Review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations

In conducting the review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations, DPPA and DPO took into account the extensive record of reviews and reforms previously undertaken with respect to peace operations, and the key lessons and recommendations presented in these reports. A list of reforms and reviews appears below, starting with the Brahimi report in 2,000. Reports were considered that addressed various general aspects and challenges across different forms of peace operations. Country-, mission- or region-specific reports are not listed.

While each major review or reform initiative was principally shaped by the pressing challenges of their time, the successive reforms and reviews have built on past recommendations in areas such as mandating, collaboration and division of labor with UN system partners, the need for adaptable administrative frameworks to mobilize capacities flexibly, and effective partnerships with host states, troop- and police-contributing countries, and external actors such as regional organizations.

Successive review processes have focused on and enabled the United Nations to strengthen institutional frameworks supporting peace operations. Overall, the track record of reform initiatives demonstrates that change and adaptation have been defining features, and often strengths, of United Nations peace operations, enabling them to respond to evolving conflict dynamics, operational challenges, and expectations from the Security Council and Member States.

Both peace operations and the Headquarters structures that plan, manage, and support them have evolved over time based on lessons learned and in response to shifting collective priorities. High-level reviews—mandated by the Security Council, General Assembly, or initiated by the Secretary-General—were often the basis for these changes, responding to evolving mandates, or at times to significant operational setbacks or performance shortcomings, including failures to protect civilians.

From the seminal Brahimi Report (2000) to the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO, 2015), as well as more targeted reviews or reform efforts, these processes diagnosed systemic, doctrinal, operational, and organizational gaps, and recommended corrective measures that sought to strengthening the effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability of peace operations.

Over time, several of these reviews and reform efforts led to significant changes in how peace operations are planned, deployed and managed; in the tasks entrusted to them; and in the capabilities and support systems required to deliver on increasingly complex mandates. While the majority of these reform efforts focused primarily on peacekeeping operations, a smaller number also addressed special political missions.

Adaptation through institutional learning

In parallel with formal review processes, organizational learning and field-driven innovation have played a critical role in shaping an incremental evolution of peace operations. Independent evaluations conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the Board of Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit, as well as self-evaluations initiated by peace operations and the Secretariat offices backstopping their work, have provided important insights to inform these processes. Over the past two decades, the Secretariat has also invested in a robust knowledge management system to systematically capture lessons from mission leadership and operational experience.

These range from major legacy studies from closed missions to the documentation of key lessons learned and good practices related to all aspects of mandate implementation. Contributions from civil society actors and academics have further informed policy change and operational effectiveness.

Each major review process on United Nations peace operations was shaped by the specific political and operational challenges of its time.

The Brahimi report responded to the failures and overstretch of the 1990s by calling for more credible, professional and capable peacekeeping. Through its detailed recommendations, it laid the foundation for the development of doctrine and training, strengthened logistics and mission support capacities, and improved force generation for military and police components.

The 2015 HIPPO report found that United Nations peace operations had “proven highly adaptable and contributed significantly to the successful resolution of conflicts and to a declining number of conflicts over two decades” while warning that changes in global conflict dynamics might now “be outpacing the ability of United Nations peace operations to respond”. The report reflected the growing complexity of multidimensional mandates and sought to re-anchor peace operations in the primacy of politics at a time when missions were increasingly expected to deliver technical or security solutions in the absence of sustained political processes.

It also called for people-centred peace operations, stronger engagement at the local level, and enhanced partnerships with regional organizations and across the United Nations system, particularly in the context of mission transitions.

More recently, the peacekeeping performance agenda and the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) have addressed the serious challenges that a number of missions faced, including the lack of effective peace processes, lack of consent from the parties, fragmented political support and, in some cases, direct attacks on a mission leading to unacceptably high casualty rates. The A4P initiative has spurred collective action to strengthen peacekeeping by all its stakeholders, including all Member States, the Security Council, the General Assembly, financial contributors, troop and police contributing countries, host countries, intergovernmental and regional organizations and the UN Secretariat.

The implementation strategies A4P+, and A4P Impact, have put a focus on key priorities and cross-cutting issues that are catalytic and enhance the impact of peacekeeping operations. While important progress has been made, implementation of many of these reforms remains ongoing.

Finally, a reform of the UN peace and security pillar was spearheaded by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and took effect in 2019. Its principal goals (per A/72/772) were to prioritize prevention and sustaining peace, to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, to make the peace and security pillar more coherent, nimble and effective through a single, integrated peace and security pillar with two closely linked departments, and to align the peace and security pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars to enable the Secretariat and the United Nations system as a whole to deliver on mandates more effectively and to work towards a comprehensive, integrated and coherent approach to sustaining peace, while respecting the distinct character of each of the pillars as separate areas of responsibility.

Early evidence of reform benefits was presented through a report of the Secretary-General in July 2020 (A/75/202) and pointed to increased effectiveness of the peace and security pillar and stronger whole-of-pillar coherence whilst acknowledging that “changes in practices, culture and processes will take time and will constitute an ongoing learning effort.”