitization and information against sexual violence are reinforced	Ituri, Haut&Bas Uélé, NK, SK and North Katanga	2009–2011	Protections agencies working on these sites.
2.2 Resilience of survivors of sexual violence is strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of educational and awareness activities on sexual violence conducted</li> </ul>	2.2.1 Impact of sexual violence on individuals and communities is reduced.	Moba, Pweto and Kalémie; all SK and NK territories;	2009–2011	UNCHR, AIDES, ASADHO, AHA, COOPI, CVT (North Katanga); FSH (SK), UNIFEM
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of educational examples and messages presented</li> </ul>	2.2.2 Social stigma aof survivors is prevented and reduced	All territories of SK and NK Djugu, Mahagi, Irumu (Ituri)	2009–2011	Search for Common Ground
2.3 A protective environment is created	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of advocacy activities conducted</li> </ul>	2.3.1 Sexual violence is prevented through advocacy	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	Cluster protection
<b>OUTCOME 3: Security sector reform and sexual violence</b>					
3.1 Security forces and agents both prevent and respond effectively to sexual violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military personnel statute and discipline regulations integrate sexual violence concerns</li> <li>Responsibilities of the chain of command enforcing discipline are</li> </ul>	3.1.1 Regulations of the disciplinary orders to prevent sexual violence implemented.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	Defence Ministry and SSR Coordination, EUSEC, UNDP.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>identified.</li> <li>• Comparison of No. of report of cases referred to justice and No. of reported cases.</li> <li>• # of modules developed</li> <li>• # of trainings conducted</li> <li>• # of awareness sessions</li> </ul>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unique training modules are validated</li> <li>• # of training sessions</li> <li>• # of specialised cells against sexual violence created in CIAT and sub CIATs</li> <li>• # of daily monitoring activities carried out.</li> <li>• # of reception and audition facilities improved and adapted to survivors of sexual violence</li> <li>• # of cases referred to the social services</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.2</b> Anti sexual violence cells of the National Congolese Police are created inside each police station office and each sub-office in accordance with the A2 activity Combating impunity on specialized sexual violence judicial corps.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNJHRO/
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of rooms rehabilitated and adapted for the assistance of survivors</li> <li>• # cases referred to other services</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.3</b> Improved assistance of survivors in the preliminary phase of enquiry	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNJHRO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # awareness sessions</li> <li>• # of penal sanctions imposed on police officers and disseminated</li> </ul>	<b>3.1.4</b> National Congolese Police agents are aware of the detrimental effects of sexual violence.	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UNPOL/EUPOL/PNC/CSRP/UNDP
<b>3.2</b> Special procedures to assist the survivors of sexual violence are included in the DDR process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of identified cases referred to a specialised program on SV</li> </ul>	<b>3.2.1</b> Women who are survivors of sexual violence are separated from the armed groups and receive specialised programs	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	UEPNDDR/SMI/DDR/UNICEF/UNDP/EUSEC
<b>3.3</b> Vetting is implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of persons excluded from the support of MONUC</li> </ul>	<b>3.3.1</b> Individuals against whom there are substantial allegations of HR abuses are excluded from MONUC support structures	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	SSR coordination/UNJHRO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of persons removed for army ranks</li> </ul>	<b>3.3.2</b> Individuals against whom there are substantial allegations for committing HR abuses are removed from the army	Eastern DRC	2009–2011	SSR coordination/UNJHRO
<b>OUTCOME 4: Multi-sectoral response to survivors of sexual violence</b>					
<b>4.1</b> Survivors of sexual violence can access essential services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of health zones with a functional reference system % health zones per province</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.1</b> Responsibility and coordination of actors involved in multi-sectoral response per health zone	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	The Focal Points; the relevant ministries (Gender, Social Affairs Justice and Health Ministries, and all their sub-divisions ; sexual violence
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of appointed focal points managing the reference system per health zone</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.2</b> Coordination of services is facilitated by focal points	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of distributed leaflets ; No of referred survivors identified through the reference system</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.3</b> Potential survivors are aware of how and where to seek assistance	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	working groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral coordination), UNFPA (medical sub-component coordination), UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of cases who access services by using agreed forms</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.4</b> Agreement on a standardize form and its regular use	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of service providers who apply SOP according to the follow up evaluation</li> </ul>	<b>4.1.5</b> A clear orientation system exists in each entry point so that survivors are aware of available services in medical care, psychosocial support, legal counselling and reintegration assistance	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	
<b>4.2</b> Essential services adhere to standards of quality and are available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of protocol document</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.1</b> A practical analysis on actual practices in the health centres informs the revision of the medical protocol	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Justice Ministry) and their divisions, the UN human rights office (JHRO), sexual violence work groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component coordination), UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of a revised national medical protocol, integrating STI treatment, PEP, and vaccinations.</li> <li>• Existence of standard procedures in the medical treatment of sexual violence survivors.</li> <li>• Existence of a checklist for the clinical management of sexual violence survivors</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.2</b> The National Protocol on Medical Assistance for Survivors of Sexual Violence gives clear directives on clinical management of rape in particular and medical care following sexual violence, on the documentation of cases, on appropriate behaviour towards adult and child survivors, and provides guidance on referral to complementary services	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Gender, medical services providers , SV working groups, NGOs, WHO, UNFPA (medical sub-component coordination) , UNICEF(multi-sectoral component coordination), UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of trained health service providers.</li> <li>• # of trained female health service providers</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.3</b> The technical capacity of personnel (women and men) and institutional capacity of health care structures in each health zone of the targeted areas are reinforced	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Gender, medical service providers , NGOs, SV working groups, WHO, UNFPA (coordinator of sub-component for medical care) and UNICEF(multi-sectoral component coordinator), UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of survivors benefiting from medical care (disaggregated by age and sex groups)</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.4</b> Availability of quality medical care services  (Rehabilitation of health structures: Obj. 3.1.1 of Return, Recovery and Reintegration)	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Gender, medical service providers , NGOs, SV Working Groups, WHO, UNFPA (coordinator of sub-component for medical care) and UNICEF(multi-sectoral component coordinator), UN

					agencies	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protocol review document</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.5</b> An analysis of current practices in psychosocial support and mental health care informs the development of MHPSS standards.	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	The Focal Points; the relevant ministries (Gender, Social Affairs and Health Ministries) and their sub divisions, sexual violence work groups, NGOs, UN agencies, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component ), UN agencies	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adoption of a Protocol on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS).</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.6</b> Standards on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support provide clear directives on quality of MHPSS care for adult and child survivors.	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Gender Health and Social Affairs Ministries) and their sub-divisions, sexual violence work groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component ), UN agencies	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of trained para-mental health service and psychosocial support providers trained (disaggregated by sex)</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.7</b> Personnel working in mental-health and psychological support are trained on the national standards	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries Gender , Health and Social Affairs Ministries) and their sub-divisions, sexual violence work groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component )	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of survivors benefiting from mental health and psychosocial support ( disaggregated by age and sex )</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.8</b> Quality psychosocial services are available.	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Gender, Health and Social Affairs Ministries) and their sub-divisions, sexual violence working groups, NGOs, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component )	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidation of best practices regarding legal aid</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.9</b> An analysis of current practices in the area of legal aid informs the standards on access to justice services for Sexual Violence survivors	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Ministry of Justice, the President of the Bar Association, National and Provincial Bar Associations, the Judicial Clinics, NGOs, UNJHRO Coordination Office, UNICEF (multi-sectoral component coordination)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adoption of a Legal Aid Protocol</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.10</b> The National Standards for Legal Aid are harmonised (with the approaches of the Legal Clinics, and the Free Consultation Office of the Bar Association.)  With Component Combating Impunity.	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Ministry of Justice, the President of the Bar Association, the National and Provincial Bar Associations, the Legal Clinics, NGOs, UNJHRO( Coordination Office), UNICEF/UNJHRO(multi-sectoral component coordination)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of professional and para- legals trained (disaggregated by sex)</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.11</b> The capacities of the legal service providers and structures are	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Ministry of Justice, the President of the Bar Association, the	



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of women professionals and para-legals hired</li> </ul>	<p>reinforced.</p> <p>With Component Combating Impunity.</p>			National and Provincial Bar Associations, the Legal Clinics, NGOs, UNJHRO ( Coordination Office), UNICEF/UNJHRO/ Batonier
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of survivors who receive legal counselling ; no of survivors who file a complaint ; no of cases that receive judgement (disaggregated by sex and age)</li> </ul>	<p><b>4.2.12</b> Availability of quality legal counselling</p> <p>With Component Combating Impunity</p>	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Justice Ministry ) and their sub divisions ; the UNJHRO ) ; the sexual violence working groups ; NGOs ; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidation of best practices related to social and economical reintegration.</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.13</b> A practical analysis of current practices in the field of social and economical reintegration informs the development of national standards on social and economical reintegration	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries and their divisions ; sexual violence working groups ; NGOs ; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance component)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adoption of a Reintegration Protocol</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.14</b> National Standards on Reintegration with a survivor-centred approach are adopted and published	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries and their divisions ; sexual violence working groups ; NGOs ; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance )
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of trained service providers (disaggregated by sex)</li> <li># evaluations conducted</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.15</b> The capacities of the personnel and the structures offering services of social and economical reintegration are reinforced and their approaches are standardised	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries(Gender and Social Affairs Ministries)and their divisions ; sexual violence working groups ; NGOs ; UNICEF (coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of survivors reintegrated in their communities/families</li> <li># of children reintegrated in schools ;no of people benefiting from economic reintegration assistance</li> <li>%of persons continue the activity 6 month after the end of the support program</li> <li>% of positive mediation cases (disaggregated by age and sex)</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.16</b> Quality and durable reintegration support services are available.	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Genre and Social Affairs Ministries) and their divisions ; sexual violence working groups ; NGOs, UNICEF(coordination of the multi sectoral assistance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of service providers trained (disaggregated by sex)</li> <li>% of positive results according to monitoring tools ( e.g. pre and post test improvement, spot check after 6 months)</li> </ul>	<b>4.2.17</b> Actors adhere to IASC guidelines	Eastern DRC	2010–2011	Relevant ministries (Genre, Social Affairs, Justice Health Ministries ) and their divisions ; sexual violence working groups ; NGOs, UNICEF(coordination of the multi sectoral assistance)

<b>OUTCOME 5: Data and Mapping</b>					
<b>5.1</b> A unique and harmonised system of data collection on sexual violence is in place and operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of existing data collection systems inventoried.</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.1</b> Existing data collection systems are inventoried	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of an updated inventory of actors intervening on sexual violence in each targeted zone</li> <li>Existence of a study mentioning zones with uncovered needs</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.2</b> A mapping of actors, interventions and uncovered needs is updated and completed for each targeted zones	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Creation of a list of SMART indicators related to each component of the Strategy on prevention and response to sexual violence.</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.3</b> Information needs on prevention and response to sexual violence and indicators to collect are determined	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of SOP on data collection steps for the different components of prevention and response to sexual violence</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.4</b> The steps on sexual violence prevention and response are validated as Standard Operating Procedures.	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of actors trained in data collection by thematic</li> <li>Proportion of actors implicated in data collection</li> <li>No of new territorial synergies implemented</li> <li>Proportion of equipped synergies</li> <li>Proportion of actors of data collection who received data collection tools</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.5</b> Technical, material and operational capacities of actors and synergies are reinforced.	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of a list of indicators periodically updated for each component on the response and prevention of sexual violence</li> </ul>	<b>5.1.6</b> Data gathering and transmission is effective.	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	UNFPA/BNUDH; Actors: Gender, Health and Justice Ministries, INS, International and National NGOs, members of synergies and commissions, UN agencies
<b>5.2</b> The processing, storage and analysis of data on sexual violence is realised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Creation of an integrated and functional database on sexual violence prevention and response</li> </ul>	<b>5.2.1</b> An integrated database for sexual violence prevention and response is created and operational	Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and

					commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of analysis generated from the integrated database</li> </ul>	<b>5.2.2</b> The processing and analysis of sexual violence data is realised	Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of studies realised improving knowledge on sexual violence</li> </ul>	<b>5.2.3</b> Knowledge on sexual violence and interventions is improved	34 ZS Nord Kivu, 34 ZS Sud Kivu, 18 ZS Maniema, 83 ZS Orientale, 10 ZS Katanga	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
<b>5.3</b> The diffusion and information sharing on sexual violence is effective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of written briefing notes</li> <li># of bi-annual and annual written reports on sexual violence</li> </ul>	<b>5.3.1</b> Information sharing on sexual violence is ensured	Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># coordination meetings held</li> <li>Existence of a monitoring and evaluation plan for the data and mapping Component</li> </ul>	<b>5.3.2</b> Effective coordination of the Component is ensured	Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Kindu, Kalemie	2010–2011	Gender Ministry, Justice Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, UNFPA, International and National NGOs, Synergy and commissions members, UN agencies

## Annex 2. Indicative budget

### INDICATIVE UNSSSS BUDGET – PHASED 2009 – 2012

Essential Interventions	Total Requirements	Available resources	Funding gap*	2009 – 2010	2010 – 2011	2011 – 2012
<b>I. IMPROVEMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</b>						
1. Strengthening of FARDC capacities, internal control and discipline	90,350,000	22,090,000	68,260,000	29,800,000	26,700,000	11,760,000
2. Support for disengagement of armed groups and their integration into the FARDC or DDR	71,465,000	2,578,000	68,887,000	16,500,000	16,500,000	1,422,000
3. Transport of FARDC, PNC and ex-combatants	10,000,000	6,178,000	3,822,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	822,000
<b>TOTAL Security</b>	<b>171,815,000</b>	<b>30,846,000</b>	<b>140,969,000</b>	<b>47,800,000</b>	<b>44,700,000</b>	<b>14,004,000</b>
<b>III. RESTORATION AND STRENGTHENING OF STATE AUTHORITY</b>						
1. Rehabilitation of strategic road axes and bridges	200,000,000	115,590,000	84,410,000	30,000,000	30,000,000	24,410,000
2. Support the deployment of the National Police (including border police, PIR and integration of AG police)	46,668,000	18,758,080	27,909,920	11,847,920	10,500,000	5,562,000
3. Support the deployment of civil administration	15,840,000	2,718,969	13,121,031	5,000,000	5,000,000	3,121,031
4. Support measures to curtail illicit trade of natural resources	9,172,000	-	9,172,000	3,172,000	3,000,000	3,000,000
5. Support the deployment of justice and penitentiary personnel	24,000,000	10,531,160	13,468,840	5,000,000	4,468,840	1,000,000
<b>Total State Authority</b>	<b>295,680,000</b>	<b>147,598,209</b>	<b>148,081,791</b>	<b>55,019,920</b>	<b>52,968,840</b>	<b>37,093,031</b>
<b>IV. RETURN, REINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY</b>						
1. Basic social needs and services restored in areas of return	217,600,000	27,700,000	189,900,000	36,200,000	76,500,000	77,200,000

2. Economic recovery promoted through creation of employment and enhanced agricultural productivity	60,170,000	29,771,000	30,399,000	8,060,000	11,060,000	11,279,000
3. Promote local peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict resolution	34,106,000	6,100,000	28,006,000	15,000,000	9,000,000	4,006,000
<b>Total RRR</b>	<b>311,876,000</b>	<b>63,571,000</b>	<b>248,305,000</b>	<b>59,260,000</b>	<b>96,560,000</b>	<b>92,485,000</b>
<b>V. COMBATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE</b>						
1. Fight Against Impunity for Cases of Sexual Violence	11,545,000	2,784,587	8,760,413	5,210,067	3,550,346	
2. Prevention and Protection of Sexual Violence	11,520,000	3,027,271	8,492,729	5,294,283	3,198,446	
3. Security Sector Reform and Sexual Violence	8,196,014	310,554	7,885,460	5,505,000	2,380,460	
4. Multi-Sectoral Response for Survivors of Sexual Violence	41,549,550	16,107,000	25,442,550	16,153,880	9,288,670	
5. Data and Mapping	5,739,000	86,000	5,653,000	3,690,000	1,963,000	
<b>Total Combating Sexual Violence</b>	<b>78,549,564</b>	<b>22,315,412</b>	<b>56,234,152</b>	<b>35,853,230</b>	<b>20,380,922</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>GLOBAL TOTAL</b>	<b>857,920,564</b>	<b>264,330,621</b>	<b>593,589,943</b>	<b>197,933,150</b>	<b>214,609,762</b>	<b>143,582,031</b>

\* Estimation of funding gap is tentative and will be further revised based on alignment of existing programmes supported by the international community

20°00'E 22°30'E 25°00'E 27°30'E 30°00'E

REPUBLICQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

1:500 000

0 100 200 Km

Equateur

Bandundu Kasai Occidental Kasai Oriental

AXES ROUTIERS PRIORITAIRES RETENUS A REHABILITER A COURT ET MOYEN TERMES DANS LE CADRE DU PROGRAMME STAREC

Localités sur Projet RN

Axes routiers retenus

- Nationale
- Nationale en Projet
- Régionale prioritaire
- Régionale secondaire
- Autres Régionales
- Locale
- Autres locales
- Eau de surface
- Parc National
- Reserve de chasse
- Reserve naturelle protégée

Sources : BD de la CI, MITPFR ; Réalisation : Unité SIG de la Cellule Infrastructures, Septembre 2009

Carte de situation



**A UNITED NATIONS  
INTEGRATED INITIATIVE**

**FAO  
ILO  
IOM  
UNDP  
UNFPA**

**UNHABITAT  
UNHCR  
UNICEF  
WFP  
MONUC**

**IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**



**SUPPORTED BY:**

**BELGIUM  
GERMANY  
JAPAN  
SPAIN  
SWEDEN**

**UNITED STATES  
UNITED KINGDOM  
THE NETHERLANDS  
WORLD BANK**

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