



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION SUPPORT STRATEGY

For the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Quarterly Report

October to December 2011



In support of the Government Stabilization and
Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC).


About the ISSSS

The **International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS)** is a framework to support the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It supports the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC); and the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1925 (2010) and 1991 (2011).

Activities are supported by voluntary contributions, the UN Peace Building Fund, and the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO). They are focused in conflict-affected provinces of Eastern DRC.

TIMELINE



Key figures

(all figures in millions of US dollars)















Project resources¹

Mobilised US\$ 273,02 M.

Spent US\$ 183,47 M.

Contributions by executing partners not listed.

Financial partners

	United States	86.5
	Netherlands	57.3
	United Kingdom	25.8
	Sweden	18.6
	Belgium	12.7
	Canada	9.0
	Spain	5.1
	European Commission	4.2
	Japan	3.5
	Germany	2.4
	Norway	1.9
	France	0.5
	GoDRC STAREC	to 20.0
	Peacebuilding Fund	20.0

¹ Funding situation as of 01.01.2012



Woman in Magungu (Rutshuru, NK), working on a community project, in the framework of MSI's project in support of Community reintegration (PBF funding)

Police Officer in Ituri, trained and deployed in one of the eight Police stations built by IOM (USAID funding).



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Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
CLPC	Permanent Local Conciliation Committee
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
CTC	Joint Technical Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDR/RR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DSRSG/RC/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARDC	Congolese Armed Forces
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
GoDRC	Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
IDP	Internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IMA	IMA World Health
IMC	International Medical Corps
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre (within MONUSCO)
MPTFO	UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSI	Management Systems International
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PNC	Congolese National Police
SRFF	Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility
SSU	Stabilization Support Unit
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNHABITAT	UN Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNPOL	UN Police (within MONUSCO)

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Foreword

The last quarter of 2011 was marked by strong positive signals from both the DRC Government and the United Nations to support the stabilization process. Indeed, in October, the government signed a new Presidential ordinance extending the STAREC-program for an additional 36 months, until June 2014. This decision is the first multi-year extension of the program. Meanwhile the UN Secretary-General recently drew attention to the need for the UN to remain engaged on Stabilization programs in the DRC at least until 2014. This would place stabilization at the core of GoDRC and UN priorities, and reaffirm a clear focus of the mission on the stabilization of eastern DRC.

By the end of the fourth quarter of 2011, 65 % of the total funds raised in support of the Stabilization Strategy had been spent, marking the end of the “first phase” of the ISSSS. So far, five of the six priority axes have been opened, resulting in enhanced security, state authority and trade. A notable ‘delivery’ during this quarter was the completion of infrastructure works on the Miti-Hombo axis, with the launch of the Hombo Bridge, reconnecting the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. This further allows the extension of the programme to Walikale territory, in compliance with the Stabilization Priority Plan 2012-2014.

Nonetheless, serious constraints remain; most importantly insufficient government willingness and capacity to support the deployment, equipment and payment of state personnel to enact the restoration of State authority. This is a clear ‘red flag’ in the ISSSS score card so far. Moreover the low funding of the SRFF needs to be addressed.

Engagement in Eastern DRC is hardly apolitical: stabilization activities in support to security, the restoration of state institutions and economic recovery, aim at quick-wins and to achieve a much need stable institutional and socio-economic environments to generate conditions for longer-term reforms, thus requiring the implication and strengthening of key political and institutional actors. Upcoming stabilization efforts in the East will request more engagement on the political and institutional fronts, keeping in mind the volatile post-elections context as well as upcoming provincial and local elections.

The new Stabilization Priority Plan (SPP) for 2012-2014 started in January 2012 and represents the new framework for the international support to STAREC. All priorities were jointly identified by the STAREC coordination structures, led by the Government of DRC.

In the framework of the SPP, policy dialogues and accompanying measures to the GoDRC will be sought taking into account the budgetary implications of state official deployment, and intrinsic funds needed for the functioning of the ISSSS-built infrastructures. This will hopefully increase the qualitative impact of the works implemented during the first phase.

The Stabilization Support Unit (SSU) would like to seize this opportunity to express, on behalf of the ISSSS participating agencies, its gratitude for the continuous support to the stabilization process in Eastern DRC.

*Stabilization Support Unit
January 2012*

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Overview of the ISSSS

2.1

Sources of funds for the ISSSS remained unchanged since Quarter 3: a large part comes from voluntary bilateral contributions, the UN Peace-building Fund, and the UN Stabilisation Mission's in the DRC resources. Several Member States continued seconding expert personnel to the Stabilisation Support Unit.




The above figure shows status of mobilized funds and the expenditure Until January 2012 (amounts in million USD).

Project funds per component

(millions USD)

New funding during Quarter 4 was allocated mainly to support the Return, Reintegration and Recovery component (US\$ 20M.), and to the Restoration of State Authority (US\$ 5M.). In addition, projects were selected for the second disbursement of SRFf funds, in support of fighting against sexual violence. Allocations were aligned with priorities set in the Stabilisation Priority Plan 2012-2014.



The above figure shows funds distribution against ISSSS components

The ISSSS is divided into five components: security; political processes; restoration of state authority; return, recovery & reintegration; and the fight against sexual violence. The above table shows the funds available per component, as of December 2011.

Support from MONUSCO

MONUSCO is mandated to support implementation of the ISSSS under Security Council Resolutions 1925 (2010) and 1991 (2011). Approximate contributions during Quarter 4 were as follows:²

Technical advisory	17 civilian staff 40 UN Police officers	
Military engineers	142 km road rehabilitation	Total (2009-11) of 332km
Coordination	2 substantive staff recruited 3 administrative staff	+ 4 substantive staff under recruitment

Personnel secondment from Member States


Coordination	4 substantive staff recruited (Netherlands, Norway, UK) 3 Staff under recruitment (Switzerland and USA)
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² See 2010-11 budget A/64/670 (2010). Apportionments estimated with MONUSCO management.

2.2 Targeted areas

The Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) targets six provinces: North & South Kivu, Orientale, Katanga, Maniema, and Equateur.

In support of the STAREC, ISSSS activities are concentrated in the provinces of North & South Kivu, and the district of Ituri in Orientale Province. Additional programs are based in Maniema (for economic recovery), and at the regional level (with respect to the FARDC).





(Starting from the top): Police Training Center constructed in Mugunga by UNOPS with PBF-funding; School institute in Isenze (SK) rehabilitated by MSI's community project (funded by USAID); and, Local conflict mediation workshop organised by UNHCR (funded by the PBF).



SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS

This section summarizes progress under the five components of the ISSSS during the fourth quarter of 2011. In each case we set off progress against the outcomes listed in the ISSSS Integrated Program Framework.

SECURITY


Objective: Threats to life, property and freedom of movement are reduced.

Four outcome areas support the overall objective: the sustainable integration of ex-combatants into the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC); FARDC operational capacity; FARDC conduct & discipline; and demobilization and reintegration of residual combatants.

3.1 Security

Total project funds

(millions USD)



Support from MONUSCO:

- Coordination of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), including at the policy level with the Ministry of Defense.
- Indirectly: Provision of an enabling environment by the MONUSCO Force.

Assessment for Quarter 4

The overall security environment in eastern DRC remained volatile during quarter 4.

There was a slight decline of armed group activity in North Kivu due to an increase in military operations (both unilateral and joint), and the killing, arrest or surrender of a number of senior leaders and officials of armed groups. “Colonel” Sadiki and his deputy commander (FDLR), and ‘Colonel’ Gervais (PARECO) were killed. ‘Colonel’ Bozi (Mayi Mayi PARECO) and ‘Colonel’ Amani Victor (FDLR) were both arrested. Mayi Mayi Kikurukuku’s leader surrendered and negotiations were recently started for a possible integration with Mayi Mayi *Général* La Fontaine.

Unfortunately, the security situation in South Kivu deteriorated significantly during the last days of the year, with a series of bloody FDLR-attacks on civilians in the Shabunda area, especially around Nzovu and Kigulube, in retaliation against civilians’ supposed support to the self-defense group Mayi Mayi Raia Mutumboki. This shows that, despite their progressive weakening over the last months, the increasing desertions and the elimination of some of their key leaders, the FDLR remains a considerable threat to security and civilians.

In quarter 4, as before, most security incidents in the eastern DRC were attributable to the

FDLR. The group was most active in Masisi, Walikale and in Shabunda territories, and to a lesser extent, in Rutshuru. As far as other foreign armed groups (FAGs) are concerned: the **LRA** was seemingly driven back to its sanctuaries in the CAR, partially as a result of the joint DRC-Uganda military operations in the areas of Dungu, Doruma and Bangadi. Actions against the **ADF** have produced mixed results at best, though; worrisome reports mention that recruitment of new elements is ongoing in Uganda and recent military operations did not affect the ongoing training in the DRC camps. Recent reports also raised the suspicion of collaboration and recruitment ongoing for the Al-Shabaab extremist movement.

As to Congolese residual groups, most of these remained an active thorn in the government's side during Quarter 4, especially southern South Kivu's **Mayi Mayi Yakutumba**. Though Yakutumba was driven out of the Ubwari peninsula during the last quarter, he has regrouped in his strongholds around Mboko, where his anti-Rwandophone discourse strikes a sympathetic chord with a part of the population. In addition, he was possibly strengthened by his alliances with the Burundian FNL and the FDLR.

Another notable Mayi Mayi leader during the period in review was Colonel **Cheka**, wanted for arrest and prosecution for his alleged involvement in mass rapes and other human rights violations, who registered his candidacy for the national legislative elections in Walikale territory. Recent discussions on the demobilization of his fighters failed to produce expected results. New armed groups were created or reactivated this year: Nyatura, Semajeri, FCD, and a strong re-emergence of Raia **Mutomoboki**: the latter took a very assertive position towards any "foreigners" intruding in Shabunda, mainly the FDLR but also 'Rwandophone' elements of the FARDC.

On the government's side, the **reorganization of the FARDC's "Amani Leo" Units**, into regiments of 1,200 soldiers, initiated early February 2011, was finalized during this quarter. The regimentation process was supposed to weed out "ghost soldiers" and dismantle parallel chains of command, thereby improving command-and-control structures. While there were some relatively successful unilateral operations against armed groups, the longer-term impact will be assessed in the coming months. Some 90% of troops have currently been redeployed across the Kivus.

How has the ISSSS contributed?

While the ISSSS indirectly increased local security during the fourth quarter by, for example, supporting the establishment of police and promoting peaceful land conflict mediation, the lack of progress on broader Security Sector Reform remained a considerable impediment.

This was especially visible in delivering the FARDC garrisoning project (see page 18) and the delay in providing the Prosecution Support Cells (PSCs) with a regulatory framework by finalizing its MoU (see page 15). The DDR of Congolese residual combatants, is also still on hold as there is no clear government DDR strategy yet.

In the upcoming months, it will be necessary to closely monitor the impact of the military operations against the FARDC. At the same time, a strong policy dialogue on the SSR agenda should be held with the GoDRC



Establishment of Prosecution Support Cells

The Prosecution Support Cells were established by the UN SCR 1925 (2010), following the “complementarity principle” foreseen in the Rome Statute. This principle gives national authorities the primary responsibility for dealing with crimes, thereby hopefully fostering national will and capacity to prosecute influential criminals. The international community may step in to provide expert support though, as for example through the PSCs in the case of the DRC.

Funded as a pilot-project by the United Nations Peace-building fund, and later completed with Canadian funds, this project aims to reinforce the capacities of DRC’s military justice, by establishing five Prosecution Support Cells composed of six international police and military experts each, and deployed to the five ISSSS/STAREC provinces.

The experts are to provide the required logistical and technical assistance to legal auxiliaries and military magistrates in their functions of investigating and prosecuting violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by the military personnel.

Prosecution Support Cell experts and Military magistrates carry a mobile court hearing in Ituri



Scorecard for ISSSS outcomes

■ Good progress ◆ Uneven ✖ Reversal

◆ Durable integration of armed groups

The reorganization (“regimentation”) of FARDC deployments in the Kivus was completed during quarter 4 and redeployment was at 90% in December 2011.

While it is premature to evaluate the long-term impact of the process, the first results seem to be mixed:

- (a) The prolonged absence of FARDC units created security vacuums in some areas, allowing armed groups to consolidate and expand their presence there;
- (b) The process was flawed by delays, frustration and ethnic mud-slinging over perceived preferential treatment of former combatants of the “Rwandophone” CNDP, leading to defections;
- (c) The lack of payment of salaries for the new regiments also caused defections and protests, which were ongoing at the time of this writing;
- (d) Some integrated elements of the former CNDP, PARECO, and FRF are refusing to be redeployed outside their areas of operation, thereby staying in control of their old (ethnic) support networks.

Preliminary assessments show that the regimentation process had a very limited impact on parallel chains of command, as the “old” loyalties of most of the integrated elements in the FARDC and PNC remained unchanged.

◆ Improved FARDC effectiveness

ISSSS support to the FARDC was focused on to the rehabilitation of two garrison sites in South Kivu and a training center in Orientale Province.

Some important programmatic progress was achieved during quarter 4 with the completion of IOM works on Camps Saio and Nyamuyuni in South Kivu. However, serious concerns remain as to the use of the camps: the FARDC has still not given any clarity on which contingents will occupy the camps, nor how the management and securing of the camps will be organized, despite EUSEC’s repeated offers of support. Furthermore, the tent camp surrounding camp Saio is in a deplorable state, and it is unknown where these military families will be transferred. The handover of the camps to the authorities may be withheld conditional on an official communication of the FARDC addressing these concerns (see p. 18).

The Lukusa Training center had been already handed-over to the FARDC during Quarter 3. The first training should start mid-February.

◆ Improved FARDC discipline & reduced impunity

The Prosecution Support Cells (PSCs) received a boost by the government’s (delayed) signing of their MoU on 16 December 2011, which enforced the Standard Operating Procedures, developed with the Ministry of Defense. This provides the PSCs with a framework for cooperation with legal auxiliaries and military

magistrates. The cooperation between the PSCs and the military authorities is still somewhat difficult at times though, as military magistrates are not always cooperative.

24 international experts from the military, police and judiciary domains were so far recruited for four PSCs, and deployed to NK, SK, Ituri and Maniema. The PSCs are equipped and already providing mentoring and support to investigations and prosecutions.



Demobilization and reintegration of residual combatants

The Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program remains suspended at the request of the Ministry of Defense. There is no clear government-endorsed DDR strategy yet, as the GoDRC remained unwilling to re-open the “DD” for residual elements of ex-armed groups. This approach is justified; as with the current blossoming of armed groups around the Kivu’s, the reopening of a program could make groups start mobilizing new fighters so they can reap the benefits of the program afterwards. However, a way forward has to be explored for those remaining fighters that have not yet benefited from previous DDR activities.

*FARDC Training Center in Lukusa (Oriental Province)
rehabilitated by IOM, with Canadian and UK funding*





FARDC garrisoning and community support project

This quarter saw the completion of the garrisoning project in support of the FARDC. Identified as a priority by DRC's Army Reform Plan, this project aimed at improving living conditions of FARDC soldiers and their dependents, concentrating troops, and enhancing command-and-control structures and discipline. The joint UNDP-IOM venture was funded by the Netherlands and focused on the strategic sites of Saio and Nyiamunyiuni in South Kivu. Due to a lack of funding, construction on the third site, Nyangezi, had to be withdrawn.

The project was finalized in December 2011, with the following results:

- Barracks were completed in camps Saio and Nyamuyuni, with a housing capacity for 1,333 soldiers and officers and some 5,500 of their dependents. Crucial support was given by MONUSCO's Chinese Engineering Company, which reconstructed the access roads and leveled the ground on which the camps were located.
- Community Projects: In addition, some twenty community development projects were set up for military families and communities surrounding the three camps; this included schools, water and sanitation facilities, social foyers and marketplaces. The community projects should improve civil-military relations.

The handover of the camps has not yet been done, as the Ministry of Defense has so far not decided on an occupational and management plan.



SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS

POLITICAL PROCESSES

Objective: Support the peaceful articulation of claims, and the implementation of commitments made by all parties.

Underneath this objective, the Integrated Program Framework identifies three priority outcome areas:

- Follow-through on commitments made under existing peace accords;
- Dialogue with residual combatants and local conflict resolution; &
- Regional relations with key neighboring countries.

3.2

Political processes

Assessment for Quarter 4

The political landscape in the eastern DRC during the last quarter of 2011 was dominated by pre-electoral preparations and the elections themselves, held on 28 November. Given that the *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* (CENI) was behind schedule with the logistics and there was still uncertainties surrounding the exact date for the elections, there seemed to have been a window of opportunity for armed groups to exploit. Several (ex-) Mayi Mayi groups were reportedly stockpiling weapons and training new recruits while the CNDP was allegedly reinforcing its parallel administration as well as its grip upon key components of the FARDC in the Kivus. To prevent violence, leaders of CNDP and ex-Mayi Mayi groups-turned-political parties were called to Kinshasa in September and October to participate in consultations with the Government on keeping those elements under control which had not yet integrated into the FARDC or had deserted from the armed forces.

Implementation of existing peace accords

Although the above-mentioned consultations between the Government and ex-armed groups' leaders did not yield any breakthrough, the government reiterated its assurances for the integration of ex-combatants into the Army and the police, the allocation of military and police ranks as well as the integration of their political cadres into the public administration. Moreover, on 29 October, in the same Presidential Ordinance extending the STAREC, President Kabila signed the extension of the National Follow Committee of the 23 March peace agreements (*Comité National de Suivi - CNS*) until issues meant to be dealt with are resolved.

Several Congolese armed groups that had agreed to lay down their arms and integrate their combatants into the national security forces were revived, in violation of the 23 March 2009 peace agreements. As mentioned under the Security component, new armed groups that have recently emerged, such as the Nyatura group and the *Défense de la Jeunesse Congolaise* tried to take hold of the border area across North Kivu and South Kivu. New groups are also reported almost every week, from Ituri to North and South Kivu, consisting mainly of splinter groups from established armed groups or of deserters from the FARDC, following growing tension amongst officers and rank and file along ethnic fault lines. Shifting alliances with/against the FDLR, the ADF and the FNL further coupled with widespread collusion at top level across State security forces, the FDLR, the FNL, the ADF/NALU and Congolese Mayi Mayi groups for the illegal exploitation and smuggling of minerals, charcoal, timber and even Marijuana add to the complexity insecurity.

Dialogue with residual combatants

As mentioned under the security component, there was no discussion between the

Ministry of Defense and residual Congolese armed groups as such. Isolated integrations into the FARDC are accepted on a sporadic basis; the GoDRC is awaiting the conclusions of current joint mapping of residual elements before deciding on a possible future approach.

Regional relations

Notable this quarter is the retreat of the Ugandan People's Defense Army soldiers from the DRC, following a request by the FARDC Chief of Staff to his Ugandan counterpart. According to the DRC, their presence was no longer required given that joint operations against LRA were suspended following the latter's retreat to Central African Republic.

Elections

The 28 November presidential and legislative elections were held in a somewhat chaotic fashion in the eastern DRC, leading to a number of demonstration violently suppressed by the police, particularly in Goma and Bukavu. There were scores of complaints about election irregularities against Independent CENI staff in various vote tallying centres or *Centres Locaux de Compilation des Résultats*(CLCR).

Partly as a result of mounting grievances over the elections, renewed inter-community suspicion and tension emerged. Members of the Nyanga, Hunde, Tembo, Nande, Shi, Hema, Lemdu, Hutu and Tutsi communities accused each other of vote rigging in favor of candidates from their respective ethnic groups. Non-Rwandophone communities accused the Rwandophones (Hutu and Tutsi) of abuse of their over-representation in FARDC command positions (more than 50% in South Kivu and North Kivu) to put pressure on voters and CENI staff to secure the election of Rwandophone candidates. Within the Rwandophone Community, many Hutu accused Tutsi of forcibly seizing grazing- and farm lands from Hutu and non-Rwandophone farmers in Masisi Territory. In the Ithombwe area (Mwenga Territory, South Kivu), mistrust between Banyamulenges (Tutsis) and non-Rwandophones led to a number of bloody encounters.

How has the ISSSS contributed and what next?

There was no activity under the Political Processes component during quarter 4. The Government has the lead in the outcome areas noted above, and has not requested support under the STAREC / ISSSS frameworks.

Despite the absence of a political spectrum from current activities implemented under the ISSSS, events having occurred during quarter 4, including recent programmes/projects assessments, guided a thorough reflection on how the assistance to the political component should be articulated in the second phase. Section 4 of this report (Policy, Coordination and Outlook for 2012 underlines upcoming activities foreseen for this component).

SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS

RESTORATION OF STATE AUTHORITY

Objective: Restore core state functions in key affected areas.


The overall objective is supported by activities in five outcome areas: roads; police; penal institutions; local governance; and the regulation of natural resources.

3.3

Restoration of state authority

Project funds

(In million USD)



Support from MONUSCO:

Military engineering: A total of 182 km of priority roads were rehabilitated this quarter. A particular engineering feat during this quarter was the joint launching of the Hombo Bridge by UNOPS and Office des Routes with the MONUSCO Uruguayan engineers. The latter received a short training in advance to be able to install this *Accrow* Bridge, connecting South and North Kivu.

Military escorts: UNOPS and the South Kivu Brigade agreed to a plan to provide escorts to improve monitoring of road contractors on the Burhale-Shabunda axis. The plan is currently being re-drafted to take some impassable sections of road into account.

Technical advisory: Estimated at 17 civilian staff (full-time equivalent); plus 40 UN police.

- UNPOL has the lead in support of the PNC
- JMAC has the lead in supporting the governance of natural resources in relation to the *Centres de Négoce*.
- Co-lead role for civil administration (Civil Affairs) and criminal justice (Rule of Law and Corrections).

Assessment for Quarter 4

During this quarter, the overall situation of effective presence of State institutions slightly improved regarding infrastructures and equipment.

The ISSSS has expanded the state presence in many areas, including in areas that were qualified as non-permissive previously. While progress under this component is to be noted for the construction of state infrastructures and some state employees, much remains to be done for these developments to be efficient and to deliver services to the population. The upcoming ISSSS Situation Assessment will update data available for his component.

Although improvements in the GoDRC's capacity to deliver "vital state functions" in the East was noted in some areas, major challenges remain regarding the maintenance of roads, as well as the effective deployment, equipment and especially payment of state agents. It is unclear whether the state actually budgets for all these services. The budgetary shortcomings for payment of state personnel and operational costs for the ISSSS-constructed infrastructures will be one of the main priorities for the upcoming stabilization phase. The next steps for the restoration of state authority will have to be agreed upon at the upcoming Steering Committee: without a clear budgeting process to support state agents, ISSSS activities can only have a limited impact.

Overall, the law enforcement presence in the East has improved in ISSSS areas; deployment and equipment of police elements in certain territories is more encouraging than that of other state services. Notwithstanding this progress, in some territories like Lubero and Walikale (North Kivu) the police is absent from approx. 50 % of the main urban centers. This often has to do with a shortage of proper equipment: means of transport and communication, as well as weapons and ammunitions are often lacking, making the police unable to resist armed assailants. There are also problems with the continuing integration of formerly armed groups into the PNC, who lack basic training for law enforcement duties.

How has the ISSSS contributed?

The ISSSS has significantly contributed to the expansion of state presence along the priority axes, both in terms of police, local administration, prisons and courts.

Roads rehabilitated under the ISSSS account for some 600 km to date. However, recent joint assessment noted that some of the axes already opened are rapidly deteriorating due to the lack of maintenance by the FONER and Office des Routes. Where present, the FONER undertakes maintenance works, but due to a lack of capacity and regular incomes, works remain sporadic and limited.

Also, to be noted the rehabilitation of road axis, with the finalization of all works on the Miti-Hombo road connecting South-with North Kivu (see p. 27). Administrative buildings were completed with some delays in sensitive areas in southern South Kivu (Baraka, Fizi and Mwenga). A prison in Bunyakiri and ten police stations in Ituri have been handed over, and a PNC training centre in Mugungais currently being finalized.

Field visits to the various administrative structures in the provinces during the fourth quarter show that the **civil service**, despite a slightly increased professionalism due to training, is still in a state of disorder. It is unclear how many civil servants are deployed where, as most attempts at a census (most recently by the World Bank) have been inconclusive. Due to a lack of payment, many civil servants are out of the office most of the time, as they have “parallel” jobs to make a living. Lack of payment is not simply due to a lack of registration (*immatriculation*) either: properly registered civil servants are rarely paid as well. Another factor holding back the professionalization of the service is the high average age of civil servants: septuagenarians are not uncommon, and with no pension facilities to have people step aside for younger staff, there is little chance of a rejuvenation of the service anytime soon.

This quarter, the number of local administrative personnel foreseen to be trained by the ISSSS projects has been reached (100%). A joint assessment with the provincial government shall evaluate how many of these have been deployed along the priority axes.

Progress was noted with regard to the **police (PNC)**. Recent assessments show an increase of police presence in ISSSS-areas, as well as, to some extent, their operational and logistical capacities, mainly due to the continuing training provided by UNPOL. In addition, payments of the PNC’s monthly allowances and salaries appear to be more regular than in the past.

The most problematic area for the restoration of state authority remains that of the **Rule of Law**. ISSSS-constructed courts and prisons remain unoccupied; As of yet, there are still no magistrates or penitentiary personnel deployed to the four *Tribunaux de Paix* constructed under the ISSSS. Although an ordinance has recently been released naming the 390 new magistrates for all of the DRC, no appointment order specific to the Kivu’s has been issued. It also remains unclear if their salaries and housing have been budgeted for.



In the framework of US-funded project, eight police stations were handed over in Ituri this quarter, destined to the PNC and the Officiers de la Police Judiciaire. Here, the Police station in Gety.

Scorecard for ISSSS outcomes



Good progress



Uneven



Reversal



Road access to key areas

During the fourth quarter, military engineering companies rehabilitated 182 km out of 261 km (69%). Keeping in mind the three-week hiatus due to the elections and the bad weather conditions, this may be considered quite a satisfactory achievement. Office des Routes and FONER have started maintenance works on a number of key axis, like Miti-Hombo.

Road rehabilitation works continued during this Quarter on the Nyabiondo – Kashebere (NK), Burhale-Mwenga (SK) and Fizi-Minembwe (SK) roads, all leading into key areas for security and humanitarian access. A notable achievement during the fourth quarter is the before-mentioned completion of the Miti-Hombo road by launching Hombo Bridge (see p. 27).

Works also continued on what is perhaps the most difficult priority axis of the ISSSS, Burhale-Shabunda. The 304 km road has been opened but due to bad weather several stretches are very difficult to pass. UNOPS will be supporting Office des Routes on the particularly difficult Burhale-Isezia stretch. The South Kivu Brigade has agreed to provide escorts to UNOPS where possible to improve the M&E of their contractors.

Maintenance of the roads remains an issue though. Although FONER takes over to maintain roads wherever possible, the hand-over process isn't exactly formalized yet and maintenance is often sporadic and delayed. FONER isn't yet established in Ituri either. Negotiations regarding the MoU between UNOPS, FONER and Office des Routes are still ongoing: once signed, OdR and FONER will take over the maintenance of the ISSSS-rehabilitated axes as a standard measure.

The Sake-Masisi road condition is rapidly deteriorating, due to bad weather conditions and the lack of maintenance. Regarding the north-west Masisi, insecurity causes important delays in the finalization of the planned road rehabilitation towards Walikale.



Police & community security

On a positive note, the recent joint GoDRC-MONUSCO assessment for MONUSCO's drawdown showed that territories benefiting from ISSSS assistance have seen an increase in police representation and professionalism compared to other territories, and are more regularly paid. The middle-to longer-term impact on community security is yet to be assessed though.

Total PNC capacity under the ISSSS is now 80 facilities (out of 93 planned) and 856 elements trained (representing 58% of the total planned): the latter represents almost 60% of the total planned with current funding.

This Quarter, major developments included:

- (a) The completion of ten new infrastructures for the PNC in Ituri by IOM (see vignette pg. X);
- (b) UNOPS finalized the PNC Training Center in Mugunga, North Kivu; initially destined to initiate training the 3,000 integrated elements.



Criminal justice system

Rehabilitation of the civilian justice infrastructures progressed during quarter 4:

- (a) Two prisons have been completed in Rutshuru and Bunyakiri, the latter being finalized during Quarter 4. Works are ongoing on the Masisi and Fizi Prisons, and the Ministry of Justice has finally endorsed the plan for the additional annex to Goma prison (separation between civilian and military inmates). However, at the time of writing only one prison (Rutshuru) is actually occupied and as of yet none of the prison staff has been officially registered (*matricule*) or has received training.
- (b) All the four *Tribunaux de Paix* are completed, though some improvement works are ongoing in Shabunda and Fizi. As noted though, no magistrates have been deployed to the Tripaix yet.



Core administrative services

This quarter, 100% of the planned training was completed; rate of deployment of required personnel to staff the ISSSS-buildings is at 135%.

Progress was made on training and deployment of civilian servants. To date, UNDP has trained 406 state employees already deployed in the East and 55 traditional leaders. In addition to the basic training, 194 of the local officials received a specialized training in public finances, planning, and management. This represents an increase of 66 civil servants since quarter 3. Twelve experts have been deployed to North and South Kivu, and Ituri to mentor local authorities.

As to the hardware, three additional administrative buildings have been finalized during quarter 4, all located in sensitive areas in southern South Kivu: Fizi, Mwenga and Minembwe (SK). Works are still ongoing for administration buildings in Shabunda, Itebero and Biruwe (NK).

However, the problems noted earlier with payment of salaries and the aging of the civil servants' corps are very serious impediments to the increased effectiveness of state services.



Governance of natural resources

Four out of five mining Trading Centers (*Centres de Négoce*) are completed to date in Ndjingala, Rubaya, Itebero and Mugogo. However, none is operational, as the Ministry of Mines did not yet validate the results of the "qualification" assessment made by the Gouvernement, MONUSCO/JMAC and the German Federal Institute for GeoScience and Natural Resources (BGR). The assessment aimed at verifying the conformity of artisanal mines operational on a 60 km radius of the CdNs.

Funding for an additional Trading Center to be located in Numbi (SK), has been approved during Quarter 4.

Rehabilitation of the Hombo Bridge

The launching of the 30 meters- long Accrow Bridge in Hombo, spanning the river between South-and North Kivu signaled the completion of the infrastructure works on the ISSSS's key Miti-Hombo axis. The launching of the bridge was a good example of coordination between the MONUSCO Force, UNOPS and Office des Routes. UNOPS provided the bridge and the expertise; Office des Routes provided the crane and materials; and the Uruguyan contingent (UEC) provided the manpower to successfully launch the bridge.



Uruguyan Engineering Company at work preparing the launching of the bridge

The completion of the Miti-Hombo road effectively means an end to over 25 years of practical isolation for the town of Hombo.

Road rehabilitation works by UEC continue on the axis though, extending Miti-Hombo into North Kivu, towards Walikale, a total of 85 kms from Hombo. As Walikale connects to the long road to Kisangani, and by the Congo River to Kinshasa, the completion of the Walikale axis should be opened up the east for commercial traffic from to the west. The GoDRC has been an unwavering supporter of this work.



SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS

RETURN, REINTEGRATION & RECOVERY

Component objective: Support the secure return and durable socio-economic reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees in their place of origin, and contribute to local economic recovery.


Underneath the overall objective, the Integrated Programme Framework (January 2010) and a Program Concept Note (July 2010) define three supporting outcomes:

- Prevention and mitigation of local conflicts;
 - Restoration of basic social services;
- Economic recovery, with focus on agriculture.

3.4 Return, reintegration & recovery

Project funds

(millions USD)



Support from MONUSCO:

- Technical advisory: Civil Affairs maps local conflicts in partnership with other actors working under the Conflict Management outcome.

Assessment for Quarter 4

In the fourth quarter, encouraging progress was noticed in returns of IDPs to **Province Orientale**, primarily due to the departure of a substantive number of LRA elements. Provisional OCHA figures state that 17,000 returnees were registered over the last 18 months, mainly in the Bas and Haut Uélés.

The situation is bleaker in the Kivus though, due to persisting swathes of insecurity that prevented the return of refugees and created new population movements. In **North Kivu**, no major return movements were noted in the ISSSS areas during the quarter under review. FARDC unilateral operations against the FDLR and clashes between armed groups caused an increase in population movements, mainly in Walikale.

In **South Kivu** there were large population movements earlier in the fourth quarter around the Ubwari peninsula and Sebele, due to continuing clashes between the FARDC and the Mayi Mayi Yakutumba. Following the withdrawal of Yakutumba from the peninsula and the re-deployment of a MONUSCO base in the area, some 21,000 people reportedly returned to their homes. At the end of the year, very serious population displacements started in Shabunda territory, especially in the Kigulube-Nzovu area due to FDLR-attacks on civilians and reprisals by the FARDC and Mayi

Mayi Raia Mutumboki.

Inter-community tensions increased in various areas, sometimes motivated by politicians who played the 'ethnic card' to garner votes (*see Component 2: Political Processes*). In Masisi (NK), there were clashes between the Hunde and the Tutsi populations. In Fizi and Kalehe, Yakutumba proved very apt at portraying FARDC actions against his movement as 'aggression by Rwandophones'. Tensions in the *Hauts Plateaux* also rose in the wake of the brutal killing of seemingly 'Rwandophone' staff members of the NGO Ebenezer in October. In addition, in Kalehe, tensions around land conflict arose between local populations and recent returnees from Rwanda.

Regarding **economic recovery**, a recent study carried in DRC's Eastern provinces, noted a slight improvement in the food security situation for North Kivu households. There was a particular increase of agricultural activities in areas that have been more or less stabilized, even where there was an increase in returnees, such as the *Grand Nord*. Predictably, the reverse is true for areas that experience insecurity: food security has notably gone down in South Kivu due to clashes in the *Hauts Plateaux*.

The upcoming situation assessment covering the last semester of 2011, will collect data related to assessment of the basic services, economic recovery and conflict mitigation and hopefully provide a more balanced picture of progress or reversals in the ISSSS-areas.

How has the ISSSS contributed?

ISSSS' contribution to the RRR continued in areas where the security situation permitted and focused mainly on mediation in local conflicts.

This was evidenced in South Kivu by the launching of UN-Habitat's land conflict management- and reconciliation program. The same project's activities were implemented in a slower pace in North Kivu due to ethnic tensions. Finally, USAID confirmed it's funding this quarter for a joint Care, International Alert and FAO-project on conflict mediation and improving livelihoods.

School rehabilitated in Sange (NK) as part of Community Projects (MSI), funded by USAID





Promoting Stabilization and Community Reintegration

The project was started in October 2009 and was finalized in November 2011. Implemented by MSI and with the collaboration of International Alert and five local NGOs, its main target beneficiaries were 30 local communities identified in North and South Kivu.

The project takes a two-folded approach to local conflicts, combining activities in support of local conflict mediation and settlement, and promoting the development and implementation of reintegration community projects. While the first initiative was to train the seven pilot *Comités Locaux Permanents de Reconciliation (CLPC)*, the second was the creation of local development committees and their subsequent development and implementation of community projects.

In addition, the community projects were identified, developed and implemented by the local development committees (CLD), whose members were elected by the local community. A first project was implemented as a “testing exercise”, and the CLDs were expected to provide to their communities a transparent feedback. Pending their success in implementing the project, they were embedded with a more important project.

The outputs achieved are underlined in the Scorecard. Lessons learnt from the project implementation concluded that:

- Involving local communities in all the project cycles are essential, including in the prioritization of needs and managing the projects; adequate training and mentoring should be provided during the implementation.
- The mentoring and continuous presence of field trainers and facilitators has proven to be efficient in promoting local ownership of the project.
- The “accountability meetings” set for each community are useful in ensuring transparency and demoting those members of the CLD who had not satisfied these criteria.
- It is crucial to link this type of project and the local structures created to the general framework of the decentralization and local governance.
- Beneficiaries’ identification should not be based on their stigmatization; instead, local communities which include marginalized groups should be targeted as a whole.
- As it includes a local dynamic of confidence and capacity building in the “management committees”, adequate time has to be given to the implementation of this type of project to achieve successful outcomes.

Scorecard for ISSSS outcomes

■ Good progress

◆ Uneven

✘ Reversal

◆ **Conflicts are prevented and resolved**

The project in support of “Promoting Stabilization and Community Reintegration” (PSCRIP), implemented by **MSI** and funded by **USAID**, came to an end in November 2011. The project’s main outputs are the resolution of 75 % of the 671 land conflict cases handled by the 22 local peace committees created by the project. In addition, the project supported the initial training of the UNHCR-established CLPCs in North Kivu, and the standardization of the peace consolidation manuals destined to local peace committees in NK and SK

Also, an important step has been achieved by **UNHABITAT** in supporting the establishment of a new Mediation and Dialogue Committee in Kalehe territory (SK), following the provincial conflicts mapping carried during Quarter 3.

Due to the unstable security situation surrounding the elections, activities under this sub-component have been limited to the organization of several workshops on conflict mitigation in Rutshuru, Masisi (NK) and Kalehe (SK).

◆ **Basic social services are restored**

The above-mention MSI project supported 30 local communities in NK and SK, by creating and training 29 local development committees in NK and SK. These structures have afterwards successfully developed, implemented and finalized some 53 community projects in NK and SK (mainly in the health and education areas).

◆ **Agricultural & economic recovery in return areas**

UNDP's project for **bio-economy** unfolded during this Quarter: five bio-digesters have been finalized in South Kivu, and the cattle has been bought and placed in dedicated cowsheds. The latter have been designed and constructed so as to facilitate the production of the biogas and the collection of the organic fertilizer. In October, the Minister of Environment launched the "Environment and Climate Change Network", which will support exchanges on this type of project within the DRC. It is to be noted that this pilot-initiative is promoting the South-South capacity building, as the Ethiopian-based experts, regularly visit and mentor the SK beneficiaries.


As to the joint venture FAO-UNDP in support of returnees in Maniema, this quarter, 15 agronomists have been deployed to assist the targeted beneficiaries. Mapping of the project site was finalized, and identified some 5,500 households that will benefit from the new and diversified agricultural production. In addition, the local community dynamics have been assessed and needs for restructuring identified.

SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS

FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Component objective: Ensure a coordinated response of all those involved in combating sexual violence, in the implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence, with a view to fight impunity, and improve prevention and response.

3.5 Fight sexual violence³



Coordination & overall assessment

In November, the Sexual Violence Unit and the Ministry of Gender organized a workshop to outline the results achieved in the implementation of the National Strategy on the fight against SV in the DRC, identify the upcoming priorities and establish a monitoring and evaluation system.

The SVU contributed to mobilizing funds for the renewal of PNC's mandate for an additional five months in Luvungi, which had been deployed after the mass rapes in Walikale in 2010 to secure the area. In addition, the trial for mass rapes and other serious human rights violations committed along the Kibua-Mpofi road, in Walikale territory in NK in 2010 started on 6 December 2011.

Progress by sub-component⁴

Fight against impunity

During this quarter, the legal aid shops in SK and IT provided legal advice to 210 victims of SGBV, of which 59 were brought to court. Of these, 22 cases benefitted from a trial, and 21 were convicted. Concerns persist however regarding the performance of most judicial decisions.

The newly designed software to process court statistics has been delivered to legal personnel users, in November 2011, subsequent to the delivery of IT equipment. Judicial authorities, criminal courts and prisons clerks and secretaries in Bukavu, Bunia and Uvira, were trained on the utilization of this software

³ Input provided by Fight against Sexual Violence - MONUSCO Coordination Unit

⁴ NB. This section covers only projects funded under the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility.

Prevention and Protection

To improve the ability to measure impact on the targeted communities, the protection and prevention components started a process of defining baselines for the population perception of SGBV, to be implemented as of January 2012.

During this quarter, 62 community networks and community alert networks in Masisi, Kashebere, Nyabiondo, Kibua and Mpofi were revitalized and on their role, and on monitoring of risks and prevention of sexual violence. With a view to reducing youth vulnerability, three youth centers for socio-cultural activities were equipped in Masisi, Kashebere and Kibua centers for socio-cultural activities.

In addition, a total of 172 community, local leaders and leaders of the civil society were trained on the 2006 law on techniques of prevention and protection of sexual violence. Thanks to the established systems more than 25 survivors of sexual violence were identified and referred to assistance structures.

Multi sectorial assistance

Activities have focused on improving the access of survivors of sexual violence to quality support systems and capacity building of staff to deliver services to survivors of SGBV. The national MSA protocols on medical, psychosocial and reintegration assistance were officially adopted during this quarter.

In **North Kivu**, the MSA programs under the 2nd allocation of SRFF, providing medical, psychosocial, reintegration assistance in Lubero, Rusthuru and Masisi were launched in November 2011. Training continued during this quarter: (a) 182 participants were trained in collection of criteria of vulnerability with regard to socio-economic reintegration, and (b) 306 social assistants from NGOs, community networks and community leaders were trained in psychosocial care and socio economic reintegration for survivors. In addition, a total of Five listening centers (*centre d'ecoute*) were rehabilitated in Nyabiondo, Kashebere, Kibua, Musienene, and Luofu, and 58 service providers were trained in clinical care, counseling and referral.

In **South Kivu**, training this quarter focused on Police officers and MONUSCO Liaison Assistants (54 trainees), and to health personnel (248 medical and psychosocial workers). In addition, a workshop on strategic communication on the fight against SGBV took place in Bukavu, and was oriented towards campaigning and developing key messages.

In **Ituri**, 350 community leaders were trained in the referral of survivors to the support structures.

Reported cases of sexual violence and assistance provided during this quarter are as follow:

Prov.	Reported cases of SV	Medical assistance	Socio economic	Referred to courts	Psychosoci al care
NK	1539	1105	477	67	1403
SK	2129	N/A	1456	22	
IT	465	339	159	N/A	N/A



Fight against sexual and gender based violence in Ituri through the reinforcement of the Congolese National Police

This project is funded by the US Department of State to reinforce the fight against sexual violence, and implemented by IOM. Its main goal was reinforcing the PNC's capacities to fight against SGBV through train and equip activities.

SGBV TRAINING:

- 20 OPJ have been trained as PNC trainers and 19 have been awarded. The best four trainees have been chosen as trainers for the training of PNC specialists.
- 155 OPJ have been trained as SGBV specialists and 129 have been awarded. All specialists have already been deployed in the five territories of Ituri (104 Irumu; 23 Djugu; 23 Mahagi; 32 Aru; 8 Mambasa).
- 277 policemen have attended 3 days training in the field (Bunia, Komanda, Irumu, Mongwalu). The awareness was conducted by PNC trainers under the supervision of UNPOL with the support of IOM.

OPERATIONAL REINFORCEMENT of the PNC :

- The training center of Bunia has been extended for a total capacity of 150 trainees; the Etat Major of Bunia has been extended with an SGBV section of 6 additional offices
- 3 police offices and 5 police sub offices have been constructed and equipped.
- The PNC personnel have been equipped with 160 radio handset, 5 vehicles, 120 motorcycles, laptop, printers, solar panel system, generator, riot control equipment, boreholes.

COORDINATION

- Technical Monitoring Committee has been created for the monitoring of the activities.
- Standard tools have been realised and approved by competent national authorities.
- 2 weekly coordination meetings have been organised with PNC and UNPOL counterparts.
- 1 national consultant in charge of the overall coordination of SGBV interventions in Ituri have been hired.

PROXIMITY

- 10 organizations created, composed of vulnerable women and police wives working together in 10 community projects.
- A PNC clinic in Bunia has been equipped and is treating police and civil population.
- Boreholes have been drilled nearby the police stations in order to increase protection on vulnerable fetching water.



PLANNING,
COORDINATION
& OUTLOOK 2012

4

Planning and Coordination

Policy & strategy

During Quarter 4, the major achievement was the renewal of the STAREC Programme: under Presidential Ordinance 11/109 which provides the legal foundation for the STAREC. The program was extended for an additional 36 months, i.e. until 30 June 2011.

This renewal was initiated by the central authorities and allows for an increased synergy between the STAREC and the ISSSS. Coordination structures remain unchanged.

The Stabilisation Priority Plan for 2012-2014 was finalized and lessons learnt from the first phase of implementation of the Integrated Programme Framework have been integrated. In addition, the reprioritization of activities within the stabilization agenda has taken into account several recommendations made by policy groups and external experts having assessed the ISSSS.

Planning context of the ISSSS

In 2011, the Government of DRC has finalized and launched the second generation of its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which outlines the strategic priorities for the period 2011-2015. Priorities identified by the PRSP include the following objectives i) improve governance and peace, ii) diversify the economy, accelerate growth and promote employment, iii) improve access to basic social services and strengthen human capital, iv) protect the environment and combat climate change.

It is in this context that MONUSCO and the UN Country Team jointly developed two strategic frameworks: the United Nations Transition Framework (UNTF) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

The UNTF 2011-2013, which is an internal UN document, describes the shared understanding of the country context and defines the shared goals for United Nations in DRC. The main components of the UNTF are based on the following existing strategies which have been discussed with governments and donors: i) UN System-wide strategy for the protection of civilians; ii) **The International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy to Eastern DRC**; iii) the Peace Consolidation Program (under development); iv) Strategy for the fight against Sexual and gender based violence; and, v) Multi-year Joint Justice Support Program.

The UNDAF 2013-2017 outlines the critical development priorities that the UN System is engaged to promote during the coming five years. UNDAF results are closely aligned with priorities set in the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper. The final UNDAF document is expected to be approved by both the UN and the government during the first quarter of 2012.

At programmatic level, the UN and the World Bank have facilitated the design of a

peace consolidation program for areas not currently covered by the STAREC/ISSSS. Once the PCP is approved and launched, it will promote complementarities with the ISSSS for sustainable peace in all the regions of the DRC.

Programme coordination

The organization of national elections has seriously affected the organization of joint coordination structures.

At provincial level, only one Joint Technical Committees with the Provincial Government could be held in North Kivu, due to electoral commitments of the provincial government. Technical sub-commissions met however on more frequent basis, due to technical character of participants.

At the national level, no meeting for the *Comité de Suivi* was organized, given the electoral process.

5 Outlook for 2012

Policy & strategy

With the renewal of the STAREC Ordinance, efforts this first Quarter 2012 will be concentrated on revitalizing the coordination structures already established, and improving the decisional paths. The political conjuncture for the first quarter 2012 will have an important impact on ISSSS coordination structures and their functioning. At the time of writing of this report, the challenge in Government's support to ISSSS steering and coordination had changed: the signature of the STAREC Presidential Ordinance for an additional three years now provides the necessary legal regulator framework; however, the elections blocked all joint coordination structures that were previously effective.

As indicated earlier in this report, the component in support of the political processes will be completely reshaped.

First, as a cross-cutting issue impacting on all ISSSS' components, it will be important to encourage GoDRC's commitment to longer-term reforms, including by providing technical assistance to the STAREC inter-provincial team. If coordination and policy were every year suspended at the end of the STAREC Presidential Ordinance, the signature of the three-year extension provides a longer-term platform for exchange and support.

Also, elections have highlighted, and in some cases, exacerbated, divisions and tensions amongst the local population in the ISSSS-areas. While IPF's forth component will continue providing the framework for the social well-being and economic recovery activities, the political component will define mechanisms to support the social reconstruction - by promoting intra and inter-group dialogue &

reconciliation initiatives.

These aspects have to be backed by a transparent debate at the policy and strategic level on what is perceived as stabilisation by the different ISSSS Partners, the donors, the GoDRC and MONUSCO. A common strategic agenda and clear policy will facilitate the promotion of an integrated approach. As a step forward, the Swiss Government has decided to second an expert who will be reviewing ISSSS' political strategy as well as the specific "Political Processes" component. This also follows the recommendation expressed in the recent policy paper issued by Oxford's "Refugee Studies Center".

Stabilization Priority Plan 2012 – 2014 (SPP)

Funding of new programmes identified as priorities in the SPP, marked the opening of the second phase of the stabilization activities.


Key lessons learned and recommendations from the first phase implementation included:

- Integration and coordination of all actors in achieving the set objectives is essential.
- Activities have to be addressed and developed in view of their sustainability, and in consistency with adequate staffing.
- GoDRC ownership can be improved and achieved if funds are channeled through the SRFF, which is the only mechanism where provincial and central governments are fully integrated in the decision-making.
- GoDRC's commitment in providing adequate resources to ISSSS/STAREC programmes has to be reflected in each intervention.
- The SPP articulated stabilization activities around a holistic, sectorial approach.
- The STAREC and ISSSS Technical Secretariat should be kept updated on the progress and the use of funds for their projects by submitting quarterly reports on time.
- The SPP extends priority programming in North Kivu along the Masisi-Walikale, and Hombo-Walikale axes.
- Conflict resolution is mainstreamed in all fourth component's programming, including the creation of linkages between targeted community and local and provincial authorities.









A1 Key ISSSS outputs

This is a cross-section of outputs for the ISSSS. Numbers are based on the most current data available from implementing partners, and are updated as they are verified at the field level.

1. Security

Key outcome area	Core outputs	Delivered	Pipeline
FARDC capacity	 Garrisons (# battalions)	6	0
	-- Training (# battalions)	0	0
Residual combatants	D Demobilized	4,898	4,000
	D R Community reintegration	2,605	2,500

3. Restoration of state authority

Key outcome area	Infrastructure		Trained officials	
	Completed	Pipeline	In place	Pipeline
Roads	 460 km	338 km	 0	TBD
Police	 81	13	 857	680
Civil administration	 19	9	 195	305
Penal chain	 6	5	 0	307

Note: "Trained officials" are new deployments or existing personnel that have been trained to the minimum standards defined by the technical lead. "Pipeline" work is funded, agreed with Government partners and in course of implementation.

4. Return, reintegration and recovery

Key outcome areas	
Beneficiaries (Income generating projects)	6800 households
Land mediation structures	22 structures 7 CLPC
Health centers	30
Education / classrooms	260
Education/school kits	8230 kits
Education/trained teachers	881
WatSan	134 water sources/points

A2

Multi-donor trust funds

As at 01 January 2012, the breakdown of ISSSS funding by source is as follows:

273.02 m



Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility

	Deposited to SRFF	Allocated to CTCs	Approved projects	Spent
Total	16.77	9.2	5.96	4,53
Change Q4	0	0	+ 5,96	+1.2

Peacebuilding Fund

	Allocated to DRC	Approved for projects	Spent
Total	20.0	17.9	11.4
Change Q4	--	--	+3.1

A3 Project inventory

All amounts are in millions of US dollars.

Locations: NK North Kivu SK South Kivu MN Maniema
IT Ituri OR Orientale REG Regional

Quarterly updates for each project are available from the Stabilization Support Unit and will be published on the ISSSS website.

	Project title	Op'n partners	Funding for 2010-13								Implementation period	
			Total		By donor			By location			Start	Finish
			USD	Spent	Donor	USD	Spent	Where	USD	Spent		
1, SECURITY			51,26	38,50		51,26	38,52		51,26	37,81		
SEC/1	Support for garrisoning (post-brassage)	IOM UNDP	23,94	24,59	UK UNDP Neth'ds	12,26 0,95 10,73	12,26 0,95 11,38	NK SK IT	1,89 16,39 5,66	1,89 17,05 5,66	Jan-06	Aug-11
SEC/3	Support for DDRRR of FDLR combatants	UNDP	0,14	0,14	UK	0,14	0,14	REG	0,14	0,14	Sep-08	Sep-09
SEC/4	Construction of regroupement centers	IOM	1,08	1,08	UK	1,08	1,08	SK	1,08	1,08	May-09	Mar-10
SEC/5	Rehabilitation of Lukusa FARDC training center	IOM	1,51	1,51	UK Canada	0,62 0,89	0,62 0,89	OR	1,51	1,51	Sep-10	Jul-11
SEC/6	Long-term sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants	UNDP	15,77	7,42	UNDP UNDP France PBF	5,16 1,74 0,46 4,41	2,31 1,74 0,46 2,91	NK SK MN IT	4,94 4,94 4,18 0,61	2,82 1,54 1,5 0,23	Feb-10	May-12

					USA	4	0	REG	1,1	0,64		
SEC/8	Military justice: Prosecution Support Cells	IOM	3,67	0,56	Canada PBF	2,71 0,96	0,06 0,5	NK SK MN KT OR	0,74 0,74 0,73 0,73 0,73	0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11	Dec-10	Nov-12
SEC/9	(DD)R of residual elements of armed groups, NK/SK	UNDP	1,10	0,08	PBF MONUSCO	0,65 0,45	0,1 0	NK SK	0,55 0,55	0,08 0	Dec-10	Dec-11
SEC/2	Trust fund for MONUSCO logistical support	MONUSCO	4,05	3,12	Neth'ds	4,05	3,12	REG	4,05	3,12	Dec-08	Jun-11
2, POLITICAL			1,60	1,60		1,6	1,6		1,6	1,6		
POL/1	Support for treatment of war-wounded combatants	UNDP	0,47	0,47	PBF Partners	0,23 0,24	0,23 0,24	NK	0,47	0,47	Mar-10	Sep-10
POL/2	Establishment of STAREC and ISSSS coordination structures	UNDP	1,13	1,13	PBF	1,13	1,13	REG	1,13	1,13	Mar-10	Jun-11
3, STATE AUTHORITY			91,61	74,48		86,61	74,48		86,61	74,48		
RSA/1	Road rehabilitation and maintenance	UNOPS MONUSCO	29,08	25,33	Neth'ds Sweden UK UK UK USA Belgium	7,59 5,06 6,98 3,03 1 1 4,42	7,59 5,06 6,93 0 1 1 3,74	NK SK IT	7,24 18,22 3,62	7,41 14,22 3,7	Apr-08	Mar-12
RSA/2	Support for state infrastructures (police, justice, admin, prisons)	UNOPS	19,06	19,05	Neth'ds USA	14,88 4	14,88 4	NK SK	8,88 8,87	8,88 8,87	Apr-08	Nov-11

					PNUD	0,18	0,18	IT	1,3	1,3		
RSA/3	Establishment and deployment of border police in Kivus and Ituri	IOM	8,44	7,14	USA USA USA UK Japan	1,44 1,62 2,1 0,28 3	1,44 1,62 0,8 0,28 3	NK SK IT	1,98 3,4 3,06	1,5 2,64 3	Jan-09	Mar-03
RSA/4	Equipment of police commissariats	GTZ	0,50	0,50	Germany	0,5	0,5	NK SK	0,27 0,23	0,27 0,23	Apr-10	Sep-11
RSA/5	Rehabilitation of route Fizi-Minembwe-Baraka	ACTED	4,20	4,20	EC	4,2	4,2	SK	4,2	4,2	Jan-09	Oct-10
RSA/6	Deployment of PIR in areas of disengagement	IOM	1,88	1,88	Germany	1,88	1,88	NK SK	0,75 1,13	0,75 1,13	May-09	Mar-10
RSA/7	Construction of police housing NK and SK	UNOPS IOM	3,19	3,19	Sweden	3,19	3,19	NK SK	2 1,19	1,95 1,24	Oct-08	Jun-11
RSA/8	Establishment of 5 Mining Trade Centers	IOM	1,44	1,41	PBF Canada UK	0,5 0,49 0,45	0,5 0,48 0,43	NK SK	0,72 0,72	0,71 0,7	Feb-10	Dec-11
RSA/9	Selection, training and deployment of civil administration	UNDP UNOPS	1,50	0,56	PBF	1,5	0,56	NK SK IT	0,69 0,69 0,13	0,25 0,25 0,06	Jul-10	Dec-11
RSA/10	Support to integration of former armed groups into PNC	UNOPS	3,07	2,28	PBF Canada	2,19 0,88	1,79 0,49	NK	3,07	2,28	Jul-10	Mar-12

RSA/11	Funding facility for urgent road rehabilitation needs	UNOPS	2,30	1,36	PBF USA	1,3 1	1,01 0,35	REG	2,3	1,36	Dec-10	Dec-11
RSA/12	Civilian justice: reinforcement of penal chain	UNDP	4,27	1,05	Canada PBF	2,6 1,67	0,7 0,35	NK SK	3,64 0,63	0,52 0,53	Dec-10	Dec-11
RSA/13	Reinforcement of police capacity in fight against SV	IOM	2,98	2,45	USA	2,98	2,45	IT	2,98	2,45	Jul-10	Jan-12
RSA/14	Programme de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG)	DAI	2,00	2,00	USA	2	2	SK MN REG	0,8 0,8 0,4	0,8 0,8 0,4	Sep-09	Mar-11
	Trust fund for MONUSCO logistical support	MONUSCO	2,70	2,08	Neth'ds	2,7	2,08	REG	2,7	2,08	Dec-08	Jun-11
RSA/15	Training of Mining Police	IOM	3,00									
RSA/15	Improving access to mining areas	IOM	2,00									
4, RETURN, RECOVERY, REINTEGRATION			91,14	54,47		91,14	54,47		91,14	54,47		
RRR/2	Return / reintegration of IDPs (UNICEF Pear Plus Programme)	UNICEF	17,97	17,97	UNICEF (NC France)	4,04	4,04	NK	3,02	3,02	Sep-08	May-11
					USA	2,58	2,58	SK	4,01	4,01		
					Neth'ds	3,5	3,5	IT	4,66	4,66		
					Sweden	6,05	6,05	REG	6,29	6,29		
					Spain	1,12	1,12					
UNICEF (NC Sweden)	0,23	0,23										
Japan	0,45	0,45										
RRR/3	Land programme for reintegration and community recovery in eastern DRC	HABITAT	7,38	2,96	PBF	0,92	0,78	NK	3,32	2,12	Mar-09	Dec-12
					USA	4,7	0,9	SK	1,48	0,07		
					Canada	1,45	0,97	IT	1,84	0,74		
					UNHCR	0,31	0,31	REG	0,74	0,02		

RRR/4	Programme on return and community reintegration SK	UNICEF FAO UNDP	11,20	11,20	Neth'ds	11,2	11,2	SK	11,2	11,2	Mar-09	Mar-11
RRR/5	Program for stabilization and reduction of conflicts in North Kivu	UNDP FAO UNICEF	6,35	2,50	Spain UNDP FAO UNICEF	4 1,5 0,25 0,6	1,92 0,18 0 0	NK	6,35	2,11	Jun-09	Mars 12
RRR/6	Community reintegration and recovery programme	UNDP FAO	0,62	0,1	UNDP	0,62	0,22	MN	0,62	0,22	Sep-09	Feb-12
RRR/7	Promotion of stabilisation & community reintegration	MSI	9,57	9,57	USA	9,57	9,57	NK SK	4,97 4,6	4,97 4,6	Oct-09	Nov-11
RRR/8	CEPI (Community Empowerment and Peacebuilding in Ituri)	UNDP UNICEF UNHCR FAO	5,02	5,02	TFHS	5,02	4,56	IT	5,02	4,56	Jan-09	Dec-11
RRR/9	Structures for pacification and conflict resolution in NK	UNHCR HABITAT WFP UNOPS	4,86	4,22	PBF UNHCR GoDRC WFP	2,65 2,12 0,07 0,02	1,95 1,83 0 0	NK	4,86	3,77	Aug-10	Dec-11
RRR/10	Integrated bio-economy initiative	UNDP	1,27	0,58	PBF GoDRC UNDP	0,77 0,25 0,25	0,33 0 0,25	SK	1,27	0,58	Jul-11	Jul-12

RRR/11	Recovery and economic revival in Maniema	UNDP FAO	4,39	0,22	SRFF UNDP	3,99 0,4	0,22 0	MN	4,39	0	Jul-11	Dec-12
RRR/12	Pilot project for community security	UNDP	2,51	2,2	UNDP	2,51	1,53	IT	2,51	1,53	Jun-10	Dec-11
RRR/13	Community recovery and livelihoods	CARE, Int'l Alert, FAO,	20,00									
5, SEXUAL VIOLENCE			37,41	14,55		37,41	14,42		31,45	14,01		
CSV/1	Reinforcement of GoDRC capacity to fight against impunity	UNOPS	0,93	0,70	SRFF	0,93	0,57	REG	0,93	0,57	Dec-10	Jun-12
CSV/2	Protection and prevention	UNHCR	0,76	0,76	SRFF	0,76	0,76	IT SK	0,21 0,55	0,21 0,55	Jun-10	Sep-11
CSV/3	Support to FARDC for reduction of SV	UNFPA	0,79	0,25	SRFF	0,79	0,25	REG	0,79	0,25	Jul-10	Dec-11
CSV/4	Extend and improve accessibility of services	UNICEF UNFPA	2,26	2,26	SRFF	2,26	2,26	REG IT SK	0,23 0,79 1,24	0,23 0,79 1,24	Jul-10	Jul-11
CSV/5	Support for data and mapping on SV	UNFPA MONUSCO	0,56	0,56	SRFF UNFPA	0,5 0,06	0,5 0,06	IT SK REG	0,23 0,18 0,16	0,23 0,18 0,16	Jul-10	Dec-11
CSV/6	Ending Sexual Violence by Promoting Opportunities and Individual Rights	IRC	7,00	4,04	USA	7	4,04	REG SK NK	3,75 1,84 1,42	1,73 1,55 0,76	Sep-09	Sep-12
CSV/7	Prevention of and Protection Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence using Behavior Change Communication in	IMC	2,08	0,27	USA	2,08	0,27	REG	2,08	0,27	Sep-10	Sep-15

	DRC											
CSV/8	Care, Access, Safety & Empowerment (CASE) Program in Eastern Congo	IMC	2,45	0,92	USA	2,45	0,92	REG	2,45	0,92	Jul-10	Jul-15
CSV/9	Ushindi: Overcoming Sexual and Gender Based Violence	IMA	8,05	1,10	USA	8,05	1,1	NK SK MN IT	2,68 2,68 1,79 0,89	0,12 0,37 0,37 0,24	Jul-10	Jul-15
CSV/10	Psychosocial Support and Reintegration of survivors of Sexual and Gender-based Violence	COOPI	4,95	3,10	USA	4,95	3,1	IT MN	2,58 2,36	1,91 1,18	Dec-08	Dec-11
CSV/11	Security, autonomy and socio-economic reintegration for women (PSAR)	UNDP	1,62	1,08	UNDP	1,62	0,59	NK SK	0,69 0,93	0,35 0,24	Oct-09	Dec-12
CSV - SRFF II	SRFF II - New allocation List of projects available on demand	Various	5.96		SRFF II						Nov-12	Nov-13

About the Quarterly Report

The ISSSS Quarterly Report is prepared by the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU), based in the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC in the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

The Report is based on data provided by implementing partners, and covers **aligned projects**. This means projects which:

- (i) support the substantive objectives of the STAREC / ISSSS;
- (ii) are coordinated through the Government-led STAREC structures; and
- (iii) provide updated substantive and financial data each quarter.

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